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Abstract
In The Art of War, Sun Tzu begins by stating: “War is a matter of vital importance
to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that
it be thoroughly studied” (c500BC/1963, p. 63). Sun Tzu follows this opening by stating
five fundamental factors a commander must master to be successful in combat (Tzu,
c500BC/1963, p. 65). The first of these factors is moral influence which Sun Tzu defines
as “that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so they will
accompany them in life and death without fear of mortal peril” (Tzu, c500BC/1963,
p. 64). In the face of the instant communication provided by satellites, 24 hour news
media coverage, and other technological advances, this factor is even more relevant
today.
This research provides an analytic framework, based on the principles of fourth
generation operations, capturing the effects of will and resolve of the combatant and
population. The strategic level model investigates the long term impacts of asymmetric
conflict. These results are primarily measured in the socio-political arena rather than the
military battlefield. The model developed in this dissertation remains a model of conflict
and combat. However, some of the impacts from the political, economic, and
informational instruments of power are represented in the model through the dynamic
adaptation of public resolve and combat spirit. To paraphrase Sun Tzu, war is vitally
important and must be studied (Tzu, c500BC/1963, p. 63). Therefore, this dissertation
puts forth a means to model key aspects of conflict in the ‘long war.’
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MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF RESOLVE AND MORALE
FOR THE ‘LONG WAR’

I. Introduction
Background
In The Art of War, Sun Tzu states:
War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the
road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.
(c500BC/1963, p. 63)
Sun Tzu follows this opening by stating five fundamental factors a commander must
master to be successful in combat (Tzu, c500BC/1963, p. 65). The first of these factors is
moral influence which Sun Tzu defines as “that which causes the people to be in
harmony with their leaders, so they will accompany them in life and death without fear of
mortal peril” (Tzu, c500BC/1963, p. 64). In the face of the instant communication
provided by satellites, 24 hour news media coverage, and other technological advances,
this factor is even more relevant today.
Current combat models were developed in a time of strategic parity. They
generally focused on impacting the military and infrastructure. Such an approach was
acceptable when all combat models correlated to national survival of the combatants; i.e.
force on force attrition. Today, the US is the sole superpower and the conflicts it faces
are often asymmetrical. Combatants may not be nation-states and national survival may
not be perceived as being directly threatened. When national survival is attacked through
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conventional means, the military, as an instrument of power, is one of the most critical
elements of national power. Therefore, modeling a near peer as force on force was
sufficient for generating courses of action and comparative analyses of weapon systems.
The other instruments, diplomatic, informational, and economic, if considered in models
at all, were analysis functions. The exception to this practice could be found, in part, in
some models of military operations other than war (MOOTW).
Today’s conflicts involve a foe who is directly attacking our population’s and our
coalition partners’ will and support as their principle strategy. To paraphrase Sun Tzu,
war is vitally important and must be studied (Tzu, c500BC/1963, p. 63). Therefore, this
dissertation develops a framework to model key aspects of conflict in the “long war”
(QDR 2006, p. v).
Problem Statement
Clausewitz reminds the reader that war is a political tool and the political
goals must always be considered when developing military goals and objectives:
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true
political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on
with other means…The political objective is the goal, war is the means of
reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their
purpose. (Clausewitz, 1832/1984, p. 87)
Additionally, the political goal is the true objective and must be achieved regardless of
the status of the military goals. To help assure the Department of Defense is achieving
the political goals, every four years the Quadrennial Defense Review is performed. The
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report stated 35 shifts in emphasis that the
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Department of Defense must pursue to meet the new strategic environment. This
dissertation directly addresses five of these shifts. These five are:
•

From nation-state threats – to decentralized network threats from non-state
enemies (p. vi)

•

From conducting war against nations – to conducting war in countries we are
not at war with (safe havens) (p. vi)

•

From major conventional combat operations – to multiple irregular,
asymmetric operations (p. vii)

•

From static post-operations analysis – to dynamic diagnostics and real-time
lessons learned (p. vii)

•

From “one size fits all” deterrence – to tailored deterrence for rogue powers,
terrorist networks and near-peer competitors (p. vi)

The likelihood of interstate conflict in the near future has decreased. This
evolution of paradigm is evident in the first three above shifts of emphasis suggested by
the Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Therefore, a refinement of the definition of
conflict is required to better understand the world the US military and its coalition
partners are facing. This dissertation offers a definition of fourth generation operations
and proposes that fourth generation operations represent an environment which is
decentralized, irregular, and asymmetric. The combatants may be from a nation-state
(with or without the government’s or population’s support) or from one of several
transnational groups.
The fourth shift in emphasis suggests that the models must be dynamic, capable of
updates based on current events and situations. While methods have been developed to
incorporate the impacts of resolution and combatant’s spirit within combat models, these
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models do not update the parameters based on the actions within the model. These
traditional models present a static representation of key aspects of conflict.
The fifth shift in DoD emphasis suggests that courses of action tested within a
combat model may significantly differ from case to case, context to context, or
environment to environment. It follows, then, that the tools available to the combatant
commander can not be limited to classical attrition based warfare.
This research creates a conflict model which incorporates the effects of public
resolution, combat spirit, will-to-fight and morale. Current combat models are generally
limited to modeling a single battle. This focus, while adequate for a major, traditional
armed engagement, does not fully address many of the key aspects of conflict which face
the nation and its coalition partners at the start of the 21st century. With transnational
terrorists fomenting insurgencies throughout the world, the victors of future conflict may
not be decided by the decisive battle of conventional troops. The proposed model does
not replace current combat models, since it would be foolish to assume that traditional
warfare will not exist in the future. Additionally, these campaign level models may still
be useful in analyzing the courses of action in a traditional battle and aiding in the proper
equipping and resourcing of battles and campaigns.
The proposed strategic level model investigates the longer term impacts of
asymmetric conflict on public resolve and soldier morale. Additionally, this strategic
level model captures the impacts of multiple engagements. As such, the proposed
strategic level model must incorporate the effects of the combat spirit of the troops, and
the morale of the population. The proposed model is still a model of conflict and combat.
However, some of the impacts from the political, economic, and informational
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instruments of power are represented in the model through the dynamic adaptation of
public resolve and combat spirit.
General Assumptions and Scope
The proposed model is focused on the strategic level of war, implying that the
impacts are measured in terms of weeks, months and years. Individual duels and battles
are not modeled. It is assumed a higher fidelity operational or tactical model is able to
provide inputs to this lower fidelity model.
The focus of this research is the resolve and spirit of the people within a
combatant group and the supporting population, not the terrain. The current location of
the forward line of troops is not modeled nor is the percentage or location of land held by
either friend or foe. Specific movement of troops, other than how they affect a
combatants’ will-to-fight, are not accounted for or modeled.
The proposed strategic level model of fourth generation operations is initially
developed as a deterministic model. Hartman states a model is deterministic if it
“contains no probabilities or random effects” (Hartman, 2005, p. 1-3). He further defines
stochastic models as “those models that incorporate uncertain outcomes using probability
distributions over the sample space of possible outcomes” (Hartman, 2005, p. 1-3). As a
first step in modeling national resolution; modeling the environment deterministically
provides insights that can assist in developing future efforts.
Deterministic models are used throughout combat modeling. Hartman states that
deterministic combat models are typically used for highly aggregated combat (Hartman,
2005, p. 2-2). Higher resolution models of combat tend to be stochastic, while lower
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resolution deterministic models “resolve the complex phenomenon of large scale combat
into a collection of single shots” (Hartman, 2005, p. 2-2). Such models can reduce the
complexity of the combat scenario to something better understood.
The definition of fourth generation operations is based on the literature of fourth
generation warfare. This dissertation assumes fourth generation operations is an
extension or outgrowth of the concept of fourth generation warfare.
Finally, this research assumes that the will-to-fight of the combatants and public
resolve of the population are critical to modeling conflict and combat. Specifically, the
importance is increased when viewing irregular asymmetric conflict. The principles of
fourth generation operations rely on the principles of legitimacy and perseverance. It is
assumed these principles reinforce the importance of public resolve and combat spirit. It
is further assumed legitimacy is represented within the views of the indigenous
population and perseverance represents the combatants and combatants’ support
structure.
Research Contributions
The overall objective and contribution of this research is to:
Provide an analytic framework of elements of fourth generation operations,
capturing the effects of will of the population and combatant.
To obtain the objective, four principal objectives must be achieved and combined. These
principal objectives are:
1) Develop and model a theory of fourth generation operations based on the
framework of US Joint doctrine
2) Develop the supporting principles of fourth generation operations
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3) Construct a theoretical modeling framework to dynamically portray public
resolve, will-to-fight, morale and combat spirit within a combat model
4) Provide a capability to model and evaluate the impacts of public resolve, willto-fight, morale, and combat spirit of combatants and population on the
outcome of the conflict
The objectives of this research provide six specific contributions to the field of operations
research and specifically combat and conflict modeling. These are discussed in greater
detail in Chapters 3 through 7 and summarized in Chapter 8.
1) Developed a theory of fourth generation operations based on the framework of
US joint doctrine
2) Developed the supporting principles of fourth generation operations
• Introduced principle of Population Perception
3) Constructed a theoretical modeling framework to dynamically portray fatigue
within a combat model
• System dynamic model with events
• Implemented the Lanchester Laws within a system dynamics model
4) Constructed a theoretical modeling framework of public resolve
• Founded on empirical evidence of four key factors
• Provided a capability to model and evaluate impacts of conflict on public
resolve
5) Constructed a theoretical modeling framework that dynamically portrays
soldier morale
• Provided a capability to model and evaluate impacts of soldier morale on
outcome of conflict
6) Constructed an analytic framework of fourth generation operations which
captures the will of the population and combatants
Document Overview
This dissertation is divided into multiple chapters. The first chapter introduces
the problem, provides a summary of assumptions, and lists the research contributions.
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The second chapter presents the relevant literature. This chapter begins by
describing fourth generation warfare. This is followed by an introduction to discrete
event simulations and system dynamics. This is followed by an introduction to
generalized linear models focusing on logistic regression. The next section of the
literature review focuses on the tools used to model combat. The Lanchester Laws are
introduced and illustrated with some examples and explanations. The next area discussed
is the research previously accomplished to model the impacts of the will-to-fight, morale
and combat spirit. The literature review concludes with a discussion of control theory.
Chapters 3 though 7 build upon the literature review to construct an analytic
framework of fourth generation operations. Figure I-1 provides a framework of the
research depicting the four steps, used in this research, to develop a fourth generation
operations model. Each input is divided into a separate chapter to develop the required
contributions. The results from each individual chapter are combined together, producing
an analytic framework of fourth generation operations which captures the will of the
population and combatants.
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Fourth Generation Operations & Principles
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Figure I-1: Framework of Research

Specifically, the third chapter introduces the concept of fourth generation
operations. Assuming that fourth generation operations is an outgrowth of fourth
generation warfare, the dissertation next develops and identifies the principles required
for this type of conflict. Thus, the principles of fourth generation operations are formed
and examined. These principles are based on the current principles of war and principles
of joint operations, along with discussions of the principles of counterinsurgency warfare.
This chapter addresses the first two principal objectives.
Chapter 4 develops a framework using the Lanchester Laws in a system dynamics
model with events. Two models of the Lanchester Laws are compared. The first is a
traditional discrete event simulation and the other is a system dynamics model.
Comparisons of the modeling techniques are presented through the implementation of an
excursion where the forces are fatigued.
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The fifth chapter presents a format to understand the perception of the ongoing
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Specifically, the public resolve for the conflict
is analyzed. Models for the public resolve are created and evaluated based on linear and
non-linear modeling techniques. The objective was to construct a theoretical modeling
framework of public resolve. The framework was founded on empirical evidence of key
factors influencing the public resolve. This chapter contributes to the public resolve
portion of the third principle objective.
Chapter 6 presents a theoretical modeling framework of combat spirit. Several
factors which impact the framework are discussed. The chapter includes an application
of the modeling framework. The notional morale of each brigade and battalion that have
deployed into Iraq is presented and combined to produce the notional morale for the
United States Army and the United States Marine Corps (USMC). An excursion based
on the impact of multiple deployments was also presented. This chapter completes the
third principle objective of the research.
The seventh chapter combines the previous chapters to build a notional model of
elements of fourth generation operations which evaluates the public resolve of the
conflict and the morale of the troops. This model is represented within a system
dynamics framework. The model is then verified and validated to build confidence in the
model. Two demonstrations of the model’s utility conclude the chapter. This completes
the fourth and final principle objective of the research.
The final chapter provides a summary of the objectives and contributions to the
field, and suggestions for future research.
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II.

Literature Review

This chapter presents a summary of the literature that underpins this research.
The first section describes fourth generation warfare. The review next identifies the
principles used within current conflicts. The concept of a strategic level model is then
introduced. The areas of discrete event simulation and system dynamics are introduced
along with some examples of how these tools have been applied to national security
problems. The Lanchester Laws are also discussed and illustrated with some examples
and explanations. This review is followed by a discussion on the research previously
accomplished to model the impacts of the will-to-fight, morale and combat spirit. Next, a
discussion on data fitting is provided; specifically logistic regression and overdispersion
are introduced. Control theory is the final area introduced in the literature review.
Fourth Generation Warfare
Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States: JP 1 defines military
operations other than war (MOOTW) as “situations short of war that require the use of
US military forces” (JP 1, 2001, p. III-8). In September 2006, Doctrine for Joint
Operations: JP 3-0, dated September 2001 was reissued as Joint Operations: JP 3-0.
Several changes were made in the document including the deletion of the term MOOTW.
By removing this phrase from joint vocabulary, several modifications were made to
JP 3-0. To begin, the range of military operations lost the dichotomy of war and
MOOTW. The old and new paradigm is illustrated in Figure II-1.
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Figure II-1: Range of Military Operations (adapted from JP 3-0, 2001 & 2006)

Figure II-1 demonstrates how doctrine had previously defined the range of
military operations as discontinuous. The US goals were associated to the
methodological approach of conflict. The new paradigm is a continuation from limited
crisis response to full-scale major campaigns. Additionally, the new perspective states
that all operations require military engagement, security operations, and deterrence.
An additional change to joint operations is the phasing of these operations.
JP 3-0, dated September 2001 defined four phases of a joint campaign. The first phase
was to deter and engage the enemy while the crisis is developing (JP 3-0, 2001, p. III-19).
The second phase was to seize the initiative. Both combatant and noncombatant
operations can be utilized to achieve the access to the region of operations required by
subsequent phases (JP 3-0, 2001, p. III-20). The third phase of operations was to
decisively defeat the enemy (JP 3-0, 2001, p. III-21). This was also known as the conflict
or combat phase of operations. The final phase of operations was the transition to a self-
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sustaining peace (JP 3-0, 2001, p. III-21). This phase was additionally referred to as
post-hostilities. The phases and typical associated goals are portrayed in the top portion
of Figure II-2.
No clear break existed between phase three (decisive operations) and phase four
(transition) within JP 3-0 dated September 2001. For example, when there was no
official cessation of hostilities, or the complete defeat and destruction of the enemy, the
operations existed between phases three and four. It has been suggested that conflict in
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQ FREEDOM may be
judged to be in the ‘between’ phase or ‘phase 3.5.’
JP 3-0 dated September 2006 expanded the phases of joint operations to six
phases. A new phase was added prior to the crisis being defined and deterred. This new
phase, phase 0, shapes the operational environment through appropriate prevention and
preparation. Additionally, a new phase was added in the gap previously described
between phases three and four. This is now referred to as the stabilization phase of
JP 3-0 dated September 2006. The final phase remains a transition of power to the civil
authorities and redeployment of the military. The phases and typical associated goals are
portrayed in Figure II-2.
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Figure II-2: Phases of Joint Operations (adapted from JP 3-0, 2001 & 2006)

In 2003, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (UK/MOD) Joint Doctrine
and Concept Centre released the study, Strategic Trends, which is a view of what the
world may look like for the next 30 years. The study looked at seven different
dimensions: Physical, Social, Science and Technology, Economic, Legal, Political and
Military (Strategic Trends, 2003, para. 2). The military dimension stated three types of
armed conflict which currently exist and will continue to exist. Interstate conflict is
conflict between nations. Intrastate conflict is conflict within a nation to include
domestic terrorism, insurgencies and civil war. The final type of conflict is international
terrorism, which is defined as “between non-state actors and foreign states” (Strategic
Trends, 2003, para. 7.2). These three types of conflict are used here to establish a
common set of terms for this dissertation.
The following is a review of each of these three types of conflict and discussion
regarding the likelihood that the United States of America will be involved in each type
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of conflict in the first part of the 21st century. This discussion is followed by an
introduction to fourth generation warfare.
The National Intelligence Council (NIC), which is responsible for the strategic
thinking of the United States Intelligence Community, commissioned the 2020 project to
take a broad and long term view of future threats. An outcome of this project is the 2004
document entitled, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence
Council’s 2020 Project. This document follows in the footsteps of the NIC’s 2015
project which resulted in the publication Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the
Future with Nongovernment Experts. These two documents present the NIC’s vision of
the global environment. They include proposed alternate futures which are used for
debate and discussion of both current and expected trends. The documents also include a
discussion of significant discontinuities which describe the outlier events that could
change the overall trends. The NIC discounts the claim that interstate conflict will occur.
The likelihood of great power conflict escalating into total war in the next 15
years is lower than at any time in the past century, unlike during previous
centuries when local conflicts sparked world wars. (Mapping the Global Future,
2004, p. 14)
The UK/MOD agrees that the future is unlikely to hold much interstate conflict
for three reasons (Strategic Trends, 2003, para. 7.4). First, it is unlikely that a new
superpower will emerge as in the Cold War, thus the United States will keep its current
hegemony for the near term. Secondly, this superiority of the United States will
discourage attacks by foreign countries; this includes attacking the allies and interests of
the United States. Finally, the risks and penalties of interstate warfare are continually
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increasing. Simply put, countries can not afford to directly wage warfare against the
United States (Strategic Trends, 2003, para. 7.4).
Nye, in The Paradox of American Power, appears to agree with the UK/MOD.
“The closest thing to an equal that the United States faces at the beginning of the twenty
first century is the European Union” (2002, p. 29). Nye justifies this remark by showing
the economy of the European Union is roughly equal to the United States economy.
Further, the European Union has a larger population and larger share of the world
exportation of goods than the United States. Additionally, the European Union has
already begun to challenge the United States economically with the Euro and by
countering United States sanctions against Cuba and Iran (Nye, 2002, p. 30).
In considering any near to mid-term peer, the threat from China must be
acknowledged. “The United States is much more likely to go to war with China than it is
with any other major power”; however, “it is hardly inevitable that China will be a threat
to American interests” (Betts, 2000, p. 17). The United States economy is twice that of
China; only with strong growth will China’s economy be equal by 2020 (Nye: 19). Nye
therefore suggests the most likely conflict with China would occur over Taiwan and not
from China challenging the United States to be the dominant power in East Asia (2002,
p. 22). While it is a possibility that war could erupt with China over Taiwan (or perhaps
North Korea), both sides would suffer greatly.
In 2003, Barnett wrote an article in Esquire magazine entitled “The Pentagon’s
New Map.” This article was expanded in Barnett’s 2004 book by the same name.
Barnett reinforces the contention that state-on-state wars are a condition of the past
(Barnett, 2004, p. 85). He claims “when wars occur now, they are almost exclusively
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internal wars, where some subsection of a state wishes to break off from the whole or
where social violence between groups within a state erupts into full-blown civil war”
(Barnett, 2004, p. 85). This views lead to the discussion of intrastate conflict.
The UK/MOD compiled data from the Peace Science Society’s Correlates of War
Project dataset. Figure II-3, presents the number of interstate and intrastate conflicts
from 1946-1995 complied by UK/MOD.

Figure II-3: Number of conflicts from 1946-1995 (Strategic Trends, 2003, Chart A)

This data shows how interstate conflict remains low and constant for each ten year
period; however, the number of intrastate conflicts has been increasing. Strategic Trends
claims the increase in intrastate conflict results from “independence movements,
separatist nationalism, and surrogate superpower conflict” (Strategic Trends,
2003, para. 7.3).
The United States involvement in the number of conflicts from 1946-1995 was
found by analyzing the Correlates of War Projects dataset version 3.0. These data
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include the United States in the following three interstate conflicts: Korea-1950,
Vietnam-1965, and the Gulf War-1991 (Sarkees, 2000, p. 134). The United States was
involved in five intrastate conflicts during that time period: Lebanon-1958, Vietnam1961, Laos-1964, Cambodia-1970, and Somolia-1992 (Sarkees, 2000, p. 139). The
UK/MOD sees the likelihood of intrastate warfare increasing as globalization impacts the
culture of non-globalized countries (Strategic Trends, 2003, para. 7.6). The pre 9/11
trend was that the United States was involved in such intrastate conflicts at a rate of one
per decade. There is no reason to expect this trend will do anything but increase with the
current Global War on Terrorism.
Barnett states that during the mid-1990’s the Pentagon was developing war plans
for combat against a mythical asymmetric near-peer scenario (Barnett, 2004, p. 93).
Barnett claims this asymmetrical threat comes from transnational terrorists, not from any
nation or state whose people or assets can be directly attacked. This leads the discussion
to the final type of conflict expected by the UK/MOD, international terrorism.
The United States is currently involved in the Global War on Terrorism, the
‘Long War’. As such, the first part of the 21st century must include the United States
combating international terrorism. However, many definitions for terrorism exist (Wentz
& Wagenhals, 2004, p. 6). The UK/MOD’s Strategic Trends defines terrorism as armed
conflict between “non-state actors and foreign states” (Strategic Trends, 2003, para. 7.2).
The types of non-state actors were categorized and presented in Table II-1.
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Table II-1: Potential Non-state Adversaries (Strategic Trends, 2003, Table C)

Sectarian

Obsessionalists

Militarists

Profiteers

Proliferators

Tribalists
Religious
denominators
Nationalists
Insurgents
Revolutionists
Warloads
Dissidents
Militants
Gangs

Vigilantes
Single
movement
issues
Cults
Sects
Radicals
Mentally
unstable
individuals
Anarchists
Dissidents
Militants
Instigators

Mercenaries
Extreme right
paramilitaries
Private
military
companies

Cartels
Of Information
Criminals
Of Technology
Opportunists Of Weapons
Pirates

The UK/MOD provides a very broad definition of terrorism which includes five
different factions: religious, fixated, militaristic, exploiters for profit, and proliferators.
These categorizations include areas which are excluded in the definitions of terrorism
used by the United Nations and the United States. Wentz and Wagenhals state the United
Nations defines terrorism as (2004, p. 6):
A unique form of crime. Terrorist acts often contain elements of warfare, politics
and propaganda. For security reasons and due to the lack of popular support,
terrorist organizations are usually small, making detection and infiltration
difficult. Although the goals of terrorism are sometimes shared by wider
constituencies, their methods are generally abhorred. (2004, p. 6)
The United Nations and UK/MOD both have different definitions than the United States
definition of terrorism. The National Security Strategy defines terrorism as
Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.
(2002, p. 5)
The National Security Strategy definition is the basis of the following definitions from
the Department of Defense, Department of State and Department of Homeland Security.
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U.S. Department of Defense: The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat
of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political,
religious, or ideological (JP 3-07.2, 1998, p. I-1).
U.S. Department of State: the premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience (Title 22 of the U.S. Code,
Chapter 38, Section 2656f(d)).
U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Any premeditated, unlawful act
dangerous to human life or public welfare that is intended to intimidate or coerce
civilian populations or governments (National Strategy for Homeland Security,
2002, p. 2)
The common theme is that terrorism is a premeditated form of violence used to
insight fear to attain a goal, objective, or program. No matter the specific definition,
terrorism will be a focus for the Department of Defense, Department of State, and
Department of Homeland Security for the first part of the 21st century. However, even
with the multiple definitions, the specifics of terrorism are nebulous.
These nebulous definitions of terrorism are subsumed in the term violent nonstate actors (VNSA) used by Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer in their several technical
reports and their book, Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors. The
VNSA does not abide by Clausewitz’s concept of Trinitarian war (Thomas & Kiser,
2002, p. 74). The concept of Trinitarian war assumes the major three elements of war are
political leadership, the army and the population (Thomas & Kiser, 2002, p. 74). VNSAs
do not follow this paradigm and instead reflect pre-nation state politics. Additionally,
VNSAs employ tactics which are “asymmetric, including violent crimes, guerrilla
operations, terrorism, and in some rare cases, cyber warfare” (Thomas & Kiser, 2002,
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p. 75). These tactics are not typical of the modern army. This concept of a VNSA may
be a better means to understand the enemy faced in current and future conflicts.
In October 1989, Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton and Wilson authored “The
Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” Their article, which was
simultaneously published in both Marine Corps Gazette, and Military Review, coined the
term Fourth Generation Warfare.
Lind et al., maintain that there have been three generations of modern warfare.
The first generation began with the employment of the smoothbore musket. This
technology required the tactics to be changed to create a more effective army.
Specifically, armies lined up to produce a high rate of fire (Lind et al., 1989, p. 2).
The second generation of modern warfare also began as a response to
technological changes: the invention of the “rifled musket, breechloaders, barber wire,
machine gun, and indirect fire” (Lind et al., 1989, p. 3). These new weapons defeated the
lines and columns tactics of first generation warfare. In second generation war, artillery
and massed firepower were used to overcome infantry and massed manpower. Both the
first and second generations of warfare were overall linear in nature (Lind et al., 1989,
p. 3).
The third generation of modern war is embodied in the idea of blitzkrieg or
maneuver warfare. Although the technology continued to increase, the shift of tactics
came from a change in ideas of warfare (Lind et al., 1989, p. 4). The difference of tactics
enabled the Germans to better command and control their troops through the effective
and efficient implementation of technologies (radio and tanks) readily available to all the
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allies. The attacker planned to bypass and cut-off the defender, causing the defender to
collapse due to a lack of access to command and logistics.
The mechanism for transition for each of the previous three generations of
warfare was improvements in technology or ideas (Lind et al., 1989, p. 4). Similarly, a
change in technology or ideas results in the fourth generation of warfare. Several
elements of the previous three generations are expected to be present and improved upon
in the fourth generation. First, the independence of the individual combatant has
increased with each generation. The expectation of the commander’s intent may directly
translate into the mission order (Lind et al., 1989, p. 4). Second, decreasing the reliance
on the logistic train, forces the combatants to increase their reliance on the enemy’s
resources and territory (Lind et al., 1989, p. 4). Third, maneuver warfare continues to be
exploited (Lind et al., 1989, p. 4). Finally, the ability to cut-off the enemy may be
improved such that the enemy is attacked internally. Lind et al. assert that “targets will
include such things as the population’s support for the war and the enemy’s culture”
(1989, p. 5).
Changes of technology creating fourth generation warfare was felt to lead to
improved weapons which may cause the individual combatant to have the military
strength and value an order of magnitude greater than seen in previous generations.
Unfortunately, in 1989, the authors claim, “the current American research, development,
and procurement process may simply not be able to make the transition to a military
effective fourth generation of weapons” (p. 8). Currently, the technology grows
significantly faster than the DOD acquisition process can maintain. This is evident by
Moore’s Law which states that the number of transistors on a chip will double every two
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years; however, the DOD acquisition process takes significantly longer (Moore, 1965,
p. 2). For example, the F-22 took over twenty years from concept to an operational
capability.
A change of ideas creating the fourth generation of warfare may also be a
possibility (Lind et al., 1989, p. 8). Lind et al., state “the genesis of an idea-based fourth
generation maybe visible in terrorism” (1989, p. 8). This does not imply that terrorism is
the fourth generation of warfare; just some of the elements of terrorism may be present in
the fourth generation of warfare. Some of these elements include how terrorism attacks
the enemy internally to cause the enemy to collapse. In addition, terrorists use the
strength of a free society’s freedom and openness as a weapon (Lind et al., 1989, p. 8-9).
Terrorists can wage their warfare while being protected by the very laws of their enemy.
This enables the terrorist to be hidden within the society until the moment of attack.
Terrorist actions are able to bring the combat to the population directly, bypassing
standing armies. An additional element is that the terrorists are able to live off the land,
perhaps in the land of his enemy, until an attack. A final element of terrorism which may
translate into the fourth generation of warfare is that the material of conflict can be far
cheaper than in previous generations of war. As an example, Lind et al. note a third
generation stealth bomber costs multiple millions of dollars, whereas a terrorist stealth
bomber is an average looking car, possibly stolen, filled with explosives (1989, p. 10).
Münkler, in his article entitled “The Wars of the 21st Century,” agrees that the
next generation of warfare may include a demilitarization of war.
21st century wars will be fought only partially by soldiers and not against
traditional military objectives. Thus a future objective will be the will or morale
of the population and not just the standing army. (2003, p. 18)

23

Münkler continues by stating the wars of the 21st century will not “be a linear extension
of the trends of the twentieth century” (2003, p. 9). Münkler statement suggests that
fourth generation warfare may not simply be the next step in evolution of war, but a shift
to a new paradigm of warfare.
In a 1994 article entitled “The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation,”
Hammes provides five tactical traits inherent in fourth generation warfare (p. 44):
•

Be fought in a complex arena of low-intensity conflict

•

Include tactics/techniques from earlier generations

•

Be fought across the spectrum of political, social, economic, and military
networks.

•

Be fought worldwide through these networks

•

Involve a mix of national, international, transnational, and subnational actors
(p. 44).

These traits can be seen in the conflicts occurring within Iraq and Afghanistan.
In 2004, Lind revisited the four generations of war in light of the post 9/11
environment and the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Lind states that in the
fourth generation of warfare the “state has lost its monopoly on war” (2004, p. 13).
Fourth generation war has also returned to a warfare of cultures and is no longer solely a
warfare of states. The tactics of the evolving fourth generation warfare are not new. A
number of the tactics are standard guerrilla tactics. Additional tactics are “classic Arab
light cavalry warfare carried out with modern technology” (Lind, 2004, p. 16). Lind
reiterates, the warfare in Iraq is not yet fourth generation warfare.
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Hammes disagrees with Lind stating the “Fourth generation warfare, which is
now playing out in Iraq and Afghanistan, is a modern form of insurgency” (2005, p. 1).
Hammes continues by explaining this type of warfare is the only kind that the United
States has lost and the enemy knows this. Hammes suggests the United States has lost
such conflicts three times: in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia (2005, p. 2).
This idea of insurgency is not new; Münkler suggests Mao Tse-tung used a
deceleration of the course of events successfully by means of guerilla warfare (2003,
p. 7). The insurgency method of decelerating events is used against an enemy which is
superior in technology and organization. A technologically and organizationally superior
adversary accelerates the warfare to obtain the decisive battle. However, the decisive
battle of the Napoleonic era is meaningless in the fourth generation of war (Hammes,
2005, p. 2). Guerilla warfare makes the enemy pay the price of attempting acceleration
until it becomes unaffordable (Münkler, 2003, p. 8).
The dramatic superiority the US military apparatus has achieved over all
potential enemies in the last two decades is largely due to its capacity to exploit
the various opportunities for accelerating the pace at the different combat levels
(Münkler, 2003, p. 8)
This asymmetry forces an enemy to evolve to an asymmetric insurgency approach.
Fadok, in a School of Advanced Aerospace Studies Thesis, wrote about
controlling the pace of the battle. He explains that Mao Tse-tung used a protracted war to
defeat the Imperial Japanese (Fadok, 1995, p. 19). Fadok illustrated the point that
controlling the pace of the conflict wins the war with a basketball analogy. In his
example, a team which is known for the ‘fast break’ style of play is playing a team which
is not suited for that style of game; perhaps better at a ‘run and gun’ style. Fadok states
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that typically the fast break team continues to increase the pace of the game until it
paralyzes the other team. However, the ‘run and gun’ team may be able to slow down the
pace of the game. When this occurs, the players and fans of the ‘fast break’ team gets
restless which allows the ‘run and gun’ team the possibility to win. Fadok continues by
stating the “analogy seems to apply even better when, as in war, we remove the time
clock” (1995, p. 18). It is apparent that insurgency tactics are very capable of protracting
the war against the fast paced United States forces operating in a conventional warfare
mode.
Those countries oriented towards preserving life, “will ultimately be defeated by
those who are ready to sacrifice themselves” (Münkler, 2003, p. 19). The first three
generations of warfare attempted to preserve life of one’s own army while attritting or
annihilating the enemy. The concepts of the potential fourth generation of warfare, such
as sacrificing troops which is used as a key tactic, is often difficult for Western Nations to
understand and thus is difficult to prepare successful defenses against.
Manwaring presents five fundamental concepts in “The New Master of Wizard’s
Chess: The Real Hugo Chavez and Asymmetric Warfare”, which are required to prepare
and defeat the fourth generation combatants. The five “educational and organizational
imperatives” are summarized below (Manwaring, 2005, p. 48):
1. Military and civilian leaders at all levels of combat must understand how the
fourth generation tactics achieve political ends
2. Civilian and military personnel must learn to work well with the media and
coalitions
3. Leaders must grow the intelligence capabilities well beyond their current
abilities
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4. Since traditional peacekeeping operations will continually become hazardous,
the peacekeepers must become effective warfighters
5. All civilian and military instruments of power must be working together to
achieve the same end state (Manwaring, 2005, p. 48)
Manwaring warns that unless the five imperatives are incorporated into the United States
strategies and doctrine, conflicts will end with unfavorable outcomes (2005, p. 48).
With fourth generation warfare reviewed, the next section discusses the principles
of warfare.
Principles of Fourth Generation Warfare
To advance against the enemy’s main force (objective), with the intention
of destroying it (offensive), with the greatest numbers possible (mass and
economy of force), with the least friction (co-operation), and in the
shortest possible time (movement), so that we may take him unawares
(surprise), without undue risks to ourselves (security) – J. F. C. Fuller
(Fuller, 1916, p. 5)
The current principles of war, while evolving from the dawn of conflict, are based
on the eight principles suggested by Fuller in 1916. The eight strategical principles
suggested by Fuller were; Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Movement,
Surprise, Security, and Cooperation (1916, p. 3). (Strategic is now the modern term for
strategical.) These are nearly identical to the principles of war found in today’s US Joint
doctrine. The principle of Simplicity was not included by Fuller. Additionally, the
principles of Movement and Cooperation have been reworded to Maneuver and Unity of
Command.
The strategical principles of war proposed by Fuller are immediately followed by
nine considerations which must be acknowledged regarding the principles of war. These
conditions are time, space, ground, weather, numbers, moral, communication, supply and
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armament (Fuller, 1916, p. 3). After a discussion of the eight principles and nine
considerations, Fuller introduces the tactical principles of war. His three tactical
principles of war are demoralization, endurance, and shock (Fuller, 1916, p. 18). These
three principles are required to develop the four stages of attack; approach,
demoralization, decision, and annihilation (Fuller: 20).
The principles of war and MOOTW from Joint Publication 1 (2000), are
discussed to assist in developing the principles of fourth generation operations.
Table II-2 summarizes the principles of war from JP 1. Table II-3 presents the principles
of MOOTW from JP 1.
Table II-2: Principles of War (JP 1, 2000, Appendix B)

Principle

Definition

Objective

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined,
decisive, and attainable objective

Offensive

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative

Mass

Concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to
achieve decisive results

Economy of Force

Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts

Maneuver
Unity of Command
Security
Surprise
Simplicity

Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the
flexible application of combat power
Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for
every objective
Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage
Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is
unprepared
Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure
thorough understanding
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Table II-3: Principles of MOOTW (JP 1, 2000, Appendix C)

Principle

Definition

Objective

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined,
decisive, and attainable objective

Unity of Effort

Seek unity of effort in every operation

Security

Prevent hostile factions from acquiring a military, political, or
informational advantage

Restraint

Apply appropriate military capability prudently

Perseverance
Legitimacy

Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military
capability in support of strategic aims
Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation
and of the host government, where applicable

Both the principles of war and MOOTW share the concepts of Objective,
Security, and Unity of Command. The principles of MOOTW refer to Unity of
Command as Unity of Effort since it must include civil, military and other agencies.
The 2006 update to JP 3-0, changed the principles of war by creating the term
principles of joint operations, this change has also been reflected in the 2007 update to
JP-1 entitled, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. These principles are a
merger of the principles of war and MOOTW. All nine of the original principles of war
are included with only minor changes. Additionally, the three unique principles of
MOOTW were added. The new JP 3-0 redefines the principle Restraint to “limit
collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force” (JP 3-0, 2006, p. A-3). The
definition of Perseverance has been changed to “ensure the commitment necessary to
attain the national strategic end state” (JP 3-0, 2006, p. A-4). Whereas, the definition of
Legitimacy is to “develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic
end state” (JP 3-0, 2006, p. A-4). The principle of Perseverance includes the concepts
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that all instruments of power (political, military, informational and economic) may be
required through the duration of a long conflict. While the principle of Legitimacy may
include influences from foreign nations, indigenous government, indigenous civilian
population, and the participating forces. Figure II-4 illustrates the relationship of the
principles of joint operations.
Old
Principles of War1

New Principles of
Joint Operations2

Old
Principles of MOOTW 3

Objective

Objective

Objective

Offensive

Offensive

Unity of Effort

Mass

Mass

Security

Economy of Force

Economy of Force

Restraint

Maneuver

Maneuver

Perseverance

Unity of Command

Unity of Command

Legitimacy

Security

Security

Surprise

Surprise

Simplicity

Simplicity
Restraint
Perseverance

1: JP 1; Appendix B; Nov 00
2: JP 3-0; Appendix B; Sep 06
3: JP 1; Appendix C; Nov 00

Legitimacy
Figure II-4: Principles of Joint Operations

The concept of fighting a counterinsurgency is related to what has been occurring
in both Iraq and Afghanistan. For this reason, it is important to insure the principles,
laws, and deductions, of counterinsurgency are encapsulated within the principles of joint
operations and specifically fourth generation operations. Galula considered the
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requirements to fight a counterinsurgency in his text, Counterinsurgency Warfare:
Theory and Practice. He proposed six principles of waging a counterinsurgency.
First, initiative is required (Galula, 1964, p. 82). He defines this as an offensive
strategy which tracts as Offensive from the principles of joint operations.
The second principle suggested by Galula, is “full utilization of the
counterinsurgent’s assets” (1964, p. 83). Galula explains that all assets must be applied
to include propaganda (informational), economic, military and administrative (political).
All the national instruments of power or Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic
(DIME) must be employed. Therefore, this is equivalent to the Mass principle, only in
the proper scale. Galula realizes that all instruments of power available to a nation-state
must be utilized to defeat an insurgency.
Galula’s third principle is Economy of Force (1964, p. 81). Economy of Force is
one of the Joint doctrine’s principles of war.
Irreversibility is the fourth principle suggested by Galula (1964, p. 82). The
example and definition provided by Galula suggests this is similar to the Perseverance
principle of joint operations. The example Galula provides is when the
counterinsurgent’s military gains the confidence and support of the population, the
insurgent’s power will be difficult to rebuild (1964, p. 82). Additionally, once leaders
within the population emerge and support the counterinsurgency, they can be trusted
because the leaders have too much to lose if the insurgency returns.
Galula’s fifth principle is “To Command is to Control” (1964, p. 85). This is the
principle of Unity of Command.
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Galula’s final principle is Simplicity, which is again a direct classic principle of
war (1964, p. 84). Figure II-5 relates the principles of war and principles of MOOTW to
the principles of counterinsurgency suggested by Galula.

Principles of War1

Galula’s Principles of
Counterinsurgency2

Principles of MOOTW 3

Objective

Initiative

Objective

Offensive

Full Utilization of the
Counterinsurgent’s Assets

Unity of Effort

Mass

Security
Economy of Force

Economy of Force

Restraint
Irreversibility

Maneuver

Perseverance
To Command is to Control

Unity of Command

Legitimacy
Simplicity

Security
Surprise
1: JP 1; Appendix B
2: Galula; Counterinsurgency Warfare
3: JP 1; Appendix C

Simplicity

Figure II-5: Galula's Principles of Counterinsurgency

Galula also presents four laws which must be followed to win a war against
insurgents:
The first law: The support of the population is as necessary for the
counterinsurgency as for the insurgent (Galula, 1964, p. 74)
The second law: The support is gained through an active minority
(Galula, 1964, p. 75)
The third law: Support from the population is conditional (Galula, 1964, p. 78)
The fourth law: Intensity of efforts and vastness are essential (Galula, 1964, p. 79)
The first three laws Galula proposes encompass the idea that the population’s
perception of the conflict is extremely important to the success of the operation. These
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laws support the joint operations principle of Legitimacy as well as recognizing the
importance of public opinion. Galula proposes persuading a minority to gain the support
of the entire population. Additionally, the population’s support is always conditional.
The fourth law differs in that it involves the principles of Mass and Economy of Force.
In addition to the four laws, the third law has four important deductions.
1) Effective political action on the population must be preceded by military and
police operations against the insurgent political organizations
2) Political, social, economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be
wanted and popular, are inoperative while the insurgent still controls the
population
3) The counterinsurgency needs a convincing success as early as possible in
order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win
4) The counterinsurgency cannot safely enter into negotiations except from a
position of strength, or his political supporters will flock to the insurgent side
(Galula, 1964, p. 78-79)
The first two deductions support the principle of Legitimacy. The third deduction
requires both the principles of Mass and Objective. The third deduction again suggests
that the population’s perception is significantly important. The final deduction involves
the principles of Perseverance and Irreversibility. Traditionally, counterinsurgency
tactics have involved limiting the opposition’s area of operations and undermining the
insurgents’ support within a nation. Containment and denial is problematic for today’s
transnational insurgency. The insurgencies may have cells throughout the world, which,
enhanced by modern communication, can communicate in ways previously unimagined.
Hoffman and Taw, in their RAND publication A Strategic Framework for
Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, give four elements critical to a successful
counterinsurgency:
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1. An effective overall command and control structure
2. “Legitimizing” measures, taken by the government to build public trust and
support, combined with antiterrorist legislation sensitive to public sentiments
3. Coordination within and between intelligence services
4. Collaboration among governments and security forces of different countries
(Hoffman & Taw, 1992, p. 3)
The first and fourth elements relate to the principles of Unity of Command. The
second element is the MOOTW principle of Legitimacy. The third element is a
combination of both the principles of Security and Unity of Command. This reinforces
the requirement of these principles within proposed principles of fourth generation
operations.
Dupuy suggests thirteen “Timeless Verities of Combat” in his book,
Understanding War (Dupuy, 1987 p. 1). These are overarching principles that apply to
all types of combat as oppose to the more limited scope of fourth generation operations,
MOOTWs, or other specific combat variants. Dupuy’s Verities of Combat are presented
in Table II-4. A discussion on how the verity of combat is related to the principles of war
and MOOTW is also included in Table II-4.
The verities of combat all have relations to the principles of war and the principles
of MOOTW. As shown in Table II-5, all the principles of war and MOOTW are present
within the verities of combat except for the MOOTW principle of Legitimacy.
The Joint Forces Staff College provides a collection of several countries’
principles of war in JFSC Pub-1: Joint Staff Officer’s Guide. Table II-6 is a summary
provided by the Joint Forces Staff College.
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Table II-4: Dupuy’s Timeless Verities of Combat and Discussion

Verities of Combat
1. Offensive action is essential to
positive combat results
(p. 1)
2. Defensive strength is greater
than offensive strength
(p. 2)
3. Defensive posture is
necessary when successful
offense is impossible (p. 2)
4. Flank or rear attack is more
likely to succeed than frontal
attack (p. 3)
5. Initiative permits application
of preponderant combat power
(p. 3)
6. Defenders’ chances of success
are directly proportional to
fortification strength (p. 4)
7. An attacker willing to pay the
price can always penetrate the
strongest defenses (p. 5)
8. Successful defense requires
depth and reserves (p. 5)
9. Superior Combat Power
Always Wins (p. 6)
10. Surprise substantially
enhances combat power (p. 6)
11. Firepower kills, disrupts,
suppresses, and causes
dispersion (p. 7)
12. Combat activities are always
slower, less productive, and less
efficient than anticipated (p. 7)
13. Combat is too complex to be
described in a single, simple
aphorism (p. 7)

Discussion
Similar to the principle of Offensive. If the
combatant does not seize the initiative, the battle’s
objectives will not be obtained.
The defender maintains both the principles of
Restraint and Mass
When the forces cannot be offensive, employing
the principle of Economy of Force in a defensive
nature is the only alternative.
The principle of Maneuver insures the combatant
attacks the enemy at the weakest position.
Galula’s principles of counterinsurgency address
the importance of initiative. This is contained
within the principle of Offensive.
The ability of the defender to delay the attacker
provides an opportunity to Mass and retain the
principle of Security.
With the proper leadership provided by the
principle of Unity of Command, the associated
Objective can be achieved with Perseverance.
The proper application of the reserves can shift the
tide of the battle. This requires an understanding of
the principle of Economy of Force
An outnumbered force can win the battle if the
principles of Mass and Maneuver are combined to
obtain superior combat power.
The principle of Surprise “has been proven to be
the greatest of all combat multipliers” (p. 6).
The nature of warfare causes significant friction.
This friction is best countered by a strong
command. Therefore, the principle of Unity of
Command is required.
“In war more than anywhere else things do not turn
out as we expect . . . Perseverance in the chosen
course is the essential counterweight” (Clausewitz,
1832/1964, p. 193).
Since the nature of war is extremely complex, the
principle of Simplicity attempts to bring the nature
of the battle to the most simplistic form
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Table II-5: Collection of the Various Principles of Warfare

Principles of
MOOTW

Principles
of War

Fuller’s
Principles of
War

X

X

X

Offensive

X

X

Mass

X

Objective

Economy of
Force

Restraint

Maneuver
Unity of
Command
Security

Perseverance

Legitimacy

Principles of
Joint
Operations

1&7

X

Initiative

1&5

X

X

Utilization of
Assets

2, 6 & 9

X

X

X

X

2, 3, 6 & 8

X

X

Movement

4&9

X

Command &
Control:
Collaboration

7 & 11

X

X

6

X

6

X

Irreversibility

7 & 12

X

X

13

X

X

Cooperation

X

X

X

X

X

Command is
Control

X

Simplicity

Hoffman &
Taw’s
Principles

Dupuy’s
Verities of
Combat

Unity of
Effort

Surprise

Galula’s
Principles of
Counterinsurgency

X
X

X
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X

Table II-6: Mulinational Principles of War (JFSC Pub 1, 2000, Figure D-1)

Former Soviet
Union
“Principles of
Military Art”

People’s
Republic of
China

United States

Great Britain
Australia

Objective

Selection &
Maintenance of
Aim

Selection &
Maintenance of
Aim

Offensive

Offensive
Action

Offensive
Action

Mass

Concentration
of Force

Economy of
Force

Economy of
Force

Maneuver

Flexibility

Unity of
Command

Cooperation

Coordination

Security

Security

Security

Surprise

Surprise

Surprise

Maintenance of
Morale

Mobility &
Tempo,
Simultaneous
Attack on All
Levels,
Preservation of
Combat
Effectiveness,
Interworking &
Coordination

Massing and
Correlation of
Forces
Economy,
Sufficiency of
Force

France

Concentration
of Effort

Concentration
of Force

Initiative and
Flexibility

Initiative

Surprise

Surprise

Liberty of
Action

Morale,
Mobility,
Political
Mobilization,
Freedom of
Action

Simplicity

Adapted from JP 1, FM 100-1, AFM 1-1, and FMFM 6-4, Military Review, May 1955, and Soviet
Battlefield Development Plan
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Strategic Level Modeling
In the first part of the 21st century we can anticipate the nation and its coalition
partners will be involved in intrastate conflicts, often focused on combating international
terrorism. As discussed earlier, an interstate war involving the US is highly unlikely in
the early part of the century. Next, this research addresses how the principles of Joint
Operations can be modeled to provide insight to current and future decision makers. This
type of analysis is expected to be most effective at the campaign or the strategic level.
Unfortunately, campaign models of the projected fourth generation warfare primarily
exist as attrition based models of interstate conflict (Lanchester Law based models.)
Taylor and Lane state, “A campaign model can be defined as one that captures the
full scope of a military campaign” (Taylor & Lane, 2004, p. 333). Additionally, Hughes,
in his book Military Modeling for Decision Making, provides a definition of campaign
models though an example:
…the defense of shipping in the Atlantic over an extended campaign, air-ground
combat in a Major Regional Contingency, or the joint air campaign of missile and
bomber attacks against Iraq in preparation for the ground campaign. (1997, p. 6)
Compare this to the examples provided for single engagement models and battle
or multiple-unit engagement models:
Single engagement models, such as submarine versus submarine, fighter versus
bomber, or tank versus tank.
Battle or multiple-unit engagement models, such as a naval task force versus
combined air and submarine attackers, or an army divisional assault on a
defending brigade, or a formation of air interceptors vectored by a fighter
direction system to attack fighter-bombers who are conducting a strike. (Hughes,
1997, p. 6)
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Dupuy, in Understanding War, defines a hierarchy of combat. He defined the
frequently used terms of war, campaign, battle, engagement, action, and duel. These
terms are presented in the hierarchy given in Table II-7. This table summarizes the
specifics on the duration, type or unit, and goal for each level of combat.
Table II-7: Hierarchy of Combat (Dupuy, 1987, Table 7-1 Page 67)

Level of Combat
War

Campaign

Battle

Engagement

Action

Duel

Duration

Units Involved

Common Tread

Months – Years

National Forces

National Goals

Weeks – Months

Army Groups or
Field Armies

Strategic Goals

Days – Weeks

Field Armies or
Army Corps

Operational
Mission

1 – 5 Days

Divisions –
Companies

Tactical Mission

1 – 24 Hours

Battalions – Squads

Local Objective

Minutes

Two Individuals,
People or Mobile
Fighting Machines

Local Objective

Dupuy states that the first level in the hierarchy is war, and war is conflict
between nations or states (1987, p. 65). This statement must be expanded to include
transnational terrorist organizations to capture fourth generation operations. Dupuy
continues by stating that a war is fought for political or economic reasons. The next level
in the hierarchy is a campaign, which is the first subdivision of a war. This is followed
by a battle which is the clash of major forces with an operational objective. Engagement
is the next level of warfare. An action is a specific event within an engagement. The
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final level of combat is the duel; which is the interaction between two entities of combat.
This can be, for instance, between two tanks, two riflemen, or two aircraft. A man with a
rocket propelled grenade (RPG) might dual a tank. Technically speaking, however, the
rules of the duel (in the classic sense) are two equivalently armed combatants.
Dupuy further described the levels of combat by relating them to tactics,
operations, and strategy. Figure II-6 presents a diagram relating how these concepts
relate to the levels of combat. Additionally, the commanders for each level are presented.
are a matter of

and are carried
out by
the smallest unit up
to divisions and
army corps

Single
engagements
tactics

army corps
and armies

Battles
operations
Campaigns
strategy
Military War

armies, army
groups, or entire
branches of the
service

under the
command of

line officers

subcommanders
the commander
in chief

the entire armed
forces: army, navy
and air force

Figure II-6: Relationship of Tactics, Operations, and Strategy (Dupuy, 1987, Figure 7-1 Page 69)

Air Force Instruction 16-1003 (AFI 16-1003), categorizes analytical models as
one of four areas: campaign, mission, engagement and other. The definitions provided
for each category follow, though no definition for ‘other’ existed in the AFI.
Campaign Model—A model that attempts to capture all important aspects of
aerospace power over the duration of a conflict across an entire theater or
theaters of operation in a force vs. force campaign length scenario.
(AFI 16-1003, 2006, p. 7).
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Mission Model—A model that captures one or more interacting aspects of
aerospace power during the course of representing an aerospace mission or
missions by evaluating mission effectiveness against enemy forces in a few-on-few
or many-on-many combat scenario. (AFI 16-1003, 2006, p. 8).
Engagement Model—A model that provides measures of effectiveness at the
system level of representation by evaluating system effectiveness against enemy
systems in a one-on-one or few-on-few combat scenario. (AFI 16-1003, 2006,
p. 7).
Hill, Miller and McIntyre present the levels of combat and the models included in
the Air Force Standard Analysis Toolkit at each level in their article “Applications of
Discrete Event Simulation Modeling to Military Problems” (Hill, Miller & McIntyre,
2001, p. 782). This listing of types of models is commonly portrayed in a pyramid of
models as shown in Figure II-7.

Figure II-7: Hierarchy of Models (Hill, Miller & McIntyre, 2001, Figure 1 Page 782)

It is a proposition of this research that the hierarchy of military modeling can be
appropriately classified by how the model represents time. Engineering or system level
models focus on instantaneous events. The instantaneous event needs only seconds to
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capture the impact and effect. An example is molecules flowing over a wing (resulting in
lift) or the moments and forces on an aircraft during a weapon’s release. This could also
encompass Dupuy’s duel.
An engagement model looks at time as a short series of events or actions. Such
models account for time in minutes. Examples of engagement models include: the
engagement of two aircraft in a basic fighter maneuver (i.e. dogfight) or a tank locating
and shooting at an enemy’s position. This covers both Dupuy’s action and duel levels of
combat.
A mission model is focused on the aggregation required to model in terms of
hours of activities. Therefore, a mission model can capture the events of take-off, aircraft
refueling, ingress towards the target, attacking the target, and finally returning to base.
The mission model also includes the activities of the enemy’s forces. These actions may
include the surface-to-air lay down, air-to-air defenses, and target movement. A mission
model is capable of modeling Dupuy’s engagement and a single battle. This can be
further seen as modeling multiple actions.
Campaign models continue this trend; time is represented as multiple days of
missions and engagements. Therefore, the campaign model is aggregated to allow for
multiple missions in a day over several days or months. This provides the ability to
analyze the impacts of logistics and attrition over an extended time. A campaign model
can capture the effects of larger battles and Dupuy’s campaign.
A strategic model captures the impacts of battles and campaigns over months or
years. This proposed definition of campaign and strategic models facilitates the ability to
view the impacts of intrastate warfare, international terrorism, fourth generation warfare,
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or the ‘long war.’ Figure II-8 presents this hierarchy, along with the appropriate time
measure. Figure II-9 relates Dupuy’s levels of combat and the proposed hierarchy of
combat models.
Strategic Models
Months/Years

Campaign Models
Days

Mission Models
Hours

Engagement Models
Minutes

Engineering/System Models
Seconds

Figure II-8: Hierarchy of Combat Models

Dupuy’s
Level of Combat
War

Old Paradigm

New Paradigm

Fidelity of Forces

Measure of Time

Strategy

Army on Army

Months/Years

Campaign

Force on Force

Days

Mission

Many on Many
or
Few on Few

Hours

Engagement

Few on Few
or
One on One

Minutes

Engineering

Components

Seconds

Hierarchy of
Combat Models

Campaign
Battle
Engagement
Action
Duel

Figure II-9: Relationship of Level of Combat and Hierarchy of Combat Models
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The traditional definitions of the hierarchy of models consider the level of detail
and aggregation of entities as the defining attribute. This can be seen as the fidelity of
forces within the model. The weakness of the traditional paradigm is that models which
incorporate details of an adversary’s decision process and the impacts of our actions over
time is considered an engineering level model because of the detail required to model the
influences of the adversary. Models of an adversary’s decision making process obviously
provide insight and support to the campaign and strategic plans and, as such, should be
considered campaign/ strategic models. The descriptions of the hierarchy of combat
models do not contradict the current hierarchy; however, they add the engineering and
strategic level models and focus on the primary measurement of the event instead of the
level of aggregation and the size/ type of entities. Therefore, both paradigms can and do
exist simultaneously to describe combat models.
Discrete Event Simulation
Law and Kelton define discrete event simulation as “the modeling of a system as
it evolves over time by a representation in which the state variables change
instantaneously at separate points in time” (2000, p. 6). Many of today’s combat models
can be characterized as discrete event simulations. These include THUNDER, STORM,
CEM, TACWAR and JWARS, among others. (THUNDER and STORM are the leading
campaign models used by the US Air Force. CEM is used by the US Army Center for
Army Analysis. TACWAR is the official campaign model of the Joint Staff. JWARS is
a next generation campaign model under development by Joint Forces Command).
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Kelton, Sadowski and Sadowski suggest nine elements of discrete event
simulations: Entities, Attributes, Resources, Queues, (Global) Variables, Statistical
Accumulators, Events, Simulation Clock, and Starting and Stopping (2002, p. 24-28). An
entity is the first common piece of a discrete event simulation. The entity is created by
the user or the model. The entity has specific attributes which gives the entity individual
characteristics. As the entity moves through the system, resources are expended. The
waiting for, and consumption of, these resources creates queues within the system.
Additionally, variables are globally changed within the system.
Statistical accumulators are used to measure the status of the attributes, variables,
and queues. Events are the time that a change to variables, entities, and attributes occurs
within the simulation. The time of the event is tracked by the simulation clock. This is
not a continuous clock but a time sequential list of events. Finally, the simulation must
have starting and stopping conditions.
Banks lists thirteen advantages of discrete event simulations (1998, p. 10-12).
Ten of these thirteen advantages are inherit in modeling a system, regardless of the tool
being used. However, three of Banks’ advantages are more directly related to discrete
event simulation as opposed to some other methodologies. First, discrete event
simulations can compress and expand time. The time clock within a simulation can be
altered to investigate specific events in great detail or increased so the impact over
days/weeks/months/years can be investigated.
Next, discrete event simulations can be used to identify constraints. Simulations
can reveal the bottlenecks within complex systems. This can assist in revealing the
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causes of delays. Discrete event simulation modeling and data collection of queues is
specifically significant.
Finally, discrete event simulation can help visualize the interactions within the
analysis. Most modern simulations have animation features which allow the users to
visualize the events but generally require smaller time slices. The focus of a discrete
event simulation, however, is generally the actions at the event instead of the entirety of
the system.
As suggested earlier, most combat models have traditionally been implemented as
discrete event simulations. The advantages and flexibility of discrete event simulations
have allowed an array of applications of combat to be modeled by this approach, from the
high fidelity engineering-level models to the lower-fidelity campaign-level models.
System Dynamics
Forrester defines a system as a “grouping of parts that operate together for a
common purpose” (1968, p. 1-1). This grouping can include the parts, people, and/or
resources required of the system. A system of combat might include the equipment,
troops, leaders, and supplies of both sides of the battle. Sweetser states that “dynamics
refers to change over time. System dynamics is, therefore, a methodology used to
understand how systems change over time” (1999, p. 2). The system dynamics society
defines system dynamics as the “methodology for studying and managing complex
feedback systems” (SDS, 2006, p. 1).
Forrester discusses two types of systems, ‘open’ and ‘feedback’ (1968, p. 1-5).
An open system takes inputs and produces an output that does not influence future inputs.
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A feedback system, or closed system, uses the outputs of one cycle to affect inputs for
future cycles of decisions. The feedback can be seen as positive feedback (where an
action produces more actions) or negative feedback (where the system seeks a goal).
Thus, a system with feedback is preferred when decisions are made by decision makers
which rely on the past performance or can affect functions integral to future decisions.
This is clearly a trait of combat. The modern commander is aware of the current position
of troops, material, force strengths, and outcomes which are feedback from the previous
time period of combat. Additionally, the current decision impacts future locations of
troops and material and therefore future options and decisions.
A system dynamics model changes in a transient nature rather than at an event.
This implies that the system is continuous in both states and variables. Thus, the rate of
effectiveness is continuously changing over time rather than held at a constant until the
next event which changes the rate occurs. A final attribute of system dynamics models is
their non-linear nature; the model can capture effects which are more than additive.
The concepts of levels and rates drive system dynamics models. When a system
is at rest, the levels are the amount of materials and supplies that are present
(Forrester, 1961, p. 68). This might be viewed in a combat model as the number of
troops, equipment, or material present at any point during the model. The rates are the
instantaneous flows of materials and items rather than time stepped increments in discrete
event simulations (Forrester, 1961, p. 69). The rates of flow can depend upon levels
determined within the model. Additionally, information about the levels must be
communicated to adjust the “valve” which controls the rate of flows within the model.
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Figure II-10 is a representation of a system dynamics model of saving money with
positive feedback presented by Kirkwood (2005, p. 10).
SAVINGS

INTEREST

INTEREST RATE

Figure II-10: System Dynamics Model of Savings

The Savings is a level and is indicated by a square container. Interest is a
decision function that is represented by a valve. The valve controls the rate of flow into
Savings from Interest which is represented as the double arrow. Finally, the Interest is
dependent upon the current level of Savings and the Interest Rate. This dependency is
identified by the single arrows. The Interest causes a rate to change the amount of the
Savings. Assuming an initial Savings level of $100 and an Interest Rate of 5% per year,
the positive feedback and growth of the system can be observed.
System dynamics models can easily be adjusted by the decision maker to test new
and different scenarios (Sweetser, 1999, p. 1). This includes adding new linkages and
feedback loops to the system. Additionally, system dynamics models are designed to
model continuous processes rather than discrete events (Sweetser, 1999, p. 2). The flow
of battle can certainly be seen as a continuous event.
System dynamics models are able to represent “softer” qualitative aspects, such as
behavior. These aspects can be difficult to model in a discrete event simulation. Coyle
states, “system dynamics, however and rightly, is strategic in orientation and it is often
seen as necessary to introduce ‘soft’ variables” (2000, p. 227). Examples of these softer
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variables include: consumer satisfaction, chaos, suffering, and other human activities
(Aracil, 1999, p. 5). For further information regarding the use of system dynamics to
model the qualitative effects and the softer aspects see Aracil (1999), Coyle (2000), and
Forrester (1994), among others. The application of qualitative aspects is pertinent to
combat since such drivers as morale, training, and leadership are all qualitative concepts
which historically have been difficult to model.
Another feature of system dynamics models, similar to complex adaptive systems,
is these models are focused on the internal dynamics of the individual system. The
evolution of the system is more important than the specific event that precipitated the
solution (Sweetser, 1999, p. 3). This concept is also valued in combat modeling, as the
solution or victory may be less important than the path to achieve the victory in a
modeling analysis.
A final advantage of system dynamics models is the choice of time step does not
impact the results. This allows the modeler to focus on the interactions within the model
and not the size of the time step to get the required level of detail.
Regression Models
This section provides an introduction to simple linear regression models, multiple
linear regression models and logistic regression models.
Least Square Linear Regression Models
Least square regression models fit a relationship of one or more independent
factors to a dependent factor. In this dissertation, simple linear regression models
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(Equation II-1) and multiple linear regression (Equation II-2) analyses are applied. The
regression coefficients are βi and the independent variables are xi.
y=β 0 +β1 ·x1 + ε
y=x′·β + ε =β 0 +β1 ·x1 +

+β n ·xn + ε

(II-1)
(II-2)

The errors (ε) are assumed to have a mean of zero, all have the same (but
unknown) variance, and be uncorrelated (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining:, 2001, p. 13).
Least squares estimates can be used to estimate the regression coefficients (βi)
(Montgomery, Peck, & Vining:, 2001, p. 71). The regression analysis results used
throughout this dissertation are presented in an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) table.
Some of the definitions, assumptions and interpretations are discussed next.
The coefficient of determination, or R2, measures the amount of variation present
in the response after the accounting for the independent variables (Hughes & Grawoig,
1971, p. 344). As more factors are added to the model, an adjusted R2 is preferred since
it accounts for the degrees of freedom of the associated model. When the R2 and adjusted
R2 are close to one, this implies most of the variability of the response is explained by the
regression model (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining:, 2001, p. 40). The standard error of the
model, or Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) is the square root of the mean squared error.
Since the models in this dissertation are used to predict the public support for a
conflict, the Prediction Error Sum of Squares (PRESS) statistic and R2Prediction are
included in the ANOVA tables. The PRESS statistic is a measure of the prediction
n

quality of the model. It is defined as

∑ ⎡⎣ y − yˆ
i =1

i

2

(i )

⎤⎦ where yˆ (i ) is the ith predicted

response when the regression is performed without the ith respective data points
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(Montgomery, Peck, & Vining: 2001, p. 152). The R2Prediction is defined as
1 − PRESS SSTotal , where SSTotal is the total sum of squares from the ANOVA table.
R2Prediction ‘explains’ the percent of variability in predicting new observations
(Montgomery, Peck, & Vining: 2001, p. 153). Similar to R2, a R2Prediction close to one is
highly desired.
The null hypothesis for the F-test is that all of the coefficients are equal to zero
(H0: βi = 0 ∀ i ; Ha: βi ≠ 0 some at least one i). If the observed F-test statistic is larger
than the appropriate reference value from the F-distribution, then the null hypothesis is
rejected (indicating at least one regression coefficient is significant).
The null hypothesis used in the analysis for each variable was that the regression
coefficient equaled zero (H0: βi = 0; Ha: βi ≠ 0). The magnitude of the t-test statistic was
compared to the appropriate reference value from the two-sided t-distribution with
α = 0.05. The null hypothesis was rejected if the magnitude is greater than the critical
value (implying a coefficient other than zero), or failed to reject (implying there was
insufficient evidence to support the coefficient is not zero).
For further details on linear regression analyses see Hughes & Grawoig (1971),
Neter et al. (1996), or Montgomery, Peck, & Vining (2001) among others.
Logistic Regression Models

Montgomery, Peck, and Vining provide some benefits of using generalized linear
models (GLMs). First, GLMs unify both linear and non-linear techniques. Second, the
assumptions and requirements that the data are normal and have constant variance are no
longer required. Finally, the responses only need to be a member of the exponential
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family. This broader category includes all exponential, gamma, normal, Poisson, and
binomial distributions (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2001, p. 443). Specifically,
multivariate logistic regression is used in this study to model public support. The logistic
regression model was chosen after exploring the Poisson distribution, because the survey
data used in the study are binary. Equation II-3 is the basic multivariate logistic
regression model.
E ( y) =

e x′β
1
=
x′β
1+ e
1 + e − x′β

(II-3)

The method of maximum likelihood is used to estimate the parameters. The
expected responses for each observation are therefore E ( yi ) = pi . A link function is used
to transform the basic model to a linear model. This link for the binomial model is
known as the logit function and presented in Equation II-4.
⎛ p ⎞
g ( x) = ln ⎜
⎟ = x′β
⎝ 1− p ⎠

(II-4)

Deviance is used to measure the goodness of fit. Equation II-5 is presented by
Collett to evaluate the deviance of a binary logistic model (2003, p. 67). The deviance
measures the difference of log of the likelihood function of the saturated model and the
fitted model.
n

Dev = −2∑ yi log
i =1

pˆ i
+ log (1 − pˆ i )
1 − pˆ i

(II-5)

The goodness of fit is evaluated by comparing the deviance of the model to a χ2
with (n - p) degrees of freedom. If Dev > χ2(n-p) then the model is not adequate. There are
two possible reasons for this inadequacy (Collett, 2003, p. 195). The first explanation is
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that the model requires additional factors to be included or the factors which are included,
need to be transformed to better represent the data. The second reason the deviance is
high could be that the data is overdispersed or has extra binomial variation.
Overdispersion is present when the actual variance is greater than the expected
variance. Since a binomial was used for the data analyzed in this study, the variance is
based directly on the mean. This direct connection between mean and variance is not the
best representation of the data.
Lambert and Roeder developed a simple diagnostic for indicating a logistic
regression model with overdispersion. Their test plotted the binomial probability (p) to
yi

⎛ p ⎞ ⎛ 1− p ⎞
the convexity of the binomial plot represented by C ( p ) = n ∑ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜
⎟
ˆ i ⎠ ⎝ 1 − pˆ i ⎠
i =1 ⎝ p
−1

n

mi − yi

(Lambert & Roeder, 1995, p. 1226). If the resulting curve is convex, then the model has
overdispersion.
Williams provided the following procedure to evaluate the overdispersion
factor, φ (Williams, 1982, p. 146):
1) Let overdispersion factor φ =0 and all weights wi=1, evaluate the Pearson
deviance (χ2) of the saturated model (all possible factors),
2
n
wi ( yi − ni pˆ i )
2
.
where Pearson Deviance = χ = ∑
ˆ i (1 − pˆ i )
i =1 ni p
2) Compare χ2 with χ2(n-p) where n is the number of binomial observations and p is
the number of parameters of the fitted model. If χ2 is unacceptably large,
n

conclude φ >0 and estimate φˆ = X 2 −

∑ w (1 − w v d )
i =1

i

i i

i

n

∑ w ( n − 1)(1 − w v d )
i =1

i

i

i i

, where

i

vi = ni pi (1 − pi ) and di is the ith diagonal element of the variance-covariance

matrix.
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(

3) Let the new weights be, wi = 1 + ( ni − 1) φˆ

)

−1

and estimate β and recalculate χ2.

4) If χ2 is close to the degrees of freedom (n - p) quit, else recalculate φˆ and
return to step 3.
After correcting a model for dispersion, the deviance can no longer be used to
check overall adequacy of the model. This is because the deviance has been adjusted to
be close to the degrees of freedom within of the model.
This section provided an introduction to generalized linear models and
overdispersion. For more detailed please see Montgomery, Peck, and Vining (2001) or
Collett (2003).
Lanchester Laws

This section is divided into three subsections. The first provides a background to
the Lanchester Laws. The second is a discussion of the direct and area fire applications
of the Lanchester Laws. The final subsection demonstrates how the Lanchester Laws
have been applied to insurgency warfare.
Lanchester’s Work

Beginning on September 4, 1914, Lanchester published a series of sixteen weekly
articles entitled “Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm.” The fifth and sixth
articles, printed on October 2nd and 9th are the foundations of the Lanchester Laws. A
brief summary is provided in this section. MacKay provides an excellent mathematical
summary of the Lanchester Laws (MacKay, 2006, p. 17).
Lanchester begins by proposing that the ancient battle was comprised of several
individual duels. Lanchester states that in an ancient battle there is “little or no
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importance” between a battle of 1000 Blue forces versus 1000 Red forces and 500 Blue
forces versus 500 Red forces (1914, p. 422). These two battles result in the same
victorious side depending only on the individual fighting value and not numerical
strength of the forces. Although the equations were never directly listed, Taylor and
others suggest that Lanchester could mathematically represent his statements of the linear
ancient battle as Equation II-6 (Taylor, 1983a, p. 54).
dR
c
=E=
dB
k

(II-6)

where, B and R are the number of Blue and Red forces engaged, c and k are the individual
fighting values for the Red and Blue forces (better known as the Red / Blue attrition
coefficients), and E is the exchange ratio. Equation II-6 can be integrated and rewritten
as the Lanchester Linear Law, Equation II-7 (Taylor, 1983a, p. 54)..
k[ R0 − R (t )] = c[ B0 − B (t )]

(II-7)

Equation II-7 assumes R0 and B0 are the initial sizes of the Red and Blue forces, and B(t)
and R(t) are the number of loses for Blue and Red forces, respectively, at time t.
The Linear Law can also be demonstrated as the Area Fire Equation
(Equation II-8):
dB
= −R × B × c
dt
dR
= −R × B × k
dt

(II-8)

The Area Fire Equations have been used to describe the effectiveness of attritting
an enemy’s army by shooting into any area as opposed to directly targeting an individual.
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This characterizes both the impacts of artillery and shooting in the direction of a nontracked target.
Taylor provides the following example as an application of the Lanchester Linear
Law. For this example, let there initially be one hundred Red forces (R0 = 100), and let
k = c, thus the exchange ratio is one (E=1). Additionally, let the initial number of Blue

forces (B0) increase from 100 to 300 in increments of 50. Solving for the size of Blue’s
forces surviving ( B f = B0 − B(t ) ) when all Red forces are annihilated ( R (t ) = 100 )

provides the results given in Table II-8.
Table II-8: Ancient Warfare Example (Taylor, 1983a, p. 56)

B0

100

150

200

250

300

Bf

0

50

100

150

200

Blue losses

100

100

100

100

100

* Fighting continues until Rf = 0
Lanchester provides a description of ancient battle to introduce the idea that
modern battle is a result of a concentration of resources as opposed to a series of duels.
The concentration of forces allows for a single target to be attacked from multiple sources
and thus is no longer a simple duel. However, when it is assumed that the forces have
equal individual fighting values, “the number of men knocked out per unit time will be
directly proportional to the numerical strength of the opposing force” (Lanchester, 1914,
p. 422). Lanchester provides the following two equations as mathematical
representations of the preceding statement (Equation II-9); when integrated, these are
now referred to as the Lanchester Square Laws (Equation II-10) (Taylor, 1983a, p. 61).
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dB
= −R × c
dt
dR
= −B × k
dt

(II-9)

k[ R02 − R 2 (t )] = c[ B02 − B 2 (t )]

(II-10)

Using the same assumptions from Taylor’s Lanchester Linear Law example, Table II-9
presents the impact of concentration of forces determined by solving the Lanchester
Square Law.
Table II-9: Modern Warfare Example (Taylor, 1983a, p. 62)

B0

100

150

200

250

300

Bf

0

112

173

229

283

Blue losses

100

38

27

21

17

* Fighting continues until Rf = 0
Taylor explains the Lanchester Laws can be used to answer the following seven questions
for previous generations of warfare:
1. Who will “win”? Be annihilated?
2. What force ratio is required to guarantee victory?
3. How many survivors will the winner have?
4. How long will be battle last?
5. How do the force levels change over time?
6. How do the parameters [i.e. initial force levels, b0 and r0, and the attritionrate coefficients, c and k] affect the outcome of battle?
7. Is concentration of forces a good tactic? (Taylor, 1983a, p. 65-66)
These are broad questions whose answers are applicable to a battle where political
objective is achieved by attritting or annihilating the enemy’s forces. The equations for
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the solutions of each of these questions are found directly from the Lanchester Linear and
Square Laws.
It is important to note that the Lanchester Laws were also developed
independently by Osipov in 1915 (Helmbold, 1993 p. 279). The work by Osipov begins
with a comparison of the casualties of 38 battles spanning from 1805 until 1905 (Osipov,
1915/1995, p. 296). Osipov states that a mathematical model of the casualties can be
made by inversely relating the remaining strengths to the initial strengths. He provides
Equation II-11, where A and B are the initial strengths of each side and A′ and B′ are the
remains strength of forces at a specific time (Osipov, 1915/1995, p. 299).
A′2 − B′2 = A2 − B 2

(II-11)

Osipov adds that the effectiveness of each side impacts the outcome of the battle. Osipov
includes two factors α and β, which “are the hits caused by riflemen on sides A and B in
one unit of time” (1915/1995, p. 302). Osipov includes these factors into Equation II-11
yielding the new expression for casualties, Equation II-12.

α ( A2 − A′2 ) = β ( B 2 − B′2 )

(II-12)

Equation II-12, with variable and parameter substitutions, is equivalent to the Lanchester
Square Law in Equation II-10. Osipov continues by providing a method to include the
impacts of machine guns and artillery. This enables the work to move from a
homogenous to a heterogeneous study of combat. Osipov showed Equation II-13
determines the number of riflemen casualties given A riflemen and M cannons for one
side, and B riflemen and N cannons for the other side, with α being the rate of kill of the
riflemen and β being the rate of kill of the cannons (1915/1995, p. 303).
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2

2

2

β ⎞ ⎛
β ⎞ ⎛
β ⎞ ⎛
β ⎞
⎛
⎜ A + M ⎟ − ⎜ A′ + M ⎟ = ⎜ B + N ⎟ − ⎜ B′ + N ⎟
α ⎠ ⎝
α ⎠ ⎝
α ⎠ ⎝
α ⎠
⎝

2

(II-13)

If a = A – A′ and b = B – B′, then Equation II-13 can be reduced to a more familiar
Lanchester representation, Equation II-14, which is the Lanchester Law for multiple
weapons (Osipov, 1915/1995, p. 303).

( A2 − A′2 ) = ( B 2 − B′2 ) − 2

β
(aM − bN )
α

(II-14)

Modeling Area and Direct Fire

The Lanchester Laws, originally representing ancient and more modern warfare,
evolved into representing area and direct fire weapons. Fortunately, the analyst may not
have to choose between the two laws but instead can use a combination. Helmbold
expanded the Lanchester Laws by representing both the Linear and Square Laws in one
general form given in Equation II-15 (1965, p. 858).
1− w

dB
⎛B⎞
= c⎜ ⎟
dt
⎝R⎠

R

(II-15)

1− w

dR
⎛R⎞
=k⎜ ⎟
dt
⎝B⎠

B

When the Weiss parameter (w) equals 1, the Lanchester Square Law results.
Similarly, when w = 1/2, the result is a form of the Lanchester Linear Law. Additionally,
when w = 0 the expression in Equation II-15 describes the Lanchester Logarithmic Laws.
The Lanchester Logarithmic Laws are typically used to describe the number of casualties
of non-fighting participants, such as the doctors, chaplains, and headquarters staff
(Helmbold, 1965, p. 858).
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Bracken introduced a tactical parameter to the Lanchester Laws in “Lanchester
Models of the Ardennes Campaign.” This parameter has been used by authors, since its
introduction, to better fit the Lanchester Laws to historical battles (See Chen and Chu
(2001), Lucas and Turkes (2004), and Hung et al. (2005)).
Starting from the general form of the Lanchester Laws (Equation II-15), Bracken
added a tactical parameter, d, and rewrote w in terms of p and q, where p + q = 1, to result
in Equation II-16 (Bracken, 1995, p. 419).
dB
= c(d or 1 d ) R p B q
dt
dR
= k (1 d or d ) B p R q
dt

(II-16)

The Red and Blue exponent parameters (p and q) are able to model the linear laws,
square laws and the continuous range between. When p = q = 0.5 the linear laws result,
and when p = 1 and q = 0 the square laws result.
Bracken’s tactical parameter was used as a constant d for the defending force and
1/d for the attacking force. The parameter switched when the attacking force changed
during the battle. When d < 1 the defender receives less casualties and when d > 1 the
defender receives more casualties. Bracken (1995), Chen and Chu (2001), Lucas and
Turkes (2004), and Hung et al. (2005) all showed the data of the Ardennes Campaign
(Battle of the Bulge) and the Battle of Kursk could be better fit using Bracken’s Tactical
Parameter, d. During both of these battles, the attacking force changed.
Regardless of the source, Bracken’s parameter suggests a means to capture the
impacts of will-to-fight of the troops when they are attacking or defending. This
approach to incorporate the will and morale of the troops works effectively only for true
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attrition based battles found in interstate conflicts and some intrastate conflicts. For
example, this method works for a Korean conflict but was not a good fit for historical
data from Bosnia or Somalia. The alliance battles in Bosnia and Somalia did not involve
large force on force engagements; therefore, a turning point as required by Bracken’s
Tactical Parameter did not exist. While not applicable to all conflicts, the methodology
of incorporating a morale/will factor, as well as the attrition coefficient is valid.
Modeling Insurgencies

Deitchman published an early article applying the Lanchester Laws to insurgent
warfare (Taylor, 1983b, p. 446). This article, entitled “A Lanchester Model of Guerrilla
Warfare,” focused on the force ratios and size of the guerrilla bands versus the
conventional/regular army. Deitchman suggests that an ambush set by the guerrillas is
best described by the guerrillas attacking by direct fire, while the conventional army
returns fire into an area or using indirect fire. Equation II-17 describes this engagement,
where x1 is the number of guerrillas, x2 is the number of conventional forces, x1 and x2 are
the rate of change of force size over time, A = r2 Ae2/ A1 (where r2 is the rate of fire of the
conventional army, Ae2 is the conventional army’s single round area effectiveness, and A1
is the area that the guerrillas are hiding) and b = r1p12 (where r1 is the rate of fire of the
guerrilla’s weapons, and p12 is the single shot probability of kill of the guerrilla’s
weapons) (Deitchman, 1962, p. 821).

x1 = − Ax2 x1
x2 = −bx1
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(II-17)

Equation II-18 is the condition for equality given these circumstances (Deitchman, 1962,
p. 821).

⎛ A⎞
x10 = ⎜ ⎟ x220
⎝ 2b ⎠

(II-18)

Deitchman continues his analysis of guerrilla warfare by demonstrating that
Equation II-18 implies that the regular forces must have a significantly favorable force
ratio to be able to win against the guerrillas. Unfortunately, the area fire weapons may
only slightly improve the capabilities of the regular forces, since the rate of fire is
reduced (Deitchman, 1962, p. 824).
Deitchman justifies his results with historical data arguing that the lower the force
ratio, the more likely it is that the guerrillas win the conflict. Figure II-11 illustrates the
outcome of guerrilla warfare since World War II up to the publication of Deitchman’s
work in 1962 correlated to the force ratio of regular forces versus guerrilla forces.
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Figure II-11: Estimated Force Ratios in Guerrilla Wars (Deitchman, 1962, Figure 2 Page 821)

Deitchman indicates significant limitations to his methodology at the beginning of the
article:

This analysis neglects many important factors in guerrilla-counterguerrilla
operations, particularly the effect of the attitude and support of the local
population, for which the two sides must contend by political, economic, and
psychological as well as military means. (Deitchman, 1962, p. 819)
This dissertation directly improves upon these limitations.
Schaffer, in his RAND research paper entitled Lanchester Models of Guerrilla

Engagements, continued Deitchman’s research. He specifically modeled three categories
of guerrilla warfare; skirmishes, ambushes, and sieges. Schaffer begins with a general
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form of the Lanchester Laws for the number of casualties, c, of each side m and n (1967,
p. 5).
Equation II-19 presents this formulation, where kn (t,m)n=knmn when the linear
law is appropriate and kn (t,m)n=knn when the square law is appropriate. The
i

term ∑ Ei (t , m)Wi (t ) represents the use of supporting fire within the Lanchester Laws.
i
⎛ dm ⎞
=
−
k
t
m
n
−
(
,
)
∑ Ei (t , m)Wi (t )
n
⎜
⎟
⎝ dt ⎠c
j
⎛ dn ⎞
=
−
k
t
n
m
−
(
,
)
∑ E j (t , n)W j (t )
m
⎜ ⎟
⎝ dt ⎠c

(II-19)

Schaffer continues with two assumptions about the rate of surrender and desertion
with the model (1967, p. 6). First, the expected values for the rates can be developed in a
similar manner and thus they can be added together. Second, the rate of surrender and
desertion is based on the rate of casualties and the difference between the force ratio and
one. Schaffer postulates the rates can be represented as the power series (Equation II-20),
where am, an, bm, bn, cm and cn are all coefficients representing the discipline and morale
of the troops (1967, p. 6).
2
2
⎡ ⎛ dm ⎞
⎤ ⎡ ⎛n ⎞
⎤
⎛ dm ⎞
⎛ dm ⎞
⎛n ⎞
⎜
⎟ = am − ⎢bm1 ⎜
⎟ + bm2 ⎜
⎟ + …⎥ − ⎢cm1 ⎜ − 1⎟ + cm2 ⎜ − 1⎟ + …⎥
⎝ dt ⎠ s + d
⎝ dt ⎠c
⎝m ⎠
⎥⎦
⎣⎢ ⎝ dt ⎠c
⎦⎥ ⎣⎢ ⎝ m ⎠
2
2
⎡ ⎛ dn ⎞
⎤ ⎡ ⎛m ⎞
⎤
⎛ dn ⎞
⎛ dn ⎞
⎛m ⎞
⎜ ⎟ = an − ⎢bn1 ⎜ ⎟ + bn2 ⎜ ⎟ + …⎥ − ⎢ cn1 ⎜ − 1⎟ + cn2 ⎜ − 1⎟ + …⎥
⎝ dt ⎠ s + d
⎝ dt ⎠c
⎝n ⎠
⎢⎣ ⎝ dt ⎠c
⎥⎦ ⎢⎣ ⎝ n ⎠
⎥⎦

(II-20)

⎛ dm ⎞
⎛ dn ⎞
Equation II-20 assumes the rates ⎜
⎟ and ⎜ ⎟ must be less than zero, am
⎝ dt ⎠ s + d
⎝ dt ⎠ s + d

and an also must be less than or equal to zero, and if the force ratio m/n is greater than
one, then cmi = 0 (similarly if n/m > 1, then cni = 0 ).
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Schaffer then combines the casualty, surrender, and desertion rates to reduce the
power series to only first and second order terms to get the generalized attrition
equations, Equation II-21.
2

i
dm
⎛n ⎞
⎛n ⎞
= − (1 − bm ) kn (t , m)n − cm1 ⎜ − 1⎟ − cm2 ⎜ − 1⎟ − (1 − bm ) ∑ Ei (t , m)Wi (t )
dt
⎝m ⎠
⎝m ⎠
2

j
dn
⎛m ⎞
⎛m ⎞
= − (1 − bn ) km (t , n)m − cn1 ⎜ − 1⎟ − cn2 ⎜ − 1⎟ − (1 − bn ) ∑ E j (t , n)W j (t )
dt
⎝n ⎠
⎝n ⎠

Equation II-21 still requires

cm = 0 (similarly

(II-21)

dm
dn
m
and
< 0 , bm and bn ≤ 0 , and if
> 1 , then
dt
dt
n

n
> 1 , cn = 0 ).
m

Schaffer first investigates skirmishes. He defines skirmishes as where the
riflemen on each side are engaged in aimed fire (Schaffer, 1967, p. 9). Since aimed fire
is considered on both sides, Equation II-21 reduces to Equation II-22.
2

i
dm
⎛n ⎞
⎛n ⎞
= − (1 − bm ) kn n − cm1 ⎜ − 1⎟ − cm2 ⎜ − 1⎟ − (1 − bm ) ∑ Ei (t , m)Wi (t )
dt
⎝m ⎠
⎝m ⎠
2

j
dn
⎛m ⎞
⎛m ⎞
= − (1 − bn ) km m − cn1 ⎜ − 1⎟ − cn2 ⎜ − 1⎟ − (1 − bn ) ∑ E j (t , n)W j (t )
dt
⎝n ⎠
⎝n ⎠

(II-22)

Assuming there are more m forces than n forces and no supporting fire,
Equation II-22 further reduces to Equation II-23 (Schaffer, 1967, p. 13).
dm
= − (1 − bm ) kn n
dt
dn
⎛m ⎞
= − (1 − bn ) km m − cn ⎜ − 1⎟
dt
⎝n ⎠

2

(II-23)

Schaffer next models the ambush. Similar to Deitchman, Schaffer assumed the
ambushee initially engages in area fire. However, as the battle continues, the ambushee
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transfers to aimed fire (Schaffer, 1967, p. 24). The ambushers use aimed fire during the
entire engagement. Schaffer assumes that at the start of the engagement the ambusher
has little motivation to desert or surrender and that at a predetermined time, tc, they
typically begin removing their forces from the battle to prevent undue attrition.
Equation II-24 represents Schaffer’s formulation of this exchange, where H represents a
unit step function, indicating the combat strength of the ambushers remaining in the fight
at time t (Schaffer, 1967, p. 25):
⎛m ⎞
cn (t ) = cn H ( t − tc ) H ⎜ − 1⎟
⎝n ⎠

(II-24)

The generalized attrition equations for the rate of attrition of the ambushed (m)
and the ambusher (n) are presented as Equation II-25 (Schaffer, 1976, p. 25):
2

i
dm
⎛n ⎞
= − (1 − bm ) kn (t )n − cm ⎜ − 1⎟ − (1 − bm ) ∑ Ei (t , m)Wi (t )
dt
⎝m ⎠
2

j
dn
⎛m ⎞
= − km (n, t )m − cn (t ) ⎜ − 1⎟ − ∑ E j (t , n)W j (t )
dt
⎝n ⎠

(II-25)

The final category of guerrilla warfare modeled by Schaffer is the siege. The
siege takes place in two stages (Schaffer, 1967, p. 39). The first stage employs the
support weapons when the riflemen are out of range. This is used to prepare the
battlefield. Unfortunately it does compromise the element of surprise. The second stage
is the engagement of riflemen. Sieges can either involve both stages or only one stage.
For the first stage of the siege, the generalized attrition equation, Equation II-21, can be
reduced to Equation II-26 (Schaffer, 1967, p. 40).

66

i
dm
= − (1 − bm ) ∑ Ei (m)Wi
dt
j
dn
= − (1 − bn ) ∑ E j (n)W j
dt

(II-26)

The second stage of a siege can be represented as Equation II-27 where PKn is the
probability of kill of the weapon used by side n,

γ n Am
m

is the average time for a troop to

acquire a target and t fm is the time to fire on a target (Schaffer, 1967, p. 45).
dm
nm
= − (1 − bm ) PKn
γ n Am
dt
dn
m
= − (1 − bn ) PKm
dt
t fm

(II-27)

Schaffer’s work is continued in the 1969 RAND research paper, Application of
Lanchester Theory to Insurgency Problems. This paper includes applications, data and
conclusions about skirmishes and ambushes from the Vietnam conflict.
Over the last one hundred years a great deal of development of the Lanchester
Laws has occurred. This discussion was limited to the development of the initial theory
and the progression of that theory as applied to guerrilla and insurgency warfare. It is
important to note that in most of the work presented the attrition coefficients are assumed
to be static and not dependent upon the current conditions within the model. Therefore, it
has been assumed that the parameters do not change within the battle. The Bracken
tactical parameter was the one of the few occurrences in the literature where the attrition
coefficients were adjusted based on current conditions within the conflict. Additionally,
it could be concluded that since only one battle/ campaign is modeled that this must be
the decisive battle of the war. No dynamic impacts of the previous battles, or future
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influences from the modeled battle, are directly accounted for within the reviewed
Lanchester Laws.
Modeling Will-to-Fight, Morale, and Combat Spirit

While much has been written about how warfare is changing; a resilient aspect is
the permanence that warfare directly attacks the will-to-fight. This was known in Sun
Tzu’s time and can be seen in the emphasis of information operations and recent creation
of Air Force Cyber Command. This section discusses the will-to-fight and morale of the
combatant as related to combat effectiveness. The discussion thus far has included some
means to incorporate the will-to-fight, morale and combat spirit into combat models.
Bracken added a tactical parameter to the Lanchester Laws. This parameter gave an
advantage to the attacker during a battle. When correlating the Lanchester model to
historical data, Bracken’s parameter was used as a free variable to best fit the casualties
of the battle. His parameter was not determined dynamically by the model. Additionally,
the value and impact was predetermined only for the time the parameter (or its inverse)
was applied.
Schaffer introduced the coefficients of am, an, bm, bn, cm and cn which all
representing the discipline and morale of the troops (1967, p. 25). Schaffer also
introduces the parameter, tc, which indicated the time that the ambushers begin
withdrawing their troops from battle (1967, p. 6). All of Schaffer’s parameters were
determined prior to the model being run and were static during the model’s application.
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Neither Bracken nor Schaffer related the values of their parameters to the actions
and events within the model. This is acceptable for a single, short battle but is not
applicable in the longer durations required for campaign and strategic level models.
The impacts of combat degradation and unit deterioration are discussed in the first
subsection. The conclusions of Marshall are presented and discussed. This subsection on
degradation and deterioration includes the impacts of ineffective combatants, the
differences between training versus active combat, and how the factors can be
implemented in the Lanchester Laws. Next, Perry’s civil stability index accounts for the
impacts of the population will within a combat model. The civil stability index
subsection is followed by a discussion of how morale has been incorporated within the
modern campaign models, specifically the Joint Warfare System (JWARS). The final
subsection discuss how morale has been previously modeled. This discussion begins by
presenting the individual components of combat spirit, and concludes with a discussion
on how morale of the troops changes while they are deployed.
Combat Degradation

The ideas of morale and combat spirit have refined over the years. During World
War One, ‘shell shock’ was considered a physical injury as opposed to a mental
restriction, since men did not suffer from mental deficiencies. “At first, doctors in the
UK proposed an organic explanation: either a microscopic cerebral hemorrhage caused
by the concussive or toxic effects of an exploding shell” (Jones & Wessely, 2007,
p. 167).
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Marshall investigated the psychological aspects of war in his book: Man Against
Fire. He interviewed World War Two and later Korean combatants immediately after
battle and reported remarkable trends about the willingness of combatants to actually
engage the enemy. Marshall found that a number of combatants did not fire at the
enemy.
…not more than one quarter of his men will ever strike a real blow unless they
are compelled by almost overpowering circumstance or unless all junior leaders
consistently “ride heard” on troops with the specific mission of increasing their
fire.
The 25 per cent stands even for the well trained and campaign-seasoned troops. I
mean that 75 per cent will not fire or will not persist in firing against the enemy
and his works. These men may face the danger but they will not fight. (Marshall,
1947, p. 50)
Marshall’s results indicate that the 25% that actually fought against the enemy
varies based on the type of equipment the combatant carried.
…we found that on an average not more than 15 per cent of the men had actually
fired at the enemy positions of personnel with rifles, carbines, grenades,
bazookas, BARs, or machine guns during the course of an entire engagement.
Even allowing for the dead and wounded, and assuming that in their number
there would be the same proportion of active firers as among the living, the figure
did not rise above 20 to 25 per cent of the total for any action. The best showing
that could be made by the most spirited and aggressive companies was that one
man in four had made at least some use of his firepower. (Marshall, 1947, p. 54)
The assumption that the dead fired their weapons at the same rate as the surviving
may be questioned. Those that actively attacked/defended their position may have
become targets because of their aggressiveness, and thus were killed. Additionally, it
could be argued the statistics quoted by Marshall included all the troops within the
theater; it is not expected combat service support personnel regularly engage in combat
operations. Marshall counters this latter argument stating:
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Most of the actions had taken place under conditions of ground and maneuver
where it would have been possible for at least 80 per cent of the men to fire, and
where nearly all hands, at one time or another, were operating within satisfactory
firing distance of enemy works. (Marshall, 1947, p. 54)
It can therefore be seen that the percentage does include some number of supporting
troops; however, all troops were within direct contact with the enemy, and capable of
engaging the enemy.
Chambers attempted to discredit Marshall’s claims in his article “S.L.A.
Marshall’s Men Against Fire: New Evidence Regarding Fire Ratios.” Through an
interview with Frank J Brennan, Chambers concludes that Marshall may not have been
very scientific in his data collection process. Brennan was an escort officer for Marshall
during some of Marshall’s post-battle interviews with troops during the Korean War
(Chambers, 2003, p. 115). When questioned whether Marshall asked the troops
specifically about the firing their weapons, Brannan responded:
I remember he brought up the question but that he did not push it in regard to the
amount of firing. That came up incidentally rather than as a result of a specific
question from him. He asked mostly open-ended questions to elicit information
about what really occurred (Chambers, 2003, p. 117).
Continuing the interview, Brennan said he discussed the conclusion in the book Men
Against Fire with Marshall. Brennan states:
I asked him specifically whether those percentages of his 25 or 30 per cent of the
men firing their weapons – were supportable. He assured me that they were
supportable talking to the soldiers of the time (Chambers, 2003, p. 117).
By supportable, Brennan meant, “any attempt to quantify the percentage that he presented
in his book” (Chambers, 2003, p. 117). From the interview with Brannan, Chambers
concludes that:
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Marshall was unscientific in his methodology and that his figures about the
percentage of troops firing their weapons were either sloppy, fabricated or simply
guesswork. (Chambers, 2003, p. 119)
While the methods used by Marshall may be contested, the original book, Men Against
Fire, did cause many within the US Army to recognize that not all armed and able
warfighters were engaging the enemy. Additionally, the data used by Marshall was based
originally on World War Two data and expanded to the Korean War. Both of these
conflicts involved a significant number of draftees as opposed to volunteer forces. This
factor was not included in Marshall’s analysis.
Rowland’s paper “The Use of Historical Data in the Assessment of Combat
Degradation” compared actual combat results to trials performed in training. The results
suggest an amount of force degradation that is experienced in battle (Rowland, 1987,
p. 149). Rowland used data from the US Civil War through the infantry battle of the
Falklands in 1982.
Rowland began by quantifying the effects of force ratio to the battle’s casualties.
The horizontal axis of Figure II-12 indicates the force ratio of attacking to defending
infantrymen. The vertical axis is the effect of the rate of fire in terms of attacker
casualties per defender. Notice that both axes are logarithmic scale. Rowland points out
that at a 4:1 force ratio, the number of casualties is double the number when the force
ratio is even (1:1) (Rowland, 1987, p. 150).

72

Attack casualties / defender (Log Scale)

100
100

30

10
10

3

11
0.1

1

10

Force ratio (attack infantry / defence infantry) (Log Scale)

Figure II-12: Variation of Attack Casualties /Defense (Rowland, 1987, Figure 1 Page 151)

Rowland then compared the rifle data from actual combat to the rifle data from the
training trials. The rifle data from the Boer Wars, US Civil War, and specific battles
from World War I (Landrecies, Mons, and Neuve Chappelle) was used to create
Figure II-13 (Rowland, 1987, p. 152).
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Figure II-13: Comparison of Rifle Data (Rowland, 1987, Figure 3 Page 152)
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Rowland notes the trends in the slopes between the trials and actual combat are
similar; however, the specific data from over 47 battles is quite different than the trials.
The actual battles indicate the number of attacker casualties per defender range from one
tenth to one eighth of the trial data. The data produced by Rowland does indicate support
to S. L. A. Marshall’s claim that on average 15% of riflemen engage in combat
(Rowland, 1987, p. 153).
Rowland continued the analysis by looking at machine-gun and artillery fire.
These results again indicated degradation in the effectiveness of the actual battles when
compared to the training trials. Rowland’s paper concluded with Equation II-28, which
was the defender’s casualties caused from small arms fire, where D is a factor for
prepared/hasty positions, G is a constant for weapon type, Na is the number of attackers,
Nd is the number of defenders, d is the preparatory bombardment density (lb/yd2), t is the
duration of the preparatory bombardment, ta is the number of attacking armored fighting
vehicles, and Ns is the number of defending machine guns and anti-tank guns (Rowland,
1987, p. 161).
D ⋅ G ( Na / Nd )

0.68

⎡1 − exp ( −5.75d / t 0.5 ) ⎤ ⎡⎣1 − exp ( −1.1ta / N s ) ⎤⎦
⎣
⎦

(II-28)

Civil Stability Index

Perry created a tool useful in capturing the population’s morale. In his thesis
entitled, Modeling Operations Other Than War: Non-Combatants in Combat Modeling,
Perry developed the Civil Stability Index (CSI). This index is defined such that the lower
values imply anarchy/instability. Table II-10 provides subjective examples of the CSI
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number for observable conditions. Perry used this CSI within a model of MOOTW
representing the influence of the population within his model.
Table II-10: Sample CSI Value Representations (Perry, 1994, Table 1 Page 21)

CSI Number
0.15
0.25
0.40
0.50
0.75
0.85

Conditions
Rwanda, April 1994
LA Riots, 1992
South Africa, March 1994
Washington, D.C. Urban housing, after dark
Average day in any European city
Average day in a U.S. small town in the Midwest

Perry proposed that specific thresholds of the CSI cause the model to alter its
activities. Table II-11 lists the CSI thresholds and associated activities his model
performs. The CSI is directly tied to the success of the conflict, effectiveness of
weapons, and the number of guerrillas and potential guerrillas.
Table II-11: Activity on Model Caused by CSI Thresholds (Perry, 1994, Table 2 Page 22)

CSI Threshold

Resulting Model Activities

> 0.15

U.S. must cease offensive action

> 0.20

Perform random draw each day against 10% chance that
outside force required U.S. to withdraw from theater

> 0.30

U.S. player prohibited from using area fire weapons

> 0.40

Transfer 2% of unarmed civilian unit personnel to armed
personnel for each day CSI is below 0.40

< 0.60

Civilians prohibited from supporting rebels with log/intel

< 0.65

Transfer 2% of armed personnel per civilian unit to
unarmed personnel

The CSI was updated based on the actions within the model. This created a
feedback loop common to system dynamics. These updates were presented in the form
of the rates found in Table II-12.
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Table II-12: CSI Activities (Perry, 1994, Table 3 Page 22)

CSI Change
+0.01
+0.01
+0.01
-0.00007
-0.0003
-0.0001
-0.1
-0.05

Impacts on CSI by Model Activities
Per delivery of logistical support to civilian unit
Per day without a starvation death
Per day without a combat death
Per death due to starvation
Per death due to direct combat
Per death due to collateral damage
Per incident of terror attack
Per day of rioting, pro-rated % of day

The interactions of the CSI can be seen in Figure II-14. Logistical support can
only improve the CSI, while terror attacks and rioting only decreases the CSI value. The
absence of deaths increase the value of the CSI; however, each death due to starvation,
direct combat, and collateral damage negatively affect the CSI. All values in Tables II-10
through II-12 were determined subjectively or as estimates to demonstrate the model
(Perry, 1994, p. 21).

+
Logistical support

Civil
Stability
Index

Terror Attacks
Rioting

+ -

Starvation Deaths
Combat Deaths
- Direct or Collateral
Figure II-14: Schematic of Impacts to CSI

Table II-13 is an example provided by Perry indicating how the CSI was calculated at the
beginning of each simulation day (Perry, 1994, p. 57). In this example, combat had not
begun; therefore, only the deaths due to starvation were included in the calculation.
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Table II-13: Changes to CSI Due to Starvation (Perry, 1994, Table 12 Page 58)

Node

Units

Casualties

Old CSI

Modifiers

New CSI

N1

R1 / W1

2/8

0.45

-0.00007 * 10

0.4493

N2

R2

3

0.45

-0.00007 * 3

0.4498

N3

B1 / B2

0/0

0.45

0

0.4500

N6

W2

8

0.40

-0.00007 * 8

0.3998

Using the CSI within a combat model provides the analyst an ability to connect the
actions of the combatants to the public resolve for the conflict. This provides
justification for other events to occur within the model.
Campaign Model Implementation (JWARS)

Bross, in a technical report titled, Measuring the “Will to Fight” in Simulation,
used the definitions of the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) to incorporate
morale and leadership into the campaign model JWARS. JWARS was used in
conjunction with the Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation (SEAS) model
to adjust to actions with the models. JWARS is a campaign level model which “has the
capability to adjust the ability of the respective combatant forces by a variety of
behavioral factors such as leadership, training, etc” (Bross, 2005, p. 2). These factors are
referred to by the JWARS community as ‘soft factors.’ SEAS “is an agent-based
simulation that concentrates on the non-military aspects of social interaction” (Bross,
2005, p. 2). These models were used together during the war-game Unified Vision 04
(UV04). The goal of the experiment was to link the ‘will-to-fight’ attributes of SEAS to
the JWARS morale and unit cohesion values.
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Bross’ claim that JWARS is capable of adjusting the ability of combatants based
on leadership and training does not imply a direct value within JWARS linking training
to the combatant’s effectiveness. The soft factors within JWARS are able to adjust five
behaviors of troops used within JWARS. These behaviors are:
•
•
•
•
•

Unit Rate of Direct Fire
Unit Speed of Maneuver
Unit Suppression of the Rate of Direct Fire
Unit Suppression of the Speed of Maneuver
Unit Breakpoints (Bross, 2005, p. 4)

The five behaviors are impacted by factors associated to the country, unit function, and
unit ranking. The country factor is determined by a vector of sixteen country attributes
defined by NGIC. These attributes are presented in Table II-14.
Table II-14: NGIC Country Attributes (Bross, 2005, Table 1 Page 5)

Ability to Assimilate
Air Defense
Battle Command
Combat Experience
Combat Service Support
Combined Arms Operations
Fire Support
Intelligence

Joint and Combined Operations
Leadership
Maneuver
Mobility and Survivability
Morale and Cohesion
Power Projection
Readiness
Training

Bross only investigated the impact of the morale and cohesion attributes;
however, when one attribute within JWARS is activated, they are all active. The number
used for the morale and cohesion attribute within JWARS is based on the score
developed by NGIC. This score is based on the evaluation of the sub-elements of morale
and cohesion. Table II-15 represents the sub-elements and score for an arbitrary
adversary.
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Table II-15: NGIC Morale and Cohesion Sub-elements (Bross, 2005, Table 2 Page 6)

Level

Service
Officers
&
soldiers

Pride

Risk
Soldiers
& leaders

Discipline

Tension

Ldr-Sub
Loyalty

Soldier
Loyalty

Unit
Morale

National
Support

10

Serve in
regiment
or cohort

All units
have pride

Share risk
assumption

All units
highly
disciplined

Tension
within units
almost nonexistent

High
degree

High
degree

Very high

Very high
degree

9

Serve in
same units

90% +
units have
pride

Share risk
assumption

90%+ units
highly
disciplined

Tension
within units
almost nonexistent

Reasonable
degree

High
degree

High in
most
units

Moderately
high degree

8

Serve in
same units

Many
units have
pride

Share risk
assumption

Many units
highly
disciplined

Tension
within units
almost nonexistent

Reasonable
degree

Reasonable
degree

Fairly
good in
most
units

High
degree

7

Usually
serve in
same unit

Many
units have
pride

Sometimes
share risk
assumption

Many units
highly
disciplined

Tension
within units
minimal

Some
degree

Reasonable
degree

Good in
elite
units;
others
fair

Mostly
supports

6

Sometimes
serve in
same units

Some units
have pride

Sometimes
share risk
assumption

Units
generally
disciplined

Tension
within units
minimal

Some
degree

Some
degree

Fair in
most
units

Mostly
supports;
some
dissidents
do not

5

Sometimes
serve in
same units

Some units
have pride

Sometimes
share risk
assumption

Units
generally
disciplined

Some
tension
within units

Little
degree

Some
degree

Low in
some
units

Nation
supports;
many
dissidents
do not

4

Sometimes
serve in
same units

Few units
have pride

Sometimes
share risk
assumption

Units
generally
disciplined

Some
tension
within units

Little
degree

Little
degree

Low in
most
units

Nation
tends to
support;
large
minority
does not

3

Sometimes
serve in
same units

Few units
have pride

Risk
assumption
between
soldiers &
leaders
unusual

Units
frequently
lack
discipline

Some
tension
within units

Little to no
degree

Little
degree

Low in
all units

Nation
divided

2

Seldom
serve in
same units

Few units
have pride

Risk
assumption
between
soldiers &
leaders
unusual

Units
frequently
lack
discipline

Frequent
tension
within units

Little to no
degree

Little to no
degree

Low in
most
units; low
desertion
rate

Nation does
not support;
some
groups do

Seldom
serve in
same units

Virtually
all lack
pride

Risk
assumption
between
soldiers &
leaders
almost nonexistent

Absence of
discipline

Frequent
tension
within units

Little to no
degree

Low in
most
units;
high
desertion
rate

Nation has
no respect
for military

8

6

3

7

6

7

9

1

Score
Average

Little to no
degree

5
NGIC Factor = 6.4
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Bross states that the columns associated with service officers and soldiers, pride,
discipline, leader-sub loyalty, soldiers loyalty, and unit morale do not change during a
short (20 day) conflict (2005, p. 7). This implies that the columns associated with risk
soldiers and leaders, tension, and national support are the only characteristics that could
change during a short conflict.
The unit function factor of JWARS divides the unit into one of three categories;
combat, combat support, and combat service support. A setting for each category is fixed
globally (Bross, 2005, p. 7). Since this is a global variable, it impacts all combatants
equally. Generally, the combat units have a factor of one. The value of the combat
support unit is less that the combat unit, and the value of the combat service support unit
is less than the combat support unit.
The unit ranking factor is the final contribution to the soft factors. Again, each
unit is considered to be in one of three categories. It is assumed the unit is an elite,
standard or militia unit. The value for each follows a similar relation as the unit function
factor and is again considered a global factor. Thus, the value for elite unit is greater than
the standard unit which is greater than the militia unit. This greatly limits the capabilities
of the model when comparing asymmetrical forces since the factors involving a
conventional force being ambushed are not properly modeled.
Bross states Equation II-29 for the impact for each behavior where N is the county
factor, R is the unit ranking factor and F is the unit function, the % subscript indicates the
amount of influence of the factor on the total behavior (2005, p. 8).

(

)(

)(

SFBehavior = 1 − ( N % ⋅ (1 − N ) ) ⋅ 1 − ( R% ⋅ (1 − R ) ) ⋅ 1 − ( F% ⋅ (1 − F ) )
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)

(II-29)

Bross next restricted the investigation to only elite combat troops and so reduced
Equation II-29 to Equation II-30 (2005, p. 8).

(

SFBehavior = 1 − ( N % ⋅ (1 − N ) )

)

(II-30)

Bross concludes with an experimental design which changed the country
attributes to impact the behaviors of the JWARS model. Figure II-15 represents the Red
and Blue troop losses as the Red soft factors are varied from ineffective to effective
(Bross, 2005, p. 12). The area indicated by the ripple on the chart suggests the possibility
of an area Dewar et al. refers to as non-monotonic behavior. If so, the results are chaotic
in nature.

Ripple

BLUE
UV04
Factor
Range

Blue - MEAN

Figure II-15: Troop loses by Red Soft Factor (Bross, 2005, Figure 6 Page 12)
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Bross concludes that the impact of the will-to-fight on combat outcomes within
JWARS with the following statement:
Combat outcomes vary significantly, both statistically and military, as the will to
fight takes on different values. Even more important for the analyst is the fact
that these effects are strongly non-linear and evidenced primarily as interactions.
This means that tracing cause-and-effects will be extremely difficult in the battles
produced by the model, just as it is in real historical and operational analysis.
The search for answers will be more time consuming rather than quick due to this
level of complexity. (Bross, 2005, p. 19)
As indicted in Bross’s conclusions, an impact to the model is evident as factors
relating to will-to-fight are changed. However, this test did not dynamically change these
factors, but rather merely established that the model does depend on the factors.
Additionally, these factors were not traced to specific events or actions conducted by
friend or foe. Finally, the complexity of JWARS has limited the conclusions and direct
connections of will-to-fight to the results of the battle.
Efforts to Model Morale

The effectiveness of the troops as presented by Marshall and Rowland is
dependent upon the combat spirit or morale of the troops. There are many definitions and
descriptions of morale. An analysis by Richardson decomposed morale into three
divisions (Richardson, 1978, p. 171).
The first division is the personal or individual morale. This division includes
physical and mental factors. The physical factors are aspects such as health, food, rest
and sleep. The mental factors included understanding the cause, self-confidence in
abilities, religious beliefs and moral principles, and the perception of the quality of
leadership.
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Williams wrote of morale that mail and food were the “two areas of largest
complaint” (Williams, 1992, p. 21). This indicated two major aspects of both the
physical and mental factors. Lt. Thornton stated “In garrison and in the field, officers
must fight continually to secure prompt deliverance of mail. No other factor in a
soldier’s existence is so important as the prompt receipt of news from home” (Thornton,
1943, p. 1). This factor, evolving to internet connectivity and e-mail, appears to be as
important in the network centric, inter-connected world.
The second division suggested by Richardson is the morale of the small group;
also known as unit cohesion (1978, p. 171). Richardson describes three facets of unit
cohesion. First, the soldier is a member of the unit with confidence in leadership.
Second, the soldier has the confidence and respect of comrades. Finally, the soldier is
determined to not let friends down (both leaders and comrades in arms). During World
War II Spiegel observed unit cohesion during the Tunisian campaign. He states:
They expressed little hate for the enemy and they had little desire to kill. Rather,
their aggressive action was motivated by a positive force – love more than hate –
manifested by 1) a regard for their comrades who shared the same dangers, 2) a
respect for their platoon leader or company commander who led then wisely, and
backed them with everything at his command, 3) a concern for their reputation
with their commander and leaders, and 4) an urge to contribute to the task and
success of their group and unit. They were fighting for themselves and for their
unit, and in that way for their country and their cause. (Spiegel, 1944, p. 310)
The third division presented by Richardson is the unit morale. This is the Esprit
de Corps of the unit as a whole. This division represents the importance of being in the
Army, Corps, or division. General Anthony Zinni stated, “Service rivalry leads to service
pride, which is good for building morale and esprit” (Zinni, 2001, p. 3). Morale
influences the decision to join the specific services and further drives the individual to
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strive for being a Ranger, Special Force Operator, or a member of other elite
organizations. It also leads members of selected units to believe their unit is special.
The review of morale and combat spirit thus far has been static in nature. The
research that follows is based in part on the results of a World War II study which
suggested a dynamic model for morale dependent upon the number of sorties flown by
Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber crews. Stafford-Clark, a flight surgeon, interviewed and
flew with the bomber aircrew members for over four years (Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 14).
The RAF Bomber Command’s policy was the airman’s tour of duty was complete after
thirty successful bomber missions.
The average rate of loss over this period was officially assessed at 5 percent on
each operation, but this referred in fact only to aircraft which were missing. It
did not include crashes in the United Kingdom, either on takeoff or return,
whether due to the normal hazards of flying or to enemy action. In practice the
chances of any particular individual surviving his 30 trips alive, unwounded and
without having been taken prisoner, or having been forced down over enemy
territory were generally accepted by the air crew themselves as being just about
one in five. (Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 13)
Over the duration of the 30 missions, the morale of each aircrew varied. The
opportunity to accomplish the mission and the novelty of flying drove the aircrews to a
high morale for the first two or three operational missions. By the fifth to eighth mission,
the aircrew had most likely seen aircraft shot down and the novelty of operational flying
was gone (Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 19). This decrease in morale appeared to continue
subconsciously until about the twelfth to fifteenth mission when the morale was at the
lowest point. The morale increased as the aircrew only looked toward the success and
surviving the next mission. From the mid-point in missions to be flown, aircrew’s morale
increased (Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 20). The peak occurred near the twenty-fifth mission.
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At this point the cumulative stress and fatigue were apparent. The commanding officer
could suspend the tour-of-duty for the aircrew at this point; however, “by far the majority
of aircrew who survive a tour complete their full quota of thirty operational sorties”
(Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 20).
Stafford-Clark presented Figure II-16, as a graphical illustration of the change to
morale for each mission. He offered no mathematical derivation for his illustration.
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Figure II-16: Stafford-Clark Model of Morale (Stafford-Clark, 1949, Figure 1 Page 21)

Several cases were analyzed by Stafford-Clark to show different implications of
the curve. Group A were aircrew that entered the service with a low morale. These
aircrew members did not complete the 30 missions (Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 27). Group
B suffered from an impact of environment and low outlook for their future . It could be
suggested that these aircrew suffered from a lack of unit cohesion. The group B aircrew
had extremely low morale before their morale improved (Stafford-Clark, 1949, p. 29).
The majority of these aircrew members did return to duty. Group C aircrew reported
very low morale due to the cumulative stress of the operations. These aircrew members
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also continued to fly; however, they were at critical levels for their morale (StaffordClark, 1949, p. 31). Figure II-17 presents the number of aircrew in each group, and the
prognosis of each case is also indicated. The cases that encountered exceptional stress all
had bad prognoses. Figure II-18 demonstrates the impact to the generic morale curve
from each of the groups.
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Figure II-17: Number of Aircrew in each Group
(Stafford-Clark, 1949, Table 2 Page 24)
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Figure II-18: Impact to Morale Model from each Group
(Stafford-Clark, 1949, Figures 2-4 Pages 36-37)
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Menninger appears to have built upon the work of Stafford-Clark by applying the
morale curve to the duration of time of a Peace Corps member’s tour of duty.
Additionally, four periods of crisis are identified and the universality and scalability of
the morale curve was introduced.
Menninger used the results of nearly 1,000 questionnaires of Peace Corps
members to build the morale curve presented in Figure II-19 (Menninger, 1988, p. 200).
There were four critical periods of psychological adjustment that were identified: arrival,
engagement, acceptance, and reentry.
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Figure II-19: Morale Curve for the Peace Corps (Menninger, 1988, Figure 1 Page 201)

A direct benefit of Menninger’s Morale Curve is how it varies on time versus
number of missions. Additionally, Menninger provides support that this model is both
universal and scalable. Menninger suggests that the morale curve is accurate (scalable)
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for a twenty-four month Peace Corps commitment as well as a five day education
seminar, nine month academic year, or a four year college education (Menninger, 1975,
p. 110). For example, during a six week camp, the first week is the point of high morale
associated with arrival. The crisis of engagement occurs during the end of the second
week. The crisis of acceptance occurs during week four. Finally, reentry occurs during
the final week (Menninger, 1988, p. 202-203). Similarly, the four year degree program
demonstrates “freshman anxiety, the sophomore slump, junior activism, and the senior
disorientation” (Menninger, 1975, p. 110).
Menninger also provides information on how to employ the morale curve when
there is no expected end to the state of affairs:
When the new situation has no clear end point, there is no obvious fourth crisis
(reentry); rather, as a general rule, the process evolves over a 2-year period as
the individual develops a new sense of self. (Menninger, 1988, p. 204)
This provides an ability to model the morale of an individual that is in a conflict
with no clear deployment/redeployment schedule or fighting for one’s own survival.
Figure II-20 presents Swank and Marchand’s schematic representation of the
impact of combat efficiency of the first sixty days of combat during the D-day invasion.
As seen previously by both Stafford-Clark and Menninger, the morale and effectiveness
is high or quickly increases when the soldier first enters combat. Stafford-Clark’s model
defends the lack of efficiency after the second month by the description of Group A
aircrew. Figure II-20 is restricted to a continuous period of extreme conflict. This
occurred during the engagement phase suggested by Menninger. It is not clear whether
the morale and effectiveness are recoverable and thus increase to a phase of acceptance.

88

COMBAT EXHAUSTION
SOLDIER BECOMES
PERIOD OF
“BATTLEWISE” MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY

HYPER-REACTIVE
STAGE

EMOTIONAL EXHAUSTION
STAGE

DEGREE OF
COMBAT EFFICIENCY

PERIOD OF
OVERCONFIDENCE

VEGETATIVE PHASE

10

20

30

40

50

60

DAYS IN COMBAT
Figure II-20: Effects of Continuous Combat (Swank & Marchand, 1946, Figure 1 Page 238)

This section provided a review of how morale has been modeled. The review
included three models of morale: RAF bomber crews during World War II, deployments
of the Peace Corps, and the sixty days following invasion at Normandy. These three
models demonstrate how morale has changed with time during a conflict.
Control Theory

Control theory provides the capability to analyze the response to systems over
time (Ogata, 1997, p. 63). A brief overview of how a system at equilibrium responds to
an impulse is provided. The discussion is limited to the second order transient response
to a unit-impulse of an underdamped system. Basically, this is how a system establishes
equilibrium over time, following an impulse or significant event, based on a damping
ratio (ζ) for the period (T). The transient response is based on the undamped (or

89

resonant) natural frequency ( ωn ), which is defined as ωn =

ωd
1− ζ 2

, where ωd =

2π
. ωd
T

is referred to as the damped natural frequency. With ζ and ωn defined, the transient
response c(t) is represented by Equation II-31 (Ogata, 1997, p. 159):

c (t ) =

ωn

1− ζ

2

eζωnt sin ωn 1 − ζ 2 t , where 0 ≤ ζ < 1 and t ≥ 0

(II-31)

The response over time can be seen for varying ζ’s in Figure II-21.
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Figure II-21: Response over Time as ζ Varies

When ζ = 0 the system is undamped and continues to respond to the impulse at
full magnitude indefinitely. When ζ = 1 the system is critically damped and returns to
equilibrium with out undershooting the status quo. While 0 < ζ < 1, the system is
underdamped and the settling time increases as ζ decreases.
If ζ and ωn are known, the system is easily defined. However, if any two peaks
are known, the function can be fit using the log decrement method. The log decrement

90

method solves ζ = δ

δ + 4π
2

2

where δ =

1 ⎛ xn ⎞
ln ⎜
⎟ (Macioce, 2003, p. 12). The
m ⎝ xn + m ⎠

height of the first peak is xn, and xn+1 is the height of the next peak. The valley between
the peaks can be used, where xn+0.5 is the distance from equilibrium. Using a control
theory approach may prove useful in fitting the morale curve.
Summary

This chapter introduced and discussed fourth generation warfare. The principles
for such a conflict were also presented. Next, the concept of a strategic level model was
introduced. The section is followed by a brief overview of system dynamics. This field
is focused on the use of continuous event models which contain feedback within the
system. The Lanchester Laws were then described. Due to the similarity of fourth
generation warfare and guerrilla warfare, the application of Lanchester Laws in this
specific field was thoroughly discussed. Unfortunately, none of the research in this area
involves dynamic models, and thus does not capture all of the key aspects of fourth
generation warfare.
The section on modeling the will-to-fight provides several descriptions, models,
and trends in modeling morale and public resolve. This was followed by a brief
introduction to control theory’s second order response to an impulse.
Attributes of each of these methods are used within the next chapters to create a
theory and modeling framework of fourth generation operations.
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III.

Fourth Generation Operations and Principles

Chapter Overview

This chapter develops the concepts of fourth generation operations and associated
principles. Additionally, the first two contributions of the dissertation are achieved in
this chapter. They develop a concept of fourth generation operations based on the
framework of US Joint doctrine and develop the supporting principles of fourth
generation operations. This contribution requires the introduction of the principle of
Population Perception.
Fourth Generation Operations

An element of Lind et al.’s fourth generation warfare is the attrition of the will
and morale of the enemy (Lind et al., 1989, p. 5). This attrition compels the enemy to
capitulate to the goals and objectives of their foe. This chapter asserts that fourth
generation warfare, particularly the aspects of will and resolve, is the backbone of fourth
generation operations. Joint doctrine presents conflict bridging the spectrum from peace
to war and back to peace (JP 3-0, 2006, p. IV-26). It is critical in today’s arena that
military operations and responsibilities span across this spectrum, thus operations is
substituted for warfare.
Fourth generation operations are defined in this study as conflict which combines
elements of guerrilla tactics, insurgency, terrorism, traditional warfare, and the ability to
exploit and skip generations of technology to conduct operations, particularly to target
the will and morale of the enemy’s support structure, in order to achieve political victory.
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In this definition, the support structure refers to both the population and the combatants.
This definition does not focus on nation-states, and therefore includes cases where
transnational groups are the instigator or target of the conflict. Additionally, the specific
methods applied in the conflict are not specified; therefore, fourth generation operations
may use any military, diplomatic, economic or informational instrument of power to
influence their enemy’s will and morale. Just as US military doctrine has expanded the
concept of information warfare to the broader and more inclusive concept of information
operations, fourth generation warfare must be expanded to fourth generation operations.
In this paradigm, operations occur not only during actual conflict, but also across
the spectrum from peace to combat and back to peace. Transnational asymmetric conflict
does not require a conventional declaration of war to be initiated. While 9/11 may be an
easily identified starting point for the ‘long war,’ our foes started their operations well
before that date. Since the population may be specifically targeted by the combatants
within fourth generation operations, fourth generation operations require a change in
technology, tactics, doctrine, combatants, and definition of conflict from those for third
generation warfare.
Fourth generation operations, while not currently defined in US doctrine,
addresses a gap previously identified within the doctrine used by the US military. This
gap has been filled by continuous transitions from non-war operations to full-scale
campaigns with the additional phases of joint operations (specifically stabilization) and
back to a sustainable peace (JP 3-0, 2006, p. IV-26).
The concept of fourth generation operations does not precisely fit any of the
definitions of combating terrorism, supporting counterinsurgency, or supporting
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insurgency provided by joint doctrine. It clearly bridges the gap in the range of
operations between war and MOOTW. This is evident by the current operations in both
Iraq and Afghanistan where the major traditional war operations ended with a resounding
victory by the coalition forces; yet, the transition to ‘supporting’ the indigenous forces in
their suppression of counterinsurgents and terrorists has been difficult to achieve. The
US and coalition forces are currently still overseeing the majority of counterinsurgency
and peacekeeping operations in a number of areas. Obviously, the military is not in a
supporting role. While this is an intermediate goal in both Iraq and Afghanistan, this goal
has not yet been fully achieved. Environments within Iraq and Afghanistan can be cited
as two occurrences of fourth generation operations, as can elements of the worldwide
global war on terrorism.
Figure III-1 depicts the relationships of the first four generations of war and
fourth generation operations. The transition from fourth generation warfare to fourth
generation operations is represented by dotted lines as opposed to the previous
generations. The solid lines represent the evolution of generations. Additionally, the
recognition of the four instruments of power (diplomatic, information, military, and
economic) are listed to emphasize how all the instruments of power are now required.
Defeating the enemy’s standing army does not immediately result in political victory,
particularly when the enemy may not have a standing army in the classic sense. Finally,
three dimensions of the operational environment are listed. These three dimensions
interact within fourth generation operations to accomplish the objectives.
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Figure III-1: Fourth Generation Operations

With the fourth generation operations defined, the principles of fourth generation
operations are next introduced.
Principles of Fourth Generation Operations

While the principles of joint operations may be sufficient in covering aspects of
fighting a counterinsurgency, they are not necessarily sufficient for fourth generation
operations. This section proposes the addition of one more principle for fourth
generation operations to those introduced in Chapter 2 (Objective, Offensive, Mass,
Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, Simplicity,
Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy). The new principle is Population Perception.
The principle of Population Perception focuses on the indigenous population.
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Population Perception can be viewed as the combatant’s attention and response to
the effects of the operations within the appropriate population. The other principles
which exist mainly in the cognitive operational environment include Perseverance and
Legitimacy. Perseverance, Legitimacy, and Population Perception all interrelate.
This research redefines Perseverance as ensuring the commitment of both the
American population and military, necessary to attain the national strategic end state.
This definition is based on US military doctrine with the italics area added. The principle
of Perseverance is how our military and supporting population perceives the ongoing
operations. The supporting population of our forces (US population) is distinctly
different than the supported population (indigenous Iraqi population). This is best
presented by the response to the question: Can we achieve our objectives if we continue
operations?
Legitimacy is redefined as developing and maintaining the will of both the
government and military, necessary to attain the national strategic end state. Legitimacy
is the perception of both the US military and indigenous government by the enemy and
the indigenous (supported) population. Legitimacy is understood by the response to the
question: Are we doing the right thing?
Finally, Population Perception is defined as attending and responding to the
operation’s effects within the appropriate population. Population Perception is how the
government and military are perceived by the appropriate population. Population
Perception is represented by the question: Do they think we can achieve our objectives
and are doing the right thing?
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Population Perception is not to be confused with perception management, which
is defined as:
Perception Management — Actions to convey and/or deny selected information
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and
objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to
influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official
actions favorable to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception
management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception,
and psychological operations. (JP 1-02, 2006, p. 407)

Perception Management may be used to shape Population Perception.
This study proposes thirteen principles of fourth generation operations. These
principles begin with the twelve principles of joint operations and include the principle of
Population Perspective. These thirteen principles are defined in Table III-1. Changes to
the principles of joint operations (JP 3-0, 2006, Appendix A) are indicated by italics.
Summary

This chapter introduced the concept of fourth generation operations. Fourth
generations operations are the evolution and extension of third and fourth generation
warfare based on a change of tactics, technology, and combatants. These operations are
currently ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the Global War on Terrorism.
The principles of joint operations were used as a building block for the principles
of fourth generation operations. The principles of fourth generation operations include
all the principles of joint operations. The chapter redefined the principles of Legitimacy
and Perseverance and added the principle of Population Perspective to create the
principles of fourth generation operations.

97

Table III-1: Principles of Fourth Generation Operations

Principle

Definition*

Objective

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined,
decisive, and achievable goal

Offensive

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative

Mass

Concentrate the effects of combat power at the most
advantageous place and time to produce decisive results

Economy of Force

Allocating minimum essential combat power to secondary
efforts

Maneuver

Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the
flexible application of combat power

Unity of Command

Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for
every objective, including military, coalition, American
government and civilian organizations

Security

Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage

Surprise

Strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is
unprepared

Simplicity

Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure
thorough understanding

Restraint

Limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force

Perseverance

Ensure the commitment, of both the American population and
military, necessary to attain the national strategic end state

Legitimacy

Develop and maintain the will, of both the government and
military, necessary to attain the national strategic end state

Population
Perception

Attend and respond to the operation’s effects within the
appropriate population

* Changes to definitions found in JP 3-0, 2006 are indicated by italics. JP 3-0 provides
updated definitions of principles found in JP 1, 2000 (see Table II-2 and Table II-3).
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IV. Lanchester Laws in a System Dynamics Framework
Chapter Overview

System dynamics models are able to represent qualitative aspects of combat that
may be difficult to capture in a discrete event simulation. Additionally, the system
dynamics construct allows for the modeling of continuous events and incorporating
system feedback. This chapter develops a systems dynamics framework of the
Lanchester Laws with events. Two models of the Lanchester Laws are presented. The
first is a traditional discrete event simulation which is offered as a baseline for
comparison; the other is a system dynamics implementation of the Lanchester Laws.
Results from the discrete event simulation and the system dynamics model are analyzed,
compared and contrasted.
The chapter provides examples of how the Lanchester Laws can be modeled using
both discrete event simulation and system dynamics. Comparisons of the modeling
techniques are presented through the implementation of an excursion (compared to a
baseline) where reserve forces are implemented. The suitability of the system dynamics
framework in some settings is further demonstrated with an excursion where the forces
are fatigued. The chapter concludes with a summary of results.
Discrete Event Simulation versus Systems Dynamics

This section compares and contrasts modeling the Lanchester Square Law in both
a discrete event simulation and system dynamics model. A simple case is used in this
section to demonstrate how to apply the discussed framework. These illustrations can be
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solved analytically; however as the complexity of interactions and dimension of the statespace increase in an actual operational scenario, the analytic solution becomes prohibitive
to solve. This is evident by the number of complex combat scenarios which require
simulation to model the initial interactions and are therefore never reduced to analytic
equations.
The Lanchester equations are implemented in discrete event simulations by
solving the equations at discrete time intervals. When the analytic solution to the
Lanchester Equations can not be found because of the complexity of the example, a
discrete event simulation is not able to solve the equations to predict the exact time future
events occurred. Therefore, the exact future event times are not generated. A discrete
event simulation evaluates events at predetermined time intervals. This is referred to by
Bratley, Fox, and Schrage as a synchronous discrete event simulation (1987, p. 17).
In general, synchronous discrete event simulation has several potential
drawbacks. One drawback is non-simultaneous events must be treated as simultaneous if
they fall within the same time period. This requires all possible interaction combinations
to be anticipated, modeled and planned. Additionally, when the step size is decreased,
the accuracy of results increases; however, the speed of the simulation decreases (Bratley,
Fox, & Schrage, 1987, p. 17). To increase the speed of the simulation, it is possible to
skip intervals if enough information about the system can be obtained. Skipping intervals
must be based on expected conditions and the required fidelity of the solution, both
further complicating the simulation (Bratley, Fox, & Schrage, 1987, p. 17).
A discrete event simulation must approximate the values of attributes and
variables between events. This can be resolved by reducing event times, but it may force
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the model to take substantially more time to complete. A system dynamics model does
not approximate to achieve the level between events. A benefit of system dynamics
models, when required by the analysis, is their ability to smoothly transition the levels of
the attributes and variables. This does not imply that the levels can not be adjusted in
step increments as demonstrated later in this chapter with the implementation of reserve
troops.
In some modeling scenarios the arrival of a regiment, army, or additional fighters
can be adequately and appropriately modeled as a discrete event, perhaps as the average
time. In other settings, the actual flow of troops into the fight may be critical, suggesting
the use of system dynamics. An example might be the arrival of Marschall Blücher’s
forces at Waterloo. While the main body had not totally arrived, the appearance of the
forward elements on the battlefield was instrumental in turning the tide of battle.
Basic Discrete Event Simulation and System Dynamics Models

There are numerous methods to model the Lanchester Laws. This study
implemented the basic Lanchester Laws in a simple discrete event simulation. The
entities generated within the discrete event simulation, for this study, do not have any
attributes, nor require any resources. As real world aspects (like ammunition, equipment
and supplies) are added to the model, they would be modeled as attributes or resources.
Figure IV-1 is the pictorial representation of a basic implementation of the Lanchester
Square Law developed in Arena 10.0.
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Bt+1 = Bt – Rt · c
Rt+1 = Rt – Bt · k
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New Entity
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Figure IV-1: Discrete Event Simulation of the Lanchester Square Law

The furthest left container created a new entity at each time interval. The entity
flowed to the Casualties container where the global variables representing the number of
Blue and Red forces at time t + 1 (Bt+1 and Rt+1) were calculated based on the attrition
coefficients (c and k) and the current size of the forces (Bt and Rt). After the global
variables were adjusted, the simulation proceeded to output the status of the variables and
then the entity was disposed. The balloons on the figure display the equation within each
container.
The system dynamics representation of the Lanchester Square Law focused on the
level of Blue and Red Forces (Bt and Rt), where the forces were the number of personnel
or the total combat value. Blue and Red forces levels were changed by the rate of Blue or
Red Attrition. Figure IV-2 is the depiction of the system dynamics representation of the
basic illustration. Red Attrition through time (RAt) was the total number of Red Forces
killed (or otherwise removed from battle) by the surviving Blue Forces during each time
interval, and vice versa for Blue Attrition (BAt). The Blue Attrition Coefficient (k)
represented the number of force of Red that could be killed per unit of Blue force.
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Rt+1 = Rt – RAt
RAt = Bt · k
Red Forces
(Rt)
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Red Attrition
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Blue Attrition
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BAt = Rt · c
Bt+1 = Bt – BAt
Figure IV-2: System Dynamics Model of the Lanchester Square Law

Discrete Event Simulation and System Dynamics Models with Reserves

This subsection demonstrates that a system dynamics model performs the same as
a discrete event simulation for a more complicated model. The basic discrete event
simulation and system dynamics models were modified to represent Dewar, Gillogly, and
Juncosa’s (1996) combat model presented in Table IV-1 . Dewar, Gillogly, and Juncosa
simulated a two sided conflict with troop replacements using a discrete event simulation
with a time-step of one-half hour. Their model used the Lanchester Square Laws with a
Red Attrition Coefficient (c) of 1/2048 and the Blue Attrition Coefficient (k) that equaled
1/512. The initial Red (R0) and Blue (B0) Troop sizes are also presented in Table IV-1.
When specific thresholds based on a force ratio or percent of surviving forces were
breached, reinforcements were requested. The reinforcement block size was 300 troops.
Each side had five reinforcement blocks and the reinforcements arrived 70 time steps (or
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35 hours) after the reinforcement threshold were breached. Withdrawal (or defeat) of the
forces was declared once additional predetermined thresholds for either combat ratio or
percent of surviving forces was crossed. Victory was declared based on a specific
combat ratio (i.e. forces were substantially outnumbered), or a force strength dropping
below a predetermined level (i.e. the battle was too costly to continue) based on the
thresholds in Table IV-1.
Table IV-1: Combat Model (Dewar, Gillogly & Juncosa, 1996: Table 1, Page 39)

Parameter

Blue

Red

Initial troop strength

B0 = 839

R0 = 1,500

Combat attrition
calculation

Bt+1 = Bt – Rt/2048

Rt+1 = Rt – Bt/512

Reinforcement threshold

Rt/Bt ≥ 4 or Bt < 0.8 B0

Rt/Bt ≤ 2.5 or Rt < 0.8 R0

Withdrawal threshold

Rt/Bt ≥ 10 or Bt < 0.7 B0

Rt/Bt ≤ 1.5 or Rt < 0.7 R0

Figure IV-3 depicts the discrete event simulation which represents Dewar,
Gillogly, and Juncosa’s combat model. The Casualties were computed as described for
Figure IV-1. Next, the model checked to see if the conditions required to declare the
winner were met. This is represented in Figure IV-3 as the diamond labeled ‘winner.’ If
there was a winner, the global variable indicating a combat force had won was changed.
If there was not a winner, the model checked to see if the Blue side was currently waiting
for reserves. If the Blue side was not waiting for reserves, the model checked the Blue
reinforcement thresholds to see if Blue Reinforcements were necessary. If reserves were
required, the global variable for Blue Waiting for Reserves was triggered, and the model
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scheduled the event to add reinforcements in 70 time steps. The model reset the Blue
Waiting for Reserves variable after 70 time steps and disposed of the entity. If the
system was waiting on Blue Reserves or did not need Blue Reserves, similar checks were
made regarding Red Reserves. This implementation did not allow for both Red and Blue
forces to add Reserves at the same time period. This was possible to implement but
would add an additional layer of condition checks and directives to the model. As
discussed earlier, a drawback of synchronous discrete event simulations is all possible
material critical state-spaces and conditions must be anticipated and those paths and
conditions must be tested and implemented within the model.
Bt+1 = Bt – Rt · c
Rt+1 = Rt – Bt · k
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New Entity
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Figure IV-3: Discrete Event Simulation of the Combat Model

The results of the discrete event simulation are presented in Figure IV-4. This
figure presents the number of forces surviving at each time period. The discontinuous
points were due to the arrival of the 300 reinforcements. The Red Forces required all of
their reserves, while the Blue Force won after only adding three reserve blocks.
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Figure IV-4: Results of the Combat Model

The basic system dynamics model was modified to represent Dewar, Gillogly,
and Juncosa’s combat model by first creating the levels of Blue/Red Force Strength and
Combat Ratio. The Blue/Red Force Strength was the percent of forces still alive at the
current interval of the battle. The Combat Ratio was the Red Forces divided by the Blue
Forces. The Combat Ratio and Blue/Red Force Strength levels were required to
determine the requirement of Red and Blue Reserves. If the reserve force thresholds
were achieved, the system checked to see if it was waiting on reserves and if there were
reserve blocks available. If all conditions were met to add the new reserves, the value
labeled Add Red Reserves (RRt) and/or Add Blue Reserves (BRt) was changed to 300 and
the rate flowed to the Red and Blue Forces respectively.
The system dynamics representation of the simple combat model was presented in
Figure IV-5. As opposed to the discrete event simulation, the system dynamics model
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allowed both Red and Blue Forces to be added at the same time, since the addition of
troops does not require all possible interaction combinations to be anticipated for each
time interval. Additionally, the time the reserves were requested could be identified at
the exact moment the thresholds were reached. The timing could be more precisely
identified within the discrete event simulation by reducing the time step, but the time step
was already small relative to the scenario.
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Figure IV-5: System Dynamics Model of the Combat Model

The discrete event simulation and system dynamic models produce equivalent
results. In both representations, the reserves arrived on the same day and the battle
concluded on the same day. There were only minor variations in the force size
throughout the run of the model. The largest difference between the sizes of forces
reported by each model for the 1,310 time intervals was 0.0013 or 0.00011% of the
response. Figure IV-4 can be used to represent the results from both the discrete event
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simulation and the system dynamics models. The correlation of Blue force at the end of
each time interval of the discrete event simulation with results from the system dynamics
model was 1 – 1.29E-12. Red correlation was 1 – 1.11E-12. Both represent a correlation
of results which is approximately one. This exercise demonstrates that system dynamics
models can effectively model the Lanchester Laws which have been historically modeled
as a discrete event simulation; in addition if a continuous flow more accurately models
the environment, a system dynamics model may be preferred.
The system dynamics model of these events and rates can be easily adjusted based
on the current environment. For example, if the reserves were located near the engaged
troops, the time of arrival of the reserves could be less than when the front line of troops
were at a distance. Additionally, the system dynamics models could ‘flow’ the reserves
into the engaged forces as logistics allowed rather than assuming all the reserves arrived
at the same time (as typically expected within a discrete event simulation). A system
dynamics based model can easily incorporate this change by connecting the ‘level’
indicating the troop’s location to the ‘level’ indicating time to wait for reserves. The time
to wait on the reserves is no longer a constant and can depend on the location of troops
and the rate of their arrival. In addition, the rate of arrival of troops to the front can be
controlled, if desired.
The discrete event simulation and system dynamics examples focused on the
engagement, or battle, level of warfare. As the Lanchester Laws have been applied to all
levels of warfare (engagement, mission, campaign and strategic), both approaches can be
used to as a modeling framework for all levels of warfare. This is not meant to suggest
current discrete event simulations are inadequate or inappropriate. Rather as combat and
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conflict become more affected by continuous, dynamic interacting elements, especially at
the campaign or theater level and the data to model such events becomes more available,
system dynamics may offer a different level of insight to decision makers. Historically,
system dynamics has been applied to a vast array of levels in planning from the factory
floor to world models (see Forrester, 1961, 1969 and 1971, among others). This suggests
that it can be applied from skirmishes through strategic levels, given proper inputs.
System dynamics models are particularly appropriate when not accounting for the
continuation of time, leads to issues of accuracy. Its consideration provides another
modeling option. As with all modeling, the analyst should select the appropriate
technique for the fidelity required by the decision environment.
Implementation of Fatigue

Thus far the values of the attrition coefficients have been static. While in real
combat the troops would become more or less effective as the battle continues and
fatigue, among other attributes, change. As a demonstration of potential options, the
dynamic attributes of the system dynamics model was expanded by incorporating a
‘fatigue’ coefficient into the Dewar, Gillogly, and Juncosa’s combat model. To model
this, fatigue was represented as the effective combat power for a force. A force having
no fatigue retains 100% of its combat power. Over time while in combat, fatigue
increases, effectively reducing combat power. The new attrition coefficient now equaled
the original coefficient multiplied by one minus the fatigue factor. It was first assumed
that the initial forces have no fatigue. It was further assumed that the reserves entered the
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conflict with no fatigue. When the reserves entered, the percentage of fatigue was reset
to reflect the addition of fresh troops.
In this excursion it was assumed that when the reserves entered, the new fatigue
was a weighted average of the fatigue from the reserves and the existing forces. For
example, when 1000 troops were fatigued at 30% and 500 fresh reserves entered combat,
the new fatigue value was two thirds (1000/1500) of it previous value or 20% based on
this illustrative fatigue aggregation formula (any appropriately vetted factor may be
used). This implementation implied that the reserves were mixed throughout the current
combatants when the reserves entered combat (of course, a damping function or morale
boost could be included).
Fatigue is modeled in the discrete event simulation by the creation of four new
global variables. These could be referred to as the Blue/ Red Attrition Coefficients (c / k)
and Blue/ Red Fatigue (BF / RF). Additionally, new decision nodes are required to
decide how, why and when to change these new global variables. The alterations are
possible, but not insignificant.
The system dynamics model added two new levels (identified as Red and Blue
Fatigue). The system dynamics model with the fatigue factor is presented as Figure IV-6.
Red and Blue Fatigue were a function of the rate reserves entered the system and the
current level of forces. The attrition coefficients (c and k) were now a function of fatigue.
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Figure IV-6: System Dynamics Model with Fatigue

The systems dynamics based modeling approach did not require the effect be
modeled as a new fatigue level; however, by directly representing this new term, the
model emphasized the new factor. The concept of fatigue could have been directly
represented within the attrition coefficient value with the arrows from ‘Red Forces’ and
‘Add Red Reserves’ being connected to the appropriate ‘Attrition Coefficient.’
Figure IV-7 presents the fatigue of each force over time.
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Figure IV-7: Fatigue of Red and Blue Forces

The arrival of Red reserves through 300 hours of conflict had the effect of
reducing overall Red fatigue. Once all the reserves were committed, Red fatigue
impacted Red’s overall effectiveness since relief was not available later in the battle.
This was opposed to the Blue forces which maintained less battlefield fatigue. The
model was run beyond the Blue victory termination point to demonstrate this point.
Figure IV-8 compares the force levels of both the Red and Blue forces with and
without the effects of fatigue. Not only did both sides suffer more losses, the battle ended
significantly sooner due to the impacts of fatigue. While fatigue was added in this
sample example, any number of factors can be incorporated as appropriate. System
dynamics offers an additional option to the modelers when the scenario and fidelity of the
analysis requires this level of detail.
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Figure IV-8: Comparison of Results

This example demonstrated how to dynamically represent the Lanchester Laws
within a dynamic conflict model and shows the inclusion of a softer factor. By including
fatigue, a qualitative aspect has been directly incorporated into the combat effectiveness
coefficient. The rate of attrition is now altered by the change of fatigue. Therefore, there
is now a change of rates being included in the combat model. The combat ratio and
attrition is still used by the system dynamics model; however, the values of the combat
effectiveness coefficients are no longer static. The coefficients are now dynamic and
continuous. This changes the paradigm generally used in discrete event simulation which
focuses on the events in the model. System dynamics highlights the rates of change.
While Lanchester Laws requires ‘breakpoints’ to declare victory, the focus is on the rate
of attrition. System dynamics provides an ability to change the rates based on other,
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possibly softer, aspects. This indicates a strength provided by dynamically representing
the Lanchester Laws if appropriate to the analysis.
This simple example illustrates how feedback loops can be used is a system
dynamics simulation. While ‘softer’ factors were used, the approach can be applied to
any factor where rates of continuous flow are to be modeled.
Summary

Discrete event simulation and system dynamics models have been used to
approximate first, second, and third generation warfare. However, in some operational
settings it may be insufficient to model only military attrition. This can be particularly
true in insurgency warfare or the broader fourth generation operations. All instruments of
power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) must be represented. System
dynamics provides an ability to include the impacts of the softer aspects of diplomacy,
information, economics, as well as military actions, when continuous flows might
provide improved insight over discrete event simulation. Feedback loops and changing
the rate of rates can be useful in capturing the broader non-attrition and non-maneuver
aspects of conflict.
This chapter compared the use of discrete event simulation and system dynamics
to model first and second generation (example on Lanchester Laws) to establish the
viability of the approach. The chapter then provided a simple system dynamics model
which fatigued the forces. The fatigued forces provided an example of how other aspects
required when modeling fourth generation operations could be implemented into combat
models.
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A systems dynamics presentation was developed to model a two sided conflict
subject to continuous, non-linear, transient behaviors with feedback. The system
dynamics presentation of the model provides the decision maker with a clearer
representation of a continuous system than a discrete event simulation. The specific
interactions are represented as levels, rates, and decision functions. The system dynamics
format can be more straightforward than the sometimes ‘black box’ appearing
presentation of a discrete event simulation.
System dynamics models can be quickly adjusted to represent new assumptions.
Additionally, as discussed in the introduction to system dynamics, system dynamics
model are able to represent ‘fuzzy’ concepts that are traditionally not approached by
discrete event modelers. Furthermore, system dynamics models smoothly transition the
values within the levels, as opposed to approximating the values as required by a discrete
event simulation.
While some discrete event simulations are able to represent continuous variables,
this does not imply the simulation represents completely dynamic models. When
incorrect conclusions could occur due to not accounting for continuous time, a model
developed to implement a system dynamics framework should be used. However, if a
mix of discrete and continuous variables is advantageous in a modeling effort, systems
which incorporate both can be developed and utilized. Care in selecting time steps must
be taken to assure accuracy sufficient for the analysis.
The implementation of Lancaster Laws within a system dynamics model adds a
significant amount of flexibility to how combat models are able to incorporate the
dynamics of battle. This added flexibility provides a means to model the impacts of the
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population’s resolve and combatants’ spirit. Additionally, this may allow combat models
to capture many other aspects of the conflict such as the political, economic, and
informational; rather than exclusively the military impacts.
This chapter accomplished the third contribution of the dissertation, the
construction of a theoretical modeling framework to dynamically portray fatigue and
other behavioral factors within a combat model. This chapter also demonstrated the
utility of using a system dynamics modeling framework to represent the Lanchester Laws
as opposed to the traditional discrete event simulation framework.
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V. Public Resolve
Chapter Overview

In October of 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace,
stated:
Baghdad is the center of gravity in Iraq, and the American people are the center
of gravity for our enemies. And what the American people believe and the
American people's ability to sustain -- what they must sustain to defeat this enemy
is what our enemies are trying to influence. (p. 1)
General Pace highlights the importance of public opinion in the war in Iraq and
subsequently the global war on terrorism - the ‘Long War.’ This chapter presents an
analysis that incorporates, into a model, the impacts of the continuous actions of our
forces on the resolve of the United States population. The utility and effectiveness of
historical methods is statistically tested against the suggested model. Multiple linear
regression models, as well as generalized linear models are used. The chapter discusses
new key factors that influence the public’s opinion. In this chapter public resolve refers
to the percent of the US population which supports an on going conflict.
It is apparent that our adversaries are directly targeting the public resolve of the
US population. Results from this chapter provide commanders, decision makers and
analysts models to aid in gauging the adversaries impact on the US’s resolve.
Additionally, these models are included in the final combat model presented in Chapter 7.
This chapter investigates the American public’s perception of the ongoing
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Models of public resolve are constructed and
statistically evaluated based on linear and non-linear modeling techniques, with the intent
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to develop a modeling framework of public resolve. The framework was founded on
empirical evidence of key factors influencing the public resolve.
The importance of the public support and resolve is highlighted. Public resolve
from Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq are then reviewed. Two simple least squares
linear regression models of public resolve are presented. The first model uses the number
of days into the conflict as an independent variable, while the second model uses the
logarithm of casualties as the independent variable. This latter model was first
introduced by Mueller (1973, p. 60). In both cases the dependent variable was public
support for the war as given by polling data.
The third section of the study presents a multiple linear regression model
expanding on the findings of the two previous models and also evaluates ten additional
independent variables specific to Iraq. A model of public support based on four
statistically significant variables is provided. These variables reflect actions taken by
both the insurgents and the US military.
A factor analysis of the identified key variables is also performed. The subsection
applies the technique to minimize the impacts of the correlation between the statistically
significant variables revealed in the multiple linear regression analysis.
The next section provides an alternate model of public support based on logistic
regression. The benefits of this technique are then discussed. This section also applies
the William’s procedure for fitting a model with overdispersion (extra binomial
variation).
The fifth section provides some insights to the impact of negative and positive
media reporting of the event ongoing in theater. The percent of positive media reports is
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used as a new independent variable in the model. Unfortunately the data available only
spanned a small portion of the conflict; therefore, the analysis was performed with a
limited data set compared to the other analyses in the chapter.
The chapter concludes with a check of the model by comparing the model’s
results with recent polling data. Additionally, the key relations that have been revealed
are reviewed. Finally, the implications of the research and possible paths for future
research are suggested.
Simple Least Squares Linear Models

Recognizing that the tactics of fourth generation operations include attacking the
public resolve of the adversary, this effort quantifies the effect of the continuous actions
employed by the enemy. The study gauges the national resolve in a clash of wills using
polling data as a proxy for public resolve and support of recent and current wars. The
specific questions used by the various polling data sources are detailed in Appendix A. A
simple linear regression for several factors was performed on data from Korea, Vietnam,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. The response collected represented the percent of the United
States population which supported the current conflict.
Duration of Conflict

When the data on public support, based on the number of days into the conflict
was fit for the Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq with time as the independent variable, a
decrease in public support was identified. The start of conflict for Korea (25 June 1950),
Afghanistan (7 October 2001) and Iraq (20 March 2003) was used as the start of
hostilities. For the purpose of this analysis, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution (7 August
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1964) was used as the start of hostilities for the Vietnam conflict since this authorization
approved the escalation of forces in the theater (Snow, 1994, p. 210).
Tables V-1 though V-4 present the fitted public resolve models for Korea,
Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq respectively. For this analysis, the magnitude of the
t-test statistic (t Stat) was compared to the appropriate reference value from the two-sided
t-distribution with α = 0.05. If any coefficient or model was determined to be statistically
insignificant, the equation indicated this in bold markings.
Table V-1: Public Support for Korea per Time

Regression Statistics
R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
PRESS
R2Prediction
Observations

0.15
0.05
8.34
1128.23
-0.54
11
df
SS
1
106.93
9
625.79
10
732.73
Coefficients Standard Error
48.56
4.76
-0.0109
0.0088

Regression
Residual
Total
Intercept
Days into Conflict

MS
106.93
69.53

F
1.54

t Stat
10.20
-1.24

P-value
3.03E-06
0.25

Significance F
0.25

Table V-2: Public Support for Vietnam (1965-1973) per Time

Regression Statistics
R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
PRESS
R2Prediction
Observations
Regression
Residual
Total
Intercept

Days into Conflict

0.85
0.85
3.64
387.39
0.80
23
df
SS
1
1612.23
21
278.73
22
1890.96
Coefficients Standard Error
60.13
1.82

-0.0126

0.0011
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MS
1612.23
13.27

F
121.47

t Stat
33.12

P-value
1.3E-19

-11.02

3.44E-10

Significance F
3.44E-10

Table V-3: Public Support for Afghanistan per Time

Regression Statistics
0.95
R2
0.94
Adjusted R2
347.57
Standard Error
0.93
PRESS
4.03
R2Prediction
18
Observations
df
SS
1
4717.69
Regression
16
259.31
Residual
17
4977.00
Total
Coefficients Standard Error
90.33
1.25
Intercept
-0.01949
0.0011
Days into Conflict

MS
4717.69
16.21

F
291.09

t Stat
72.29
-17.06

P-value
1.48E-21
1.09E-11

Significance F
1.09E-11

Table V-4: Public Support for Iraq per Time

Regression Statistics
R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
PRESS
R2Prediction
Observations
Regression
Residual
Total
Intercept
Days into Conflict

0.71
0.70
5.43
5722.94
0.70
191
df
SS
MS
1
13402.02
13402.02
189
5577.21
29.51
190
18979.23
Coefficients Standard Error
t Stat
64.96
0.76
85.53
-0.0204
0.0010
-21.31

F
454.17

Significance F
3.77E-52

P-value
4.8E-153
3.77E-52

Table V-1 indicates that there is not a significant linear trend for public support of
the Korean War, based on days of conflict. The R2 in Table V-1 suggests the model does
not explain much of the variation in the observed data and the coefficient for days of
conflict. Additionally, the magnitude of the t-test statistic for the days coefficient (-1.24)
is less than the critical value from the t-distribution (tα=0.05,44=2.32). Therefore, the null
hypothesis fails to be rejected and there is insufficient evidence that the coefficient is not
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zero. Additionally, the PRESS statistic and R2Prediction indicate this model should not be
used to predict the public resolve.
It should be noted that combat in the Korean War lasted just over three years
before the cease fire was signed. The Korean War followed on a global war that
generally had national support. It appears that the limited duration of the conflict and
proximity to World War Two may have influenced the Korean War data that is based on
duration of the conflict.
The R2 for each of the other conflicts suggests a stronger connection between time
and public support. Additionally, the magnitudes of the t-test statistic for all the
coefficients in Tables V-2 through V-4 are greater than the critical value; therefore, the
null hypotheses can be rejected, indicating strong evidence that the coefficients are not
zero (with α = 0.05). Finally, the F-test statistics are greater than the F-test critical values
further indicating the coefficients are statistically significant.
The Prediction Error Sum of Square (PRESS) statistic was used to determine the
R2Prediction. The R2Prediction for Vietnam (Table V-2) and Afghanistan (Table V-3) both
indicated the model accounted for over 80% of the variability of the residuals for the
predicted values. The model of Iraq (Table V-4) only accounted for 70% of the variance
when predicting.
The fitted decline of support for Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq varies from
0.0127% to 0.0204% per day. The data used for Vietnam spans nine years of the conflict.
The first five years on the conflict was also analyzed for comparison to the conflict in
Iraq and Afghanistan using similar timeframes. When the first five years of data for the
Vietnam conflict were used in the analysis (see Table V-5), the R2 for the Vietnam model
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rose to 0.89 with a slope of 0.0185% per day. Additionally, the range of slopes for
Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam (prior to 1970) only varied from 0.0185% to 0.0204% loss
of support per day.
Table V-5: Public Support for Vietnam (1965-1969) per Time

Regression Statistics
R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
PRESS
R2Prediction
Observations
Regression
Residual
Total
Intercept
Days into Conflict

0.89
0.88
2.70
142.89
0.86
17
df
SS
1
876.92
15
109.20
16
986.12
Coefficients Standard Error
66.26
1.99
-0.0185
0.0017

MS
876.92
7.28

F
120.46

t Stat
33.23
-10.98

P-value
1.83E-15
1.45E-08

Significance F
1.45E-08

Figure V-1 presents the available polling data for the Vietnam conflict along with
two linear regression lines. The solid line depicts the result of fitting all of the available
data, while the dashed line includes only the data prior to 1970.
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Figure V-1: Public Support of the Vietnamese War with Linear Trends

When only the first five years of Vietnam were included in the regression, the R2
increased from 0.85 (Table V-2) to 0.89 (Table V-5), and standard error of the model
(RMSE) decreased from 3.64 to 2.70. Figure V-2 presents the decline of support for the
wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq over time. The linear trend of all data points for
each conflict is also presented. The slopes of the fitted models for Vietnam (prior to
1970), Afghanistan, and Iraq are approximately parallel suggesting public opinion in
modern wars decline at a fixed rate over time. For the available data, this rate of decline
is between 0.018% to 0.021% per day or roughly 0.6% per month.
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Figure V-2: Decline of Public Support over Duration of Conflict

The confidence interval for a regression coefficient (βi) in a linear model with n
data points and p variables is given by, βi ± tα / 2,n − p SEβ . The 95% confidence intervals
i
for the slopes (β1) of the fitted models Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam are presented in
Figure V-3. The confidence interval for the coefficient for time all overlap at 0.02. This
suggests a hypothesis that public opinion declines at approximately the same rate over
time for similar conflicts. Based on these three data sets, the hypothesis that public
opinion declines at 0.02% per day cannot be statistically rejected. This suggests that for
each month roughly 0.6% of the total public support is lost.

125

CONFLICT

Afghanistan

Iraq

Vietnam
(1965-1973)
Vietnam
(1965-1969)
-0.025

-0.0225

-0.02

-0.0175

-0.015

-0.0125

-0.01

SLOPE
Figure V-3: Confidence Interval of Slope (Duration of Conflict)

The confidence intervals on the public support at the start of the conflict are
presented in Figure V-4. The Y-intercept (β0) is interpreted to be the initial support for
the conflict. Clearly, public support varied widely at the start of these conflicts.
However, note that the 95% confidence intervals for the first four years of Iraq and the
first five years of Vietnam overlap at 65%. Based on these two data sets, the hypothesis
that public opinion began at 65% cannot be statistically rejected.
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Figure V-4: Confidence Interval of Y-Intercept (Duration of Conflict)
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Equation V-1 presents a composite model for public support based on both
Vietnam and Iraq data. This implies that a model of the public support for Iraq is
statistically indistinguishable from the model of the first five years of Vietnam.
Public Support = 65 − 0.02days

(V-1)

The residual plots did not indicate trends within the residuals which would require
further analysis for Vietnam (Figure V-5) or Afghanistan (Figure V-6). The residuals for
Korea are not included since the model has been determined to not be statistically
significant.
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Figure V-5: Residuals for Vietnam Model (Days into Conflict)
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Figure V-6: Residuals for Afghanistan Model (Days into Conflict)

The residuals for the model of Iraq indicate that the number of days into the
conflict has a non-linear impact on the response (top of Figure V-7). Therefore, the
model was regressed with number of days into the conflict squared (Days2) as an
additionally variable. The results of this regression are in Table V-6. The residuals for
the analysis are included in the bottom of Figure V-7. The inclusion of the squared
number of days into the conflict improves the predictability (R2Prediction improves from
0.70 to 0.83) and the residuals indicate no trends.
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Figure V-7: Residuals for Iraq Model (Days into Conflict)
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Table V-6: Public Support for Iraq per Time Squared

Regression Statistics
R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
PRESS
R2Prediction
Observations
Regression
Residual
Total
Intercept
Days into Conflict
Days into Conflict2

0.83
0.83
4.11
3285.97
0.83
191
df
SS
2
15801.87
188
3177.36
190
18979.23
Coefficients Standard Error
71.71
0.81
-0.0522
0.0028
2.35E-05
1.97E-06

MS
7900.94
16.90

F
467.49

t Stat
88.85
-18.91
11.92

P-value
1.7E-155
2.36E-45
9.45E-25

Significance F
1.09E-73

Logarithm of Casualties

While simple linear models for the public support using the number of days into
the conflict provided a good fit for Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq (the model of Iraq
improved when using the variable squared); the variable did not adequately fit the Korean
conflict. Mueller suggests an alternative to the number of days in the conflict. He related
the number of casualties in both the Korean and Vietnam wars to the public opinion polls
of the day. He found that the support for the war dropped by 15 percentage points each
time the order of magnitude of number of casualties increased (Mueller, 1973, p. 60). As
we are modeling US resolve and support, casualties were defined as total number of US
military killed and wounded during the conflict. Additionally, Mueller suggested that the
Korean and Vietnamese conflicts even begin with essentially the same level of support
(1973, p. 60).
Using the data provided in Mueller’s book, Figure V-8 was created. In
V-8 , the percentage of the US population which supported the wars in Korea and
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Figure

Vietnam was correlated with the base ten logarithm of the total number of casualties.
Figure V-9 presents the same data plotted relative to time.
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Figure V-8: Casualties versus Public Support (Mueller’s Model)
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Figure V-9: Mueller's Model with Date Indicated
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Using the same methodology presented by Mueller, the public support for the war
in Iraq is given in Figure V-10. Figure V-11 presents the data relative to the date of the
war.
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When the data of public support were fit for Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq with an
analysis based on Mueller’s work, a decrease in public support relative to casualties was
identified (log10(cas)). Tables V-7 though V-9 present the data for models based on the
log of casualties for Korea (Table V-7), Vietnam (Table V-8) and Iraq (Table V-9). The
tables present the model results as described earlier. All the models were significant.
Table V-7: Public Support for Korea per Casualty (Based on data from Mueller, 1973, p. 61)

Regression Statistics
0.83
R2
0.82
Adjusted R2
5.21
Standard Error
1138.25
PRESS
0.74
R2Prediction
25
Observations
df
SS
1
3610.9
Regression
23
739.6
Residual
24
4350.5
Total
Coefficients Standard Error
114.46
13.82
Intercept
-14.89
2.39
Log10(cas)

MS
3610.9
32.2

F
112.3

t Stat
8.28
-6.23

P-value
2.34E-08
2.34E-06

Significance F
2.53213E-10

Table V-8: Public Support for Vietnam per Casualty (Based on data from Mueller, 1973, p. 61)

Regression Statistics
0.90
R2
2
0.89
Adjusted R
3.20
Standard Error
316.8
PRESS
0.86
R2Prediction
24
Observations
df
SS
1
2041.3
Regression
22
240.7
Residual
23
2282.0
Total
Coefficients Standard Error
124.98
6.04
Intercept
-16.51
1.16
Log10(cas)
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MS
2041.3
10.9

F
186.57

t Stat
20.68
-14.23

P-value
2.34E-16
6.85E-12

Significance F
3.18E-12

Table V-9: Public Support for Iraq per Casualty

Regression Statistics
R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
PRESS
R2Prediction
Observations
Regression
Residual
Total
Intercept
Log10(cas)

0.85
0.85
3.84
2869.21
0.85
191
df
SS
MS
1
16185.85
16185.85
189
2793.37
14.78
190
18979.23
Coefficients Standard Error
t Stat
108.52
1.76
61.77
-15.02
0.45
-33.09

F
1095.14

Significance F
1.44E-80

P-value
2.9E-127
1.44E-80

The t-test statistics indicate the coefficients for the models for public support
based on logarithm of casualties are all statistically significant. Additionally, the R2 and
adjusted R2 values above 0.80 signify the models appropriately represent the variance
within the data.
Figure V-12 provides the residuals for Korea, Vietnam and Iraq. No significant
trends occur in the data. The residuals versus the log of casualties, predicted value and
time have been included in the figure.
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Figure V-12: Residuals for Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq (Log10(Casualties))

Figure V-13 presents the 95% confidence intervals of the coefficient for log10(cas)
for each of the three wars and indicates that Mueller’s rule of thumb (as casualties
increased by an order of magnitude: the support for the war dropped by about 15
percentage points) is supported by the data from Iraq. It should be noted that casualties
can only increase with time; therefore, a correlation between these factors is expected
(the rate, however, may vary). Additionally, the 95% confidence intervals for the start of
the war (Y-Intercept) for Korea, Vietnam and Iraq overlap at 113% of public support as
seen in Figure V-14. Based on these three data sets, the hypothesis that public opinion
theoretically began at 113% cannot be statistically rejected.
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Based on the confidence intervals, Equation V-2 provides a generic model of
public support as the logarithm of total casualties in Iraq.
Public Support = 113 − 15log10 (casualties)
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(V-2)

The model does not fit well in early stages of the conflict when the casualties are
low or zero. However, this only occurs when there are less than ten casualties. Further
addressing this issue Mueller states:
The intercept figure is a backward extrapolation to an imaginary starting point
percentage … at the point when casualties would have been zero. To avoid this
absurdity a transformation of the dependent variable could have been undertaken,
but this would have complicated the analysis without adding any important new
information. (Mueller, 1973, p.60)
Least Squares Multiple Linear Regression
Basic Model

In the previous section, two single variable models for the three conflicts were
presented. This section considers a model combining both previous variables along with
additional variables into a single model. Using data provided by The Brooking Institute
within the Iraq Index, ten variables were included in a least squares multiple linear
regression (MLR) model (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006):
Number of US troops present
Daily attacks by insurgents
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
Insurgents captured or killed
Foreign nationals taken prisoner
Total insurgents
Total foreign insurgents
British fatalities
Iraqi civilian fatalities
Iraqi military fatalities
The original variables (log10(cas) and number of days) were also included in the MLR. A
stepwise linear regression analysis was performed and eight of the new variables were
rejected at an α = 0.05 level, for modeling public support. For this data, the α must be
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relaxed to 0.17 before the next variable (British Fatalities) would be included in the MLR
model. Table V-10 provides the results and appropriate p-value from the analysis.
Table V-10: Results from Stepwise Procedure

Variable

Estimate

P-value

Intercept

91.47

4.42E-41

Log10(cas)

-7.322

0.00161

Insurgents (Captured/Killed)

0.0008418

0.00228

Days

-0.05957

0.00240

Daily Attacks

-0.0403

0.00813

British Fatalities

0

0.1684

Iraq Military Fatalities

0

0.2166

Total Insurgents

0

0.3020

Iraqi Security Forces

0

0.3999

Iraq Civilian Fatalities

0

0.4515

Foreign Insurgents

0

0.4947

Foreigners Kidnapped

0

0.6334

US Troops

0

0.9565

The remaining four variables were statistically significant at an α = 0.05 level:
logarithm of number of casualties (log10(cas)), number of insurgents captured
(insurgents), days into the conflict (days), and daily number of attacks by insurgents
(attacks) (see Appendix B). Table V-11 is the complete MLR model. The model and
coefficients are significant, as shown in the table. Log10(cas), days, and daily attacks
have a negative impact on public support, while insurgents captured or killed has a small,
but positive effect on public support. Figure V-15 plots the data along with the fitted data
curve from the MLR model. The ‘MLR results’ line of Figure V-15 used the historical
values of each independent variable for the month indicated along the horizontal axis.
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Table V-11: Public Support for Iraq (MLR Model)

Regression Statistics
0.87
0.86
3.72
2728.43
0.86
191
df
SS
4
16400.2
186
2579.1
190
18979.2
Coefficients Standard Error
91.47
5.24
-7.322
2.287
0.0008418
0.000272
-0.05957
0.01935
-0.04030
0.01506

R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
PRESS
R2Prediction
Observations
Regression
Residual
Total
Intercept
Log10(cas)
Insurgents Killed
Days
Attacks

MS
4100.0
13.9

F
295.69

t Stat
17.47
-3.20
3.09
-3.08
-2.68

P-value
4.42E-41
0.00161
0.00228
0.00240
0.00813

Significance F
1.98E-79
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Figure V-15: Public Support of Iraq (MLR Results)

Table V-12 is the correlation matrix of the significant variables. As suggested
earlier, the log10(cas) was correlated with the number of days into the conflict. Similarly,
the number of insurgents capture or killed was correlated with the number of days into
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the conflict. This correlation suggests redundancy in the significant variables and
violates the independence assumption discussed in Chapter 2. Multicollinearity may
cause the variable’s standard error to increase or the t-test statistic to decrease, among
other problems. These consequences would cause concerns about the suitability of the
model. Factor analysis may be applied to produce rotated factors which are uncorrelated
and therefore do not have the consequences associated with multicollinearity.
Table V-12: Correlation of Variables for MLR

Log10(cas)

Insurgents

Days

Attacks

Log10(cas)

1

0.84

0.88

0.76
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The residuals plots for each variable from the MLR are presented in Figure V-16.
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The three linear regression models presented in this section are compared in
Figure V-17. Table V-13 compares the R2, F-test statistics, and standard errors (RMSE)
for the three models. The data curves relied on the historical data of each independent
variable at the month indicated.
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Figure V-17: Comparison of Linear Models of Public Support

Table V-13: Comparison of Linear Models

Iraq (Days)

Iraq
(Log10(cas))

Iraq (MLR)

R2

0.71

0.85

0.87

Adjusted R2

0.70

0.85

0.86

R2Prediction

0.70

0.85

0.86

F-Test

454.16

1095.13

295.69

Standard Error
(RMSE)

5.43

3.84

3.72
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The MLR analysis indicates that the actions taken by the insurgents and by the US
military shape the public opinion of the conflict. The number of US casualties and
number of insurgent captured are influenced by the actions and decisions of both sides,
while the insurgents alone are able to directly have an effect on the number of daily
attacks. Therefore, the MLR model is able to quantify, for the variables used, the impacts
to public opinion from actions taken by both the insurgents and the military.
Factor Analysis

The fitted model provides a precise estimate of the coefficient and the coefficient
is the influence of the variable. Multicollinearity makes the direct influence of a variable
potentially difficult to precisely obtain. One method to address multicollinearity is to
apply an orthogonal factor analysis. This section provides a basic overview to factor
analysis and applies the technique to the data used to fit the multiple linear regression.
Fruchter (1954), Harman (1976), and Montgomery, Peck and Vining (2001), among
others, all provide more details.
Factor analysis is a method to analyze data which reveals significant, unobserved
factors within observed variables or factors. If orthogonal factors are extracted the
factors may be used to avoid the multicollinearity of the underlying variables. This does,
however, require interpretation of the factors.
The technique is very similar to principle component analysis. However, factor
analysis is generally preferred when the goal is to determine an underlying structure,
while principle component analysis is typically applied for data reduction (Harmon,
1976, p. 14). Additionally, Dillon and Goldstein state that principle component analysis
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is variance oriented, and factor analysis is focused of the covariance (Dillon & Goldstein,
1984, p. 71). If an orthogonal rotation is used, these orthogonal representations are
uncorrelated by design to satisfy the multiple linear regression assumption of
independence. Oblique rotations may also be used to identify other factors. This
research uses regression analysis of the uncorrelated factors to build a model of public
resolve.
An orthogonal, varimax factor analysis was originally performed on the data with
all twelve variables; however, the results did not provide any additional analytic insight.
Therefore, the remainder of the section only refers to the factor analysis performed on the
four significant variables found in the multiple linear regression analysis. Table V-14
presents the resulting eigenvalues and percent variability accounted for by their factors.
A factor analysis of four variables yields four eigenvalues each associated with a factor.
The percent variability is the contribution of the factor to the variance of all the variables
(Harmon, 1976, p. 18).
Table V-14: Factor Analysis

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 4

Eigenvalue

3.6554

0.2496

0.0943

0.0006

Percent
Variability

91.39

6.24

2.36

0.02

Cum Percent

91.39

97.63

99.98

100

Franklin et al. (1995) and Horn et al. (1979) both indicate the number of factors
selected in the factor analysis is a highly debated issue. Some methods, such as Kaiser’s
rule, retain all components with eigenvalues greater than one (Franklin et al., 1995, p.
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101). Some tests such as Bartlett’s Chi-Square test use the latent roots of the residual
matrix (Horn et al., 1979, p. 288). Other tests rely on graphical interpretations. Cattell’s
scree test looks for the knee of the curve when plotting the eigenvalue of each factor in
the analysis. Cattell suggests using the number of factors after the trend in the plot no
longer changes rapidly; therefore, the ‘knee in the curve’ is counted when determining
the number of factors.
Criticism for each method exists. Kaiser’s rule can over extract components and
thus not include factors which may help provide understanding of the data (Franklin et
al., 1995, p. 103). Bartlett’s Chi-Square test is highly dependent upon sample size and
Cattell’s scree test may overestimate the number of factors (Franklin et al., 1995, p. 103).
Applying Cattell’s scree test, Figure V-18 suggests the use of two factors.
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Figure V-18: Scree Plot for Factors of Public Resolve

An orthogonal rotation was performed using the varimax method (see Harman,
1976, p. 290-299). Table V-15 is the factor loading matrix for the key factors of public

143

resolve. As observed during the scree test, two factors were obtained from the factor
loading matrix. A pattern exists in the matrix where the first factor has influences from
the days into the conflict, number of daily attacks and total insurgents captured or killed.
This was defined as the time driven component. The second factor is primarily
influenced by the log10 of US casualties. This factor was defined as the casualty driven
component. Table V-16 provides the rotation matrix.
Table V-15: Factor Loading Matrix of Public Support Key Factors

Variable

Factor 1
Time Driven
Component

Factor 2
Casualty Driven
Component

Log10(cas)

0.48

0.85

Insurgents
(Captured/Killed)

0.86

0.49

Days

0.81

0.57

Daily Attacks

0.82

0.43

Table V-16: Rotation Matrix of Public Support

Variable

Factor 1
Time Driven
Component

Factor 2
Casualty Driven
Component

Intercept

-1.18

-2.22

Log10(cas)

0.593

-0.375

Insurgents
(Captured/Killed)

0.000303

-0.000380

Days

-0.0176

0.0253

Daily Attacks

-0.00288

0.00511
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Applying the rotation to the initial data with four variables yields a new set of
data with two factors. A multiple linear regression of public resolve and these two
factors yields the ANOVA table presented in Table V-17.
Table V-17: Public Support for Iraq (Two-Factor Analysis Model using MLR)

Regression Statistics
R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
PRESS
R2Prediction
Observations
Regression
Residual
Total
Intercept
Time Factor
Casualty Factor

0.85
0.85
3.85
2874.18
0.85
191
df
SS
2
16197.76
188
2781.47
190
18979.23
Coefficients Standard Error
51.11
0.28
-4.77
0.28
-7.91
0.28

MS
8098.88
14.80

F
547.40

t Stat
183.64
-17.26
-28.69

P-value
4.8E-214
1.23E-40
1.35E-70

Significance F
4.01E-79

The standard error (RMSE) of the model remains very close to the error of the
other linear models as presented in Table V-13; however, the model does not possess the
multicollinearity of the previous models.
Figure V-19 depicts the results of the factor analysis model and provides the
multiple linear regression model results (Table V-11) for comparison. The ‘MLR results’
and ‘Factor Analysis’ lines of the figure used the historical values of each independent
variable/ factor for the month indicated along the horizontal axis.
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Figure V-19: Comparison of Public Support from MLR Model and Factor Analysis Model

Several of the residuals from the factor analysis are presented in Figure V-20. No
significant trends were observed in the data.
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As with any factor analysis, the ideal number of factors to be used can be
contested. The scree test indicates that two variables should be included. It should be
noted, since the second eigenvalue is much less than one, justification can also be made
for one factor. Table V-18 are the results when only one factor was used and regressed to
the public opinion response.
Table V-18: Public Support for Iraq (One-Factor Analysis Model using MLR)

Regression Statistics
R2
0.21
Adjusted R2
0.21
8.90
Standard Error
15161.97
PRESS
R2Prediction
0.20
191
Observations
df
SS
1
4020.50
Regression
189
14958.73
Residual
190
18979.23
Total
Coefficients Standard Error
51.11
0.64
Intercept
-4.55
0.64
Factor 1

MS
4020.50
79.15

F
50.80

t Stat
79.40
-7.13

P-value
4.2E-147
2.1E-11

Significance F
2.1E-11

The results in Table V-18 indicate the use of one factor results in a weaker model.
Additionally, the residuals in Figure V-21 suggest a trend in the data.
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Figure V-21: Residuals from Factor Analysis (One Factor)
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One limitation of least squares linear regression models is they should not be
used, if not supported, for extrapolation beyond the range of the variables used in
building the model. For methods to approximate the response beyond the known data
ranges see Bratley, Fox, and Schrage (1987), among others. Because of this limitation,
the results of the analyses should be viewed cautiously when projected outside the range
supported by the data.
An approach to avoid exceeding the bounds for public resolve is to build a
multivariate logistic regression model. A benefit of logistic regression is the expectation
function is constrained between zero and one. Since the data for public resolve
represents the percent of the population which supports the conflict using logistic
regression limits the fitted model to feasible responses. This approach is presented in the
next section.
Generalized Linear Model

The public support for the conflict in Iraq was fit to a logistic regression model
using the twelve independent variables identified in the previous section on MLR. Since
the number of people questioned for each survey was known, it was possible to use a
binomial model. Each survey (pi or observation) questioned ni people, with mi people
supporting the conflict.
The survey data referenced within Appendix A and the data for the factors from
the Iraq Index was used to fit a logistic regression model (Appendix B). Five variables
were determined to be significant; the same four variables used in the MLR and the
independent variable indicating the number of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The model is

148

presented in Table V-19. The summary of the regression coefficients and standard error
is presented for each of the factors.
Table V-19: Public Support for Iraq (Logistic Regression Model)

Goodness of Fit Factor
Deviance
809.7
Pearson Deviance
802.7
χ2
-LogLikelihood
2824.02
5648.04
Difference
133229.03
Full
136053.05
Reduced
Coefficients Standard Error
2.42
0.12
Intercept
-0.0009919
0.0004
Days
-0.552
0.048
Log10(cas)
-0.00129
0.00026
Attacks
1.77E-05
5.30E-06
Insurgents Killed
-5.88E-07
2.26E-07
Iraq Security Force

df
5

Prob > χ
0.0E-200

χ2
461.2
6.4
134.1
24.2
11.1
6.8

Prob > χ
2.70E-102
0.011
5.27E-31
8.80E-07
0.00086
0.0093

As discussed in Chapter 2, deviance was used to measure overall adequacy of the
logistic regression model. The deviance for this model was 809.7, which was greater
than the critical value, χ2α=0.05, 185 = 225. Since deviance > 225, it was concluded this
initial model was not adequate.
The model was evaluated for additional independent variables and the residuals
were investigated for trends indicating if additional transformations of factors were
required. No additional variables were found and the residuals did not indicate any
required transformations. Figure V-22 presents the normalized predicted responses
compared to the deviance residuals.
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Figure V-22: Residuals from Public Support (Logistic Regression Results)

Since no other variables could be added to account for the variability within the
results and no specific trends were discovered in the residual analysis, the data was
assumed to be overdispersed or exhibit extra binomial variation.
The Lambert and Roeder test of convexity was used for the model of public
support represented in Table V-19. The resulting graph (Figure V-23) was clearly
convex, indicating the presence of overdispersion. Overdispersion indicates the actual
variance is greater than the expected variance. Since a binomial was used for the data,
the variance is based directly on the mean. This direct connection between mean and
variance was not the best representation of the data. The overdispersion factor, φ ,
accounts for this disconnect.
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Figure V-23: Convexity Plot of Logistic Regession Model of Public Support

Using William’s procedure, φˆ was determined to equal 0.003627 when all twelve
factors of the model were included. The weights for each observation were calculated
and the model was refit. The model adjusted for overdispersion had the same four
significant factors as the MLR. Table V-20 is the final logistic regression model of
public support. The equation displays the regression coefficients, standard error, and χ2
for each factor. Figure V-24 presents the logistic regression model and the original
survey data. The ‘Logistic Regression results’ line of the figure used the historical values
of each independent variable for the month indicated along the horizontal axis.
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Table V-20: Public Support for Iraq (Logistic Regression Model Corrected for Overdispersion)

Goodness of Fit Factor
188.0
Deviance
186.0
Pearson Deviance
0.003627
William’s Weight
χ2
-LogLikelihood
705.30
1410.61
Difference
27446.21
Full
28151.51
Reduced
Coefficients Standard Error
2.16
0.22
Intercept
-0.00204
0.00077
Days
-0.436
0.094
Log10(cas)
-0.00162
0.00056
Attacks
3.04E-05
1.08E-05
Insurgents Killed
90

Prob > χ
3.46E-304

χ2
98.82
6.96
21.55
8.42
7.89

Prob > χ
2.77E-23
0.0083
3.45E-06
0.0037
0.0050

Iraq Polling Data
Logistic Regression Results
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Figure V-24: Public Support of Iraq (Logistic Regression Results)

Unfortunately, deviance of the model was no longer a valid check of the overall
adequacy of the model, due to William’s procedure which adjusts the deviance to the
degrees of freedom within of the model. No conclusion about the statistical significance
of the model can be made; therefore, the logistic regression model was not used later in
the development of the model of fourth generation operation in Chapter 7.
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As with the MLR model, the same correlations were observed (see Table V-12).
As applied in the MLR section, factor analysis was used to address the observed
multicollinearity. The time and casualty components were used from the factor analysis
performed in the previous section. These factors were regressed using logistic regression.
Table V-21 provides the results from the logistic regression. The deviance of the model
was significantly higher than the critical value from the χ2 distribution, implying the
model was again inadequate. As observed earlier in this section, the lack of fit may result
from a lack of independent variables or overdispersion.
Table V-21: Public Support for Iraq (Factor Analysis Model using Logistic Regression)

Goodness of Fit Factor
Deviance
974.4
Pearson Deviance
966.8
χ2
-LogLikelihood
2741.65
5483.30
Difference
133311.40
Full
136053.05
Reduced
Coefficients Standard Error
0.103
0.0047
Intercept
-0.191
0.0045
Time Factor
-0.334
0.0057
Casualty Factor

df
2

Prob > χ
0

χ2
491.3
1831.6
3757.5

Prob > χ
7.54E-109
0
0

While logistic regression offers several potential benefits, including a response
which is constrained between zero and one, this research did not use the technique or
models in later chapters of the dissertation.
Impact of Media Reporting

This research suggested one additional important variable; the percent of positive
stories about the war in Iraq. This area of research required data provided by two studies
conducted by The Media Research Center. The first study investigated the major
network evening news coverage (ABC, CBS, and NBC) of the war in Iraq from January
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through September 2005 (Noyes, 2005, p. 1). The second study analyzed news reports of
the cable television channels (CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News Channel) for ten weeks
from May 15th through July 21st 2006 (McCormack et al., 2006, p. 2).
The Media Research Center classified each of the news stories of the war as
positive, negative, or neutral.
To be classified as “positive,” the optimistic news had to exceed the pessimistic
by at least a three-to-two margin; to be counted as a “negative” story, the story
had to be similarly dominated by bad news. Stories that could not be assigned to
either group were counted as balanced or neutral. (Noyes, 2005, p. 2)
It should be noted that the classification of what is positive, neutral, and negative
may be open to interpretation. Be that as it may, the Media Research Center’s data was
taken as accurate for this analysis. Clearly, the analysis should be repeated if this
assumption proves to be inaccurate.
The percent of stories which were reported to be positive regarding the war in Iraq
was never greater than 28% in the Media Research Center’s analysis. While the percent
of negative stories reached a high of 83% at the end of May 2006. On average, for the
period reported by the Media Research Center, 58% of the stories were negative, 30%
were neutral and only 12% were positive.
Using least squares simple linear regression, the percent of positive and negative
stories were both regressed to public support. The analysis used the public opinion data
from the two timeframes the Media Research Center provided data. This limited the
analysis to only thirty-five points of data. Table V-22 provides the resulting model based
on the number of positive stories, and Table V-23 provides the model based on percent of
negative stories. The same hypothesis tests were used as discussed in Chapter 2.
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Table V-22: Public Support for Iraq based on Percent of Positive Stories

Regression Statistics
R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
PRESS
R2Prediction
Observations
Regression
Residual
Total
Intercept
Percent Positive

0.34
0.32
2.44
221.37
0.26
35
df
SS
1
100.99
33
196.30
34
297.29
Coefficients Standard Error
43.12
0.97
30.16
7.32

MS
100.99
5.95

F
16.98

t Stat
44.25
4.12

P-value
5.8E-31
0.000239

Significance F
0.000239

Table V-23: Public Support for Iraq based on Percent of Negative Stories

Regression Statistics
R2
0.031
Adjusted R2
0.002
2.95
Standard Error
328.71
PRESS
R2Prediction
-0.11
35
Observations
df
SS
1
9.24
Regression
33
288.05
Residual
34
297.29
Total
Coefficients Standard Error
49.24
2.47
Intercept
-4.06
3.95
Percent Negative

MS
9.24
8.73

F
1.06

t Stat
19.96
-1.03

P-value
5.45E-20
0.311

Significance F
0.310934

Table V-22 shows there was a correlation between the percent of positive stories
and the increase in public support for the conflict. The R2 indicated that this factor alone
did not fully explain the variance of the data. However, the factor was statistically
significant. Conversely, Table V-23 indicated the percent of negative stories was not
statistically significant. The magnitude of the t-test statistic (-1.03) was less than the
critical value from the t-distribution (2.03). Additionally, as expected based on the t-test,
the F-test statistic indicated the model was not statistically significant.
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A multiple linear regression analysis was also performed using the twelve
previous independent variables and the percent of positive and negative news reports.
The completed analysis created a model which included the logarithm base ten of the
total US casualties and the percent of positive media reports. The other variables were
not considered to be statistically significant at an α = 0.05 level. The decrease in
significant factors (from the previous MLR model) was anticipated given the smaller
sample size. Table V-24 provides the model for the limited timeframe.
Table V-24: Public Support for Iraq (MLR with Percent of Positive Media Reports)

Regression Statistics
R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
PRESS
R2Prediction
Observations
Regression
Residual
Total
Log10(cas)
Percent Positive

0.997
0.967
2.61
253.35
0.997
35
df
SS
MS
2
76578.22
38289.11
33
224.16
6.79
35
76802.38
Coefficients Standard Error
t Stat
38.70
7.64
5.06
10.01
0.24
41.36

F
5636.74

Significance F
1.7E-41

P-value
1.53E-05
5.19E-30

As the R2 and F-tests indicate, the model provides significant insight into the
factors impacting the public resolve for the time period. Figure V-25 illustrates the
original data for public resolve (Iraq Polling Data), and the model’s response at each data
point given the independent variables historical value for the date on the horizontal axis
(MLR results). The figure also presents the percent of positive media reports (Positive
Reports). The connection between the changes in the public resolve and the number of
positive reports is clear. Positive reports appear to have a mitigating effect, improving
public support for the war.

156

PUBLIC SUPPORT (%)

80

Iraq Polling Data
MLR Results
Positive Reports

70
60
50
40
30
20
10

Jun-06
Jul-06

Apr-06
May-06

Jan-06
Mar-06

Dec-05

Oct-05
Nov-05

Aug-05
Sep-05

Jun-05
Jul-05

Apr-05
May-05

Feb-05
Mar-05

Jan-05

0

DATE
Figure V-25: Public Support and Percent of Positive Media Reports

Further analysis of the final data point on Figure V-25 provides an illustration of
how this impact may be evaluated. Given there were no positive reports that week, there
was no positive impact; however, if the percent of positive reports increased to 10%, the
model suggested that the notional support of the war would increase to 47% from 43%.
Similarly, if the percent of media reports were at levels seen in early 2005 (21%), the
model implied that support for the war might have been as high as 52%. Additionally, if
the percent of positive media reports was at the reported high of 28%, the public support
may have been as high as 54% (a full 10% increase in total public support).
Unfortunately, the data covered less than a year of the conflict in Iraq. Therefore,
percent of positive media stories was not included in the final model of public resolve
used later in this dissertation. While not included in the model for the dissertation, the
independent variable and related importance did require a discussion. Further research
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and analysis of media reporting, as well as other scores of positive, neutral and negative
stories from varied raters, would allow this variable to be included within a model of
public resolve.
Recent Polling Data and Summary
Recent Polling Data

The models presented in this chapter were created using data ending in 2006.
These were compared to activities which occurred in July 2007. The opinion survey
from 6-8 July shows only 36% support (Gallop); July 18th-21st, 36% (ABC); and finally,
July 20th-22nd, 42% (CBS). This gives a simple average of 38.0% of the US population is
supporting the current conflict in Iraq. The standard deviation is 3.5%.
The least squares simple linear regression model based only on days into the
conflict (Table V-4) suggests the public support should be 33.1%. The model based on
the logarithm of the number of casualties (Table V-9) suggests the public support should
be 41.2%. The MLR model (Table V-11) reports 37.9% in July 2007, GLM (Table
V-20) reports 38.8%, and the factor analysis model (Table V-17) reports 35.0%. The
values were based on reported data for each factor for mid-July 2007 (O’Hanlon &
Campbell, 2007). All the models, except the least squares simple linear regression model
based on days, provided predictions very close to the observed values and were within
one standard deviation of the data. Based on the data available, it can be supported
statistically that public resolve decreases over time and is related to the casualties
sustained.

158

The least squares multiple linear regression model of public resolve provides
insights to the implications of current policy and military doctrine. The number of US
casualties and duration of the conflict which has already occurred can not be reduced;
therefore, their contribution to public resolve cannot be reversed. However, if the total
number of insurgents captured (or killed) increased and the number of daily attacks
decreases, the model suggests that public support for the conflict may increase. The
research also suggests (based on a limited sample) that positive media reports have a
positive effect on public support.
The Brookings Institute’s Iraq Index suggest that at the end of 2006 there were
roughly 25,000 insurgents (O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007, p. 26) and approximately 175
daily attacks made by insurgents (O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007, p. 7). Theoretically, if
all of these estimated insurgents could be removed (additionally causing the daily attacks
to reduce to zero) without creating new insurgents, the percent of population supporting
the conflict based on the statistical model could increase by 28.1%, suggesting over 71%
of the US population might support the conflict. If only a quarter of this objective was
completed, the model suggested the public resolve could potentially increase to over
50%. Unfortunately, data from Korea, Vietnam, or Afghanistan provide no empirical
evidence that the downward trend of public resolve has been reversed.
Summary

This chapter presented multiple models of US support for conflicts, with
particular attention to Iraq. The data for building these models included recent public
opinion data along with historical data from Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan. The first
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model, a simple least squares linear regression with time as the covariate, showed a
similar trend in slope for Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, suggesting that public opinion
declines at ~0.6% per month or ~2% per quarter. Additionally, public support for the
first four years of Iraq and the first five years of Vietnam (1965-1969) can be represented
with the same model (Equation V-1). This conclusion indicates that the decline of public
support for Vietnam and Iraq over time are statistically the same.
Mueller proposed that as the number of casualties increase by an order of
magnitude, the public support for a war decreases by 15%. This was based on data from
Vietnam and Korea. This research concludes Mueller’s proposed model is still valid for
the conflict in Iraq.
When looking for other variables which influence public opinion, a multiple
linear regression analysis and logistic regression analysis both identify the same four
variables. The key variables were the logarithm of the number of US casualties, days
into the conflict, number of daily attacks made by insurgents, and number of insurgents
captured or killed. Only the number of insurgents captured or killed had a positive
impact on public opinion.
Factor analysis was applied to the key variables found during the linear and
logistic regressions. This analysis was able to eliminate the correlation within the factors
used in the models. Finally, the impact of the percent of positive media reports regarding
the war in Iraq was analyzed. The factor was determined to have significant influence on
the public resolve for the conflict; however, there was insufficient data spanning the
duration of the conflict to support including the factor in the following chapters.
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As seen in this chapter, both the multiple linear regression model (Table V-11)
and the logistic regression model (Table V-20) can be used to estimate the public resolve
for the conflict. As they are both members of generalized linear models (GLM), GLM
has been demonstrated as a valid and powerful technique to estimate the US public
resolve during a conflict.
The chapter constructed a modeling framework of public resolve. The framework
was founded on empirical evidence of key factors influencing the public resolve. The
proposed model within this study demonstrates how actions made by both the insurgents
and the US military impact public opinion. The R2Prediction values for several of the
models indicate the prediction of the variance within the model is greater than 80%.
Further research incorporating perturbations, such as elections and troop surges,
to the public resolve should be pursued. These impacts may significantly change the
regression coefficients. These models for public resolve can be used within current
combat models to gauge the public support of various courses of action. Additionally,
the impact of public resolve can be connected to the combat effectiveness of our troops.
This chapter presented the fourth contribution of the dissertation. The chapter
constructed a modeling framework of public resolve. The framework was founded on
empirical evidence of key factors influencing the public resolve. The proposed model
within this study demonstrates how actions taken by both the insurgents and the US
military impact public opinion.
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VI.

Modeling Morale

Chapter Overview

Warfare has always included aspects of fighting spirit and morale. This can be
seen by the effects of drums, the Spartan’s red cloaks, the sighting of a single Iroquois
Confederation scout, Lord Haw-Haw’s or Hanoi Hannah’s broadcasts, or today’s
asymmetric conflicts with the employment of improvised explosive devises (IEDs).
These aspects can be seen currently in the many facets of information operations and
information warfare. However, as the services expand their information operation
efforts, this ability to directly influence the hearts and minds of the population and
soldiers will be more commonplace.
This chapter develops a theoretical modeling framework of combat spirit. Several
factors which impact the framework are discussed. The chapter concludes with an
application of the modeling framework. The example models the morale of notional
brigades and battalions that have deployed into Iraq based, in part, on the actual histories.
An excursion based on the impact of multiple deployments is also presented.
Supposition of Soldier Morale

This section develops an equation representing the model of morale provided by
Stafford-Clark and Menninger. The morale curves were introduced in Chapter 2. This
equation, which is based on control theory, enables other influences to be modeled
impacting the morale of deployed soldiers.
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Applying the log decrement method from control theory, both the Stafford-Clark
model and Menninger model were represented as a second order response to an impulse.
The heights at arrival, engagement, and acceptance were used to derive ζ, and the
distance between peak times of engagement and acceptance was used to calculate the
period of the function. The coefficients from the log decrement method are presented in
Table VI-1, arbitrarily assuming the system’s steady-state is zero and the height at arrival
is 0.5.
Table VI-1: Coefficients for Response to an Impulse

Stafford-Clark

Menninger

Model of Soldier
Morale

ζ

0.18

0.21

0.2

Period, T
(% of deployment)

0.77

0.71

0.7

Equation VI-1 presents the model of soldier morale based on the length of
deployment (L) and time in theater (t).
1.832
t
⎛
8.976 ⎞
Soldier morale ( t ) = ⎜ 0.1070 L e L sin
t⎟
L
⎝
⎠

−1

(VI-1)

Using the data from Table VI-1, the transient response to an impulse was overlaid
on the original morale curves provided by Stafford-Clark and Menninger (Figure VI-1
and Figure VI-2). Unfortunately, a statistical fit of the relation can not be conducted
since the original graphs were only hand drawn and not mathematically derived.
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Figure VI-1 and Figure VI-2 indicate that the model of soldier morale from
Equation VI-1 provides similar results as the hand drawings provided by Stafford-Clark
and Menninger. From these observations a general supposition of soldier morale is
proposed:
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Supposition of Soldier Morale: The Morale of an individual or unit engaged in a
classical combat situation can be modeled as a second order system represented as
the transient response to an impulse. Specifically, the period is 70% of the length
of deployment and ζ = 0.2.

While individual elements will always affect a specific unit’s morale, the
supposition can be used in combat models. The coefficients of the proposed relation are
presented in Table VI-1. Figure VI-1 also compares this proposed relation with the
Stafford-Clark morale curve and the fitted impulse. The proposed relation is not
illustrated in Figure VI-2, since the data are obscured by the fitted impulse. The system
is well represented by an impulse, since the unit is at an average level of morale while in
garrison waiting to be deployed. The deployment order is the impulse to the system. The
morale curves suggested within this study do not start at zero. This represents the time
required to transit to theater and engage the enemy.
Assuming a deployment of twelve months, with peak morale occurring prior to
deployment and the minimum morale occurring one-third of the way through the
deployment, the morale curve for a typical brigade is estimated by Figure VI-3.
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Figure VI-3: Morale Curve of a Twelve Month Deployment
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12

The supposition is supported by research on OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
conducted by Smith and Hagman (2006). They researched the morale and cohesion of
members of the 172nd Stryker Brigade, immediately preceding their deployment to Iraq
and also six months into their deployment (mid-deployment). They categorized the
results of their surveys based on horizontal changes, vertical changes and organizational
changes. This represented how the members associated with their comrades (horizontal),
the unit cohesion with their commanders (vertical) and of the overall brigade
(organizational). The results (as seen in Figure VI-4) demonstrate the soldiers lost unit
cohesion with their leadership (vertical) both directly and organizationally. The cohesion
between comrades did not change (horizontal). The trend of loss of morale from predeployment to mid-deployment further supports the supposition of soldier morale
presented in this section. Comparing the initial morale with the morale at month six, in
Figure VI-3, tracks with the decrease suggested by Smith and Hagman.
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Figure VI-4: Platoon Member Ratings of Cohesion
(Smith & Hagman, 2006, Figure 2 Page 8)
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The control theory based soldier morale model introduced and developed in the
section, supported by historical and empirical evidence, is next adapted by introducing
several factors which may impact the shape and attributes of the morale curve.
Influencing Factors

The basic morale curve may be adjusted to represent several key factors. These
factors differ between each conflict due to military policies and environment. This
section highlights and develops several of these factors with support for their importance
and methods to integrate the factors into the morale curve.
Unit Cohesion

As opposed to World War II, soldier could leave combat before the conflict ended
in the Vietnam War. “The realization that one did not have to get killed or wounded to
return stateside, as was the expectation in World War II, raised hopes and individual
morale” (Helmus & Glenn, 2005, p. 18). On the other hand, individual rotations within
Vietnam caused lower unit cohesion (Helmus & Glenn, 2005, p. 18). The enlisted
soldiers generally rotated out of theater after 12 months, while the officers might only
spend six months in theater (Helmus & Glenn, 2005, p. 17). The experience of the
commander directly impacted the morale and effectiveness of the soldier.
Over half the battalion commanders in Vietnam were routinely relieved without
cause prior to the end of their sixth month in command in country: over half the
company commanders were similarly relieved before they completed four months
in command. (Thayer, 1975, p. 225)
The vertical unit cohesion was difficult to build and maintain when commanders were
rotated more often than the troops. Additionally, combat effectiveness was directly
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impacted. The average number of KIAs per month for a battalion commander with less
than six months experience was 4.98 soldiers in 1965 and 1966. A battalion commander
with over six months experience averaged 4.25 KIA per month (Thayer, 1975, p. 225).
The impact is more significant when reporting the number of soldiers lost in sizable
skirmishes (five or more deaths in a company in one day). The battalion commander
with less than six month in command lost 2.46 soldiers per month, while the commander
with more than six months experience lost 1.62 soldiers per month in sizable skirmishes
(Thayer, 1975, p. 225). Therefore, it was good for effectiveness to be assigned in a unit
with an experienced commander; however, since these commanders were routinely
reassigned, it was difficult to assure these benefits.
The current policy of the US Army is that soldiers train and deploy together so
that can meet operational requirements (AR 600-35, 2006, p. 3). The policy is designed
to increase both morale and combat effectiveness. Unit cohesion is stronger since the
unit trains and deploys together. Further, extended training and operational time with the
same commanders improve unit combat effectiveness.
Veteran Status

Rotation policy also relates directly to the next factor: combat veteran status. A
soldier who is a combat veteran performs differently than the soldier on their first
deployment. Quester et al. provide some insight into how morale changes over multiple
deployments. Quester et al. suggest that more deployments lower the soldier’s morale
and therefore lower the reenlistment rates (2006, p. 9). Figure VI-5 shows that the
reenlistment rate decreases for first time USMC reenlistments as the number of
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deployments increase. A first term reenlistment is a young Marine facing their first
reenlistment decision (Quester et al., 2006, p. 1). Fifty-three percent of the Marines
making reenlistment decisions have no dependents and thus are single without children
(Quester et al., 2006, p. 7).
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Figure VI-5: FY05 Reenlistment Rates for First Term Marines
(Quester et al., 2006, Figure 4 Page 9)

More information on the morale of veterans can be found in the Mental Health
Advisory Team’s (MHAT) Reports. The third report dated May 2006 provided
information on the soldier’s morale deployed during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
04-06. One of the insights from the MHAT’s Report was the personal morale between
first time and multiple deployers did not vary significantly. Specifically, 55% of first
time deployers and 57% of multiple deployers ranked their morale as medium, high or
very high (MHAT-III, 2006, p. 18). On the other hand, individual views of how these
individuals viewed their unit morale did significantly differ; only 45% of the multipletime deployers ranked morale as medium, high or very high, compared to 59% for first
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timers (MHAT-III, 2006, p. 18). This difference was shown to be statistically significant
(z-value = -2.48, p <0.05) (MHAT-III, 2006, p. 18). These results imply that the combat
veteran’s perception of unit cohesion decreases, by 14%, when each unit redeploys to
theater. The same trend was observed in the MHAT-IV report.
Multiple deployers are also more susceptible to mental health problems. The
MHAT-IV report indicates acute stress, depression, and anxiety were all statistically
higher among multiple deployers when compared to first time deployers. Figure VI-6
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provides the percent of soldiers who screened positive for each mental health problem.
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Figure VI-6: Mental Health Problems of First and Multiple Time Deployers
(MHAT-IV, 2006, Figure 8 Page 23)

As seen with unit morale, the multiple time deployers on average exhibit lower
morale and potentially lower combat effectiveness. Their effectiveness is potentially
lower since they are more susceptible to mental health problems.
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Deployment Duration

Another factor which may impact the morale of the forces is the actual
deployment duration as opposed to the DEROS (date of expected return from overseas.)
Hosek, Kavanagh, and Miller provide a model which predicts the probability of retention
based on time away as opposed to expected time away. Table VI-2 provides the results
of their model and suggests how the intention to stay (thus implying morale) decreases as
the actual time in theater extends beyond the expected DEROS.
Table VI-2: Probability of Intension to Stay
(Hosek, Kavanagh & Miller, 2006, Table 4.8 Page 78)

Army

Navy

USMC

Air Force

0.28
0.27
0.29
0.27
0.27

0.44
.04
.041
0.38
0.24

0.54
0.54
0.55
0.53
0.46

0.59
0.59
0.58
0.49
0.44

Enlisted
Much Less
Less
Neither
More
Much More

0.34
0.39
0.36
0.36
0.31

0.34
0.33
0.33
0.27
0.17
Officer

Much Less
Less
Neither
More
Much More

0.6
0.57
0.62
0.58
0.48

0.5
0.58
0.53
0.54
0.38

The rows indicate the probability of intension to stay in the military based on the
actual duration of deployment versus the expected DEROS. For example the ‘Much
Less’ column indicates the when an enlisted sailor was actually deployed much less time
than expected, the rate of retention was predicted to be 34%. On the other hand, when an
enlisted sailor spent much more time deployed than expected, the probability the sailor
stayed in the Navy was only 17%. The percent of expected reenlistments dramatically
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decreased from those whom returned from theater when expected (indicated as the
Neither row in Table VI-2) and those whom returned much later than expected. Navy
enlisted were nearly one half the original rate, while the Air Force enlisted saw a decrease
of 17%.
We can model the impact of deployment changes by adjusting the morale curve
based on the timing of the announcement to extend a unit or return the unit sooner than
expected. If a unit is extended for a few months soon after arriving to the theater of
operations, the morale curve may simply be stretched to adjust to the longer duration.
However, if the extension is announced just prior to returning stateside, the morale curve,
which is already on the down slope from acceptance to reentry, continues to decrease
perhaps at a higher rate.
Leadership

The leadership of a unit is also very important to the soldier’s morale. Examples
of how leaders were able to manifest victory from their troops can be found throughout
the pages of history. Several examples occurred during the Civil War battle of Manassas
in 1861. Brigadier General Barnard Bee rallied his brigade stating:
There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Let us determine to die here, and we
will conquer. Follow me. (Freeman, 1950, p. 82)
The result was:
His men obeyed the call; and, at the head of the column, the very moment when
the battle was turning in our favor he fell, mortally wounded. (Freeman 1950,
p. 82)
Brigadier General Thomas Jackson was henceforth referred to as ‘Stonewall.’ Later
during the same battle, addressing the 2nd and 4th Virginia Infantry, Stonewall Jackson
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stated, “Reserve your fire till they come within fifty yards, then fire and give them the
bayonet; and when you charge, yell like furies!” (Henderson, 1906, p. 151). This was
considered the first use of the Rebel Yell, further demoralizing the forces of the Union.
McPherson states:
Startled by this screaming counterattack the discouraged and exhausted Yankee
soldiers, their three-month term almost up, suddenly decided they had fought
enough. They began to fall back, slowly and with scatted resistance at first, but
with increasing panic as their officers lost control, men became separated from
their companies, and the lest shred of discipline disappeared. The retreat became
a rout as men threw away guns, packs, and anything else that might slow them
down in the wild scramble for the crossings of Bull Run. (1988, p.344)
The image of ‘Stonewall’ Jackson standing before the troops as a ‘stone wall’ and his
directive to use the Rebel Yell provided the leadership required to break the morale of the
Union forces. This loss of morale allowed the Confederate States of America to win the
battle that day.
This section provided an overview of how specific factors can impact the model
of soldier morale. The next section provides an example of how the model can provide
insight to the conflict in Iraq.
Application (Notional Morale in Iraq)

In this section, the model of soldier morale is applied to illustrate a notional
estimate of the morale based on the US troops in Iraq. The morale of each land brigade
and amphibious battalion is approximated using the model of soldier’s morale. By
combining the morale for each unit, an overall morale of land and amphibious units is
estimated. This estimate offers insight the morale within theater, providing commanders
the ability plan operations when morale is at high levels.
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The date each US Army Brigade and USMC Battalion entered and left theater
was used to model the notional morale. Korb et al. published the dates of the US Army
Combat Brigade’s deployments in their report titled, Beyond the Call of Duty (2007).
The Center for Naval Analysis’s Marine Corps Deployed Unit Database (2007) was used
to obtain the dates of USMC Battalion deployments. While the actual dates are used,
other parameters are notional; thus the illustration, while based on existing units, is
notional. The following analysis should not be assumed to actually represent any
particular unit’s morale. The notional estimated morale for each brigade/ battalion was
represented by the model of soldier morale. The morale curve was scaled to the length of
the deployment and the system, prior to the impulse, was set at 0.5 (average morale on a
scale from zero to one). Additionally, the lowest morale of an average unit was assumed
to occur at one third of the deployment duration. Again, individual factors will certainly
affect specific unit morale.
The estimated morale of a single unit deployed for twelve months can be seen in
Figure VI-3. Figure VI-7 presents an overall notional estimate of hypothetical
amphibious troop morale for four years of conflict. The overall estimated morale was
determined by using the weighted average of the each battalion. The weight was based
on the number of amphibious troops in each battalion. Figure VI-7 also provides the
estimated morale for two ground force battalions. The time the battalion arrived in
theater and duration can be observed.
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Figure VI-7: Hypothesized Morale of Amphibious Units and two Battalions

Figure VI-8 presents the notional estimate for all land and amphibious units for
four years. The hypothesized land unit’s morale and overall morale were both calculated
using weighted averages, as discussed previously.
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Figure VI-8: Overall Hypothetical Morale
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Excursions can be tested by applying the insights from the influencing factors
previously discussed. For example, the morale curve can be adjusted to reflect the impact
of veteran units returning to theater. Quester et al.’s data about retention rates implies
that morale deceases at least 6% each time an individual returns to theater (Quester et al.,
2006, p. 9). In this scenario it was assumed that 50% of the troops previously deployed
with unit; therefore, the overall morale of the unit decreased 3% each time the unit
returned to theater. With more data it would be possible to take a weighted average of
the number of veterans in a unit. Figure VI-9 illustrates the hypothesized impact to
amphibious units’ morale after implementing such a notional loss of morale for veterans.
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Figure VI-9: Hypothetical Amphibious Unit’s Morale as Impacted by Combat Veteran Status

Figure VI-9 projects the morale to the fifth year of the conflict based on the
deployment schedule. After five years of the conflict, the baseline assumption of morale
projects morale at roughly 0.5. However, as more veterans return to theater the overall
amphibious unit’s morale is decreased by as much as 0.085. While actual unit morale is
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affected by unit cohesion, experience, training, and leadership, this model can be used to
estimate the optimal deployment schedule to maximize the morale within theater. For
example if all the troops enter the theater simultaneously, the morale will fall to its low
when all the troops enter the engagement phase at the same time. On the other hand, if
the forces were appropriately staggered, some troops will be at the engagement phase
while others troops will have higher morale since they were at the arrival or acceptance
phase. Figure VI-10 demonstrates the morale for two different deployment schedules.
The first assumes twelve month deployments begin in the spring and six month
deployments begin in both the spring and fall. The second scenario had the forces evenly
deployed (or staggered) every month. The higher variance of the morale when the forces
deploy in large groups is evident, when compared to the steady morale in theater when

MORALE

the deployments are evenly spread among all the months.

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Fall and Spring Deployments

Monthly Deployments

0

6

12

18

24

30

36

TIME (Months)
Figure VI-10: Hypothetical Morale of Various Deployment Schedules
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The model can also be used in other, more complex simulations and war-games to
estimate combatant morale. Of course, actual morale is a fusion of individual unit
cohesion, training, leadership, and experience.
Although the application presented within this study focuses on the friendly
operations, the theoretical modeling framework might be extended to an insurgency as
well. Hypothetically, the insurgent is recruited when a significant event creates an
impulse to their morale which sends their support for the insurgency above the recruit’s
specific threshold. Since the insurgent has no expected duration of the conflict, the
duration of the impact of the impulse is two years unless another significant event occurs.
This duration is based on the time to create a new sense of self as described by
Menninger (Menninger, 1988 p. 204). The individual morale for each insurgent must be
modeled since they are not among a deployed unit. However, it may be possible to group
the insurgents based on the months they were recruited and adjusted by the operations
they participate in. Any hypothesized results would have to factor in the effects of
religious fervor and a suicide bomber mentality.
Since the model of soldier morale is based on control theory, there are at least two
means to improve the results. First, regression analysis techniques can be applied to
obtain statistically significant regressors for the control factors. As the number of data
points are provided, the regression and fit of the control theory improves.
The performance parameters of control theory can also be optimized. The
parameters can be optimized to impact the level of morale. It is possible to adjust
parameters of the combatant’s morale so that a planned major operation can be conducted
while the morale and effectiveness of the engaged combatants is expected to be high. For
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more information on the methods and procedures used to optimize the performance of
control theory by adjusting the parameters, see Ogata (1997) among others.
While developed to model the soldier’s morale, this framework can also be used
in other situations where morale is important. Obviously, this model provides a
mathematical framework which can be used to model the deployments of Peace Corps
members; however, as Menninger suggests his non-mathematical model can be applied
universally, this control theory based framework may be applied universally. The model
can be applied to model the morale and effectiveness of a new employee, when
developing a lesson plan to teach students, or to anticipate the performance of a project
team. Providing a new employee the encouragement or needed support during the initial
slump may produce a more effective employee. Whereas developing a lesson plan which
integrates the morale curve may produce a more effective learning environment and
therefore more effective students. Given the morale cycle, work effort and effectiveness
might be estimated in project planning. Additionally, this model may be applied to
model the morale of a firm after a merger, the start-up of a new company, or a team built
for a specific task.
Summary

The fighting spirit and morale of the troops is a target in fourth generation
operations. This chapter provided a model which could be implemented to minimize the
impact to the morale of our troops. By investigating the troop’s morale and combat
spirit, the impact to their combat effectiveness can be better understood.
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A theoretical modeling framework of combat spirit was developed. Several
factors which impact the framework are discussed. The chapter concluded with an
illustration of the modeling framework. The notional morale of each brigade and
battalion that have deployed into Iraq was presented and combined to produce the
hypothetical morale for land and amphibious units. An excursion based on the impact of
multiple deployments was also presented.
The model of soldier morale based on a systems response to an impulse can be
used as a measure of effectiveness during courses of action analyses. The morale factor
can be used within a combat model to insure the combatants are effective and efficient
during the combat maneuvers. With the proposed model, the effects of average morale
can be incorporated into larger modeling efforts.
This chapter presented the fifth contribution of the dissertation. This contribution
constructed a theoretical modeling framework that dynamically models soldier morale.
This provides a capability to model and evaluate the aggregate impact of soldier morale
due to various courses of action the commander may take or from other external factors.
This chapter also completes the third objective of this research. This objective
was to construct a theoretical modeling framework to dynamically portray public resolve,
will-to-fight, morale and combat spirit within a combat model. The public resolve
portion of the objective was completed in Chapter 5, and the morale and combat spirit is
presented in this chapter. These elements will next be combined into an overall model of
elements of fourth generation operations.
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VII. Modeling Elements of Fourth Generation Operations
Chapter Overview

This chapter provides an analytic framework for modeling elements of fourth
generation operations. This framework captures the morale of a deploying force and
public resolve in support of their forces. The model remains a model of conflict and
combat; however, the impacts from the political, economic, and informational
instruments of power are represented in the model through the dynamic adaptation of
public resolve and soldier morale.
This chapter combines the results of the previous four chapters creating a model
of some elements of modern conflict. The methodology to build the model is presented
along with the submodels. Additionally, the data for a scenario based on OPERATION
IRAQI FREEDOM is populated during the discussion of model development. Once the
complete model is developed, the next section provides a discussion on the verification
and validation of the model. The verification and validation process is based on a
multiple step procedure which is intended to provide confidence in the model.
The final section provides two demonstrations of the potential applications of the
model. The first demonstration varies five key factors, providing a potential decision
maker with insight to the importance of each factor. The second demonstration
emphasizes the versatility and importance of feedback loops and highlighting the
framework’s ability to include softer aspects of combat.
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Analytic Framework of Elements of Fourth Generation Operations

The analytic framework of the model of elements of fourth generation operations
is presented in this section. This model expands on the system dynamics representation
of the Lanchester Laws presented in Chapter 4. A scenario based on the US forces (Blue)
and insurgents (Red) in Iraq, from March 2003 through December 2006, was used to
populate the model with data. The deployment and redeployment schedules determined
the number of Blue forces in theater (troops participating in the conflict). The scenario’s
implementation predetermined the Blue deployment schedules; however, it is possible to
alter the implementation creating other options to deploy the Blue forces. The number of
Red forces was determined by the rate Red accumulated new forces which depended on
the recruiting and training of insurgents.
Figure VII-1 is the system dynamics representation of a top-level model of
elements of fourth generation operations. Using the symbology presented in Chapter 2,
the square containers indicate levels, valves indicate rates, the double arrows show flow
created by the rates, and single arrows indicate dependencies between various model
components.

182

RED
CASUALTIES
(RCAS)
RED (R)

R=
RED INCREASE
- RCAS

BLUE (B)

BLUE
CASUALTIES
(BCAS)

B=
DEPLOY - BCAS
- REDEPLOY

Figure VII-1: Simple Model of Combat

The system dynamics representation of the Lanchester Laws is focused on the
level of Blue and Red forces, where the forces are the number of personnel as represented
by Helmbold’s general form of the Lanchester Laws (Equation II-15). Blue and Red
force levels are changed by the rate of Blue and Red Casualties. Red Attrition is the total
number of Red forces killed (or otherwise removed from battle) by the surviving Blue
forces, and vice versa for Blue Attrition. The Red and Blue Casualty rates depend upon
the number of forces and their respective attrition coefficients. The Blue forces increase
as units Deploy into theater and decrease as the units redeploy to home station. The Red
force increase is determined by the number of new forces which enter on their side.
In the broader analytic framework, either Red or Blue may increase by way of
either deployments or simple increases. In the scenario, Blue deploys and Red flows as a
rate of recruitment. The deployment of Blue forces requires a Deploy Date and
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Deployment Duration for each unit. The Deploy Date is used to create a Deploy
Schedule of when all troops enter the theater. This schedule, along with the Brigade Size,
provides the information required for the rate of Deploy. Similarly, the Deployment
Duration and Deploy Date determine the Redeploy Date. The Redeploy Date is used to
create the Redeploy Schedule and count the Number of Deployments each unit has
completed. The Redeploy Schedule is used by the Deploy rate to remove all surviving
troops from the theater of operations. These interactions can be seen in the left side of
Figure VII-2. It should be noted that the system dynamics framework allows for more
complex representations, including feedback loops, if the situation and the data support
such models.
USMC and USA
Data

1600 for 0 ≤ i < 14
6400 for 14 ≤ i < 16
2200 for i ≥ 16
R=
RED INCREASE
- RCAS
RCAS = 0.0287 * B * (R/B)1-0.69

RED (R)
BLUE
COEFFICIENT (BC)

BLUE (B)

(w)

BCAS = 0.0111 * R * (B/R)1-0.44
B=
DEPLOY - BCAS
- REDEPLOY

RED
COEFFICIENT (RC)

Figure VII-2: Model of Fourth Generation Operations
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The actual date each US Army Brigade and USMC Battalion entered and left
theater was used in this example model. Korb et al. published the dates of the US Army
Combat Brigade’s deployments in their report titled, Beyond the Call of Duty (2007).
The Center for Naval Analysis’s Marine Corps Deployed Unit Database, was used to
obtain the dates of USMC Battalion deployments. While the actual dates are used, other
parameters are notional; thus the illustration, while populated with existing units, is
notional.
Unlike Blue forces deploying into and redeploying out of theater, the Red forces
in the model enter and accumulate. Red Monthly Increase changes the rate of increase of
insurgents. This was established by the number of insurgents in theater and number of
insurgents captured or killed as reported by the Iraq Index. In this example scenario, it
was assumed the rate of increase equaled the monthly change in total insurgents plus the
number of insurgents captured or killed.
Analysis of the data provided by O’Hanlon and Kamp identified three distinct
rates of insurgent increase. The average of the increase in insurgents for the first thirteen
months of the conflict was 1,596 (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006, p. 16, 17). For simplicity,
1,600 insurgents were added to the model each month for the first thirteen months. This
was followed by a steep increase in insurgents for three months. The average month
increase was 6,405 (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006, p. 16, 17). Therefore, the rate of new
insurgents was 6,400 for this three month period. Since this steep increase, the average
number of new insurgents per month has been 2,196 (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006,
p. 16, 17). The scenario thus assumed a rate of 2,200 insurgents per month. Equation
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VII-1 summarizes these rates of insurgent increase, where i is the number of months
transpired in the scenario.
Rate of increase of insurgents (i ) = 1, 600
6, 400
2, 200

for 0 ≤ i < 14
for 14 ≤ i < 16
for i ≥ 16

(VII-1)

This is a very simplified model to add new insurgents to the model. If a more
detailed insurgent model is required, see Allan and Stahel (1983), Coyle (1985),
Hetherington (2005), and Anderson (2006). Models to capture these works can be added
to the basic model as required. A continuous flow into and out of theater can be
modeled.
It was initially assumed that the Lanchester Square Law could be used to
represent the attrition of the conflict. Equation VII-2 represents the appropriate
coefficients and equations resulting from applying the method of least squares to fit the
data from the Iraq Index, created by the Brookings Institute. The t-test statistic was used
to as the test criteria for evaluating the fit of the data. When comparing the difference
between the original data and the results from the Lanchester Laws, the data suggests
symmetry about zero. Figure VII-3 provides a histogram of the errors for the Blue
attrition and Figure VII-4 provides the results for the Red attrition. Therefore, the
assumptions discussed in Chapter 2 regarding the t-test appear to be satisfied and the ttest may be used to test the significance of the attrition coefficients. Bracken (1995) and
Chen and Chu (2001), among others, have also used the same technique for determining
the attrition coefficients for the Lanchester Laws. As sever skewness does not appear, the
t-test was used. Of course, other tests are possible and should be used when appropriate.
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Figure VII-4: Histogram of Red Attrition Error

Unfortunately, the t-test for the model indicates that one of the coefficients is not
statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level for a two sided null hypothesis test for β = 0.
Therefore, the model of attrition based on the Lanchester Square Law was rejected.
dB
= 0.03425 R
dt
dR
= 0.01379 B
dt

t = 1.24 < tα =0.05,44 = 2.32
(VII-2)
t = 17.96 > tα =0.05,44 = 2.32
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Since the Lanchester Square Law was not appropriate to model the attrition,
Helmbold’s general form of the Lanchester Laws was applied (Equation II-15).
Helmbold’s general form allows for a mixing of the square, linear, and logarithm laws;
therefore, modeling direct fire, area fire, and attacks on non-combatants. Data from the
Iraq Index was used to empirically determine the values of the Red and Blue Coefficients
and the Weiss Parameter (see Appendix B). The data was initially regressed requiring
the same Weiss parameter (w) for both the Red and Blue attrition. This model was not
rejected at the α = 0.05 level and it is presented in Equation VII-3. Based on Schaffer’s
research, the Weiss parameter at w = 0.664 can be interpreted as indicating the Red and
Blue forces are both using a mix of area and direct fire (Schaffer, 1967, p. 24).
1− 0.664

dB
⎛B⎞
= 0.01763 ⎜ ⎟
dt
⎝R⎠

t = 15.27 > tα =0.05,44 = 2.32

R

(VII-3)

1− 0.664

dR
⎛R⎞
= 0.02970 ⎜ ⎟
dt
⎝B⎠

t = 20.51 > tα =0.05,44 = 2.32

B

While the model is not inappropriate, it assumes the proportion of area and direct
fire used by the Red and Blue forces was the same. To better match the tactics employed,
the research next focused on finding an individual Weiss parameter for each side of the
conflict. Equation VII-4 includes the coefficients derived from the method of least
squares regression of the Red and Blue forces with different Weiss parameters.
1− 0.44

dB
⎛B⎞
= 0.01111⎜ ⎟
dt
⎝R⎠

t = 14.97 > tα =0.05,44 = 2.32

R

(VII-4)

1− 0.69

dR
⎛R⎞
= 0.02869 ⎜ ⎟
dt
⎝B⎠

t = 20.51 > tα =0.05,44 = 2.32

B
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A Red Weiss Parameter of w = 0.44 can be interpreted to imply that the Red
forces are concentrating on area fire. However, Red’s techniques occasionally involve
killing noncombatants. This can be seen in the tactics of the Improvised Explosive
Device (IED). The Blue Weiss Parameter of w = 0.69 implies that the Blue tactics are a
mix of both area and direct fire. Schaffer suggested that in an ambush, the ambushee’s
initial response is area fire but the combatant transitions to direct fire as the ambusher is
acquired (Schaffer, 1967, p. 24). Shaffer’s theory is empirically supported by this
research, and Equation VII-4 was implemented in the model of elements of fourth
generation operations.
The model of soldier morale based on Equation VI-1 and Figure VI-3 was
implemented as a submodel of the model of elements of fourth generation operations.
This implementation for each unit can be seen in Figure VII-5.

ωD / √(1-ζ2)
0.70 * D

2 π / PERIOD

(D)

D/3

Tminbreak

Xminbreak

0.03

ωn

1−ζ 2

eζωnt sin ωn 1 − ζ 2 t

Figure VII-5: Submodel of Soldier Morale
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0.2

The Deployment Duration and Number of Deployments are calculated previously
in the model, hence they are represented in the figure as dotted lines as opposed to solid
outlines (see Figure VII-2). These parameters are used to calculate the actual number of
months each unit is in theater (D). This deployment duration is used to calculate the
Period (T), Damped Natural Frequency (ωd), Natural Frequency (ωn), and Time of
Minimum Morale (Tminbreak). Tmin, Tmax,, Tadjust,, Xmin, and Xminbreak are all used to adjust the
phase of the unit’s morale curve so the first period of low morale occurs at one third of
the deployment duration.
Quester et al.’s data about retention rates implies that morale deceases at least 6%
each time an individual returns to theater. In the illustrative scenario it was assumed that
50% of the troops previously deployed with unit; therefore, the overall morale of the unit
decreased 3% each time the unit returned to theater. Thus, the Veteran Impact was set at
0.03. This decrease was applied for each subsequent return to combat. The value could
also be a weighted average of experienced troops in a unit if such information were
available.
The final submodel estimates the United States Public Opinion for an ongoing
conflict. The implementation of the factors from Table V-11 can be seen in
Figure VII-6. The number of days in the conflict (days), Blue Casualties, and Red
Casualties are all levels from the model. The number of Daily Attacks was not directly
available but was estimated from other available data. A multiple linear regression was
performed using the known factors/levels the model produced against the number of daily
attacks reported by the Iraq Index. Table VII-1 summaries the result of that regression.
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The model of daily attacks suggests that the number of daily attacks can be estimated by
the square of the cumulative Blue Casualties (BCAS) and size of Red forces (R).

91.47 − 0.05957date − 7.322 log10 ( Bcas )
− 0.04030 DA + 0.0008418 RCAS

3.20e − 07 BCAS 2 − 0.00465BCAS + 0.00394 R

BLUE ATTRITION

Figure VII-6: Submodel of Public Resolve
Table VII-1: Model of Daily Attacks

Regression Statistics
R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
PRESS
R2Prediction
Observations
Regression
Residual
Total
BCAS
BCAS2
R

0.96
0.94
16.60
12846.36
0.96
44
df
SS
MS
F
3
305766.88
101922.29 370.06
41
11292.12
275.42
44
317059.00
Coefficients Standard Error
t Stat
P-value
-0.00465
0.0017
-2.67
0.0109
3.20E-07
5.6E-08
5.71
1.1E-06
0.00394
0.00071
5.52
2.09E-06

Significance F
3.38E-29

Figure VII-7 illustrates the original data for the number of daily attacks and
compares this to the estimates produced by the model of daily attacks given the data from
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the Iraq Index (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006, p. 22). The data produced by the simulation
are also presented in the figure. The simulation data is discussed in the section on
verification and validation.
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Figure VII-7: Number of Daily Attacks

While both the multiple linear regression model (Table V-11) and the logistic
regression model (Table V-20) can be used to estimate the public resolve for the conflict,
the MLR model was used when constructing the model of elements of fourth generation
operations demonstration. As discussed in Chapter 5 a benefit of logistic regression is
the expectation function is constrained between zero and one. The logistic regression
model can be implemented by changing the equation for Public Opinion indicated in
Figure VII-6.
This section introduced an analytic framework of elements of fourth generation
operations via a notional scenario. This model is empirically supported by data from the
current conflict in Iraq. This framework is not limited to the Iraq conflict as presented in
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this study, but may be extended to other conflicts. The next section provides the
verification and validation of the analytic framework.
Verification and Validation

The Department of Defense provides the following definitions for verification,
validation and accreditation with respect to the modeling and simulation process.
Verification. The process of determining that a model implementation and its
associated data accurately represents the developer's conceptual description and
specifications (DODI 5000.61, 2003, p. 15)
Validation. The process of determining the degree to which a model and its
associated data are an accurate representation of the real world from the
perspective of the intended uses of the model (DODI 5000.61, 2003, p. 15)
Accreditation. The official certification that a model, simulation, or federation of
models and simulations and its associated data are acceptable for use for a
specific purpose (DODI 5000.61, 2003, p. 10)
These definitions can be summarized as: verification ensures the model is built correctly,
validation ensures the model performs correctly, and accreditation accepts the model for
the proper use. This study is only able to perform tests which support verifying and
validating the model. Accrediting the model requires a user to perform additional tests
with a specific purpose and accept the model as able to perform the specific purpose.
Forrester and Senge discussed the requirements to verify and validate system
dynamics models. They stated:
There is no single test which serves to ‘validate’ a system dynamics model.
Rather, confidence in a system dynamics model accumulates gradually as the
model passes more tests and as new point of correspondence between the model
and empirical reality are identified (Forrester & Senge, 1980, p. 209).
Sterman summarizes the frustration of validating system dynamics models:
1. There can be no absolute test of validity,
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2. There can be no objective tests of validity,
3. There can be no single test of validity. (Sterman, 1984, p. 51)
Forrester and Senge suggest a three phase process to build validation. The phases
validate the model structure, model behavior, and policy implications. Each phase is
discussed in greater detail in the following sections with the results from the verification
and validation of the model of elements of fourth generation operations. Figure VII-8
provides an overview of the tests suggested by Forrester and Senge. The core tests
(which are shaded in Figure VII-8) are considered by Forrester and Senge as being the
most important (1980, p. 226).
Confidence – Building
Tests
Model Structure

Model Behavior

Policy Implications

Structure Verification

Behavior
Reproduction

System Improvement

Parameter Verification

Behavior Prediction

Changed- Behavior
Prediction

Extreme Conditions

Behavior Anomaly

Boundary Adequacy

Boundary Adequacy

Family Member

Policy Sensitivity

Dimensional
Consistency

Extreme Policy

Boundary Adequacy

Behavior Sensitivity

Surprise Behavior

* Shaded containers are core tests

Figure VII-8: Confidence-Building Tests (Forrester & Senge, 1980, Table 1 Page 227)

Building on Forrester and Senge, Khazanchi (1996), Coyle and Exelby (2000) and
Martis (2006) provide applications, clarifications and insights for some of the tests.
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Model Structure

Validation of the model structure was divided into multiple tests. Each test is
focused on how the model is built. These tests closely align with the DoD definition of
verification. The first test is the structure verification.
Verifying structure means comparing structure of a model with structure of the
real system that the model represents. To pass the structure-verification test the,
the model structure must not contradict knowledge about the structure of the real
system (Forrester & Senge, 1980, p. 212)
The structure verification also questions if all the relevant structures have been modeled.
The justification of the basic structure of the model, as seen in Figure VII-1, is based on
the research of the Lanchester Laws, discussed in Chapter 2. This structure is expanded
to the combat model presented in Figure VII-2, Figure VII-5 and Figure VII-6 providing
the necessary factors for the model of conflict. Both the Red and Blue forces and their
movement (at a strategic level) are modeled. The attrition of those forces is available
along with the notional soldier morale. Additionally, the Blue’s Public Opinion of the
conflict is represented. The model exhibits the proper structure for modeling elements of
fourth generation operations.
The next test is the parameter verification. This test addresses whether the
parameters are consistent with numerical values and are recognizable to the real world.
The basic parameters within the model are the individual soldier and time, accounted for
in terms of months. The public opinion and soldier morale parameters are scaled from
zero to one, representing the respective percent of public support and level of morale. All
parameters are based on numerical values fitted to the real world values, except the
morale parameter. This parameter assumes the notional morale of a soldier is bounded
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and averages 0.5. Consequently, all parameters have a recognizable meaning in the real
world.
The third test is the extreme condition test. The test focuses on running the model
at the parameter’s boundaries and comparing the data to the real system’s behavior in the
same conditions. Forrester and Senge state:
The extreme-conditions test is effective for two reasons. First, it is a
powerful test for discovering flaws in model structure. Many proposed
formulations look plausible until considered under extreme conditions.
The second reason for utilizing the extreme-conditions test is to enhance
usefulness of a model for analyzing policies that may force a system to
operate outside historical regions of behavior. (1980, p. 214)
Unfortunately, as is the difficulty in verifying any combat model, it is not possible to
replicate the conditions of combat solely for the purpose of model verification and
validation. Therefore, this test can not be accurately performed for the example. The
model can only be compared to how the real world is expected to perform. The equations
that underlay the system dynamics model produce reasonable results for conditions
ranging in number of units deployed, size of units deployed, number of insurgents, and
number of casualties for each side. In the demonstration section of this chapter, five
factors are varied to notional extreme conditions and produced reasonable responses.
The demonstration did not reveal any flaws in the model structure.
The next test of structure validation is boundary adequacy of the structure. This
focuses on the level of aggregation of the model (Forrester & Senge, 1980, p. 215). The
test evaluates if the necessary parameters for the decision are all internal to the model.
The submodels and parameter settings are statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level.
The insights into the number of forces, casualties, public opinion, and soldier morale are
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the focus of the model. The model is able to estimate each of these parameters with its
current structure with only one external input: the deployment schedule of the Blue
forces. This allows for the Blue deployment schedule to be varied, providing insights to
policy changes. As a result, all other decisions are endogenous to the model.
The final test of the structure is dimensional consistency. This investigates if all
the equations are using the proper units within the model. As briefly discussed earlier,
the units within the model account for the number of individual soldiers and time is
tracked by months. These dimensions are consistent with the specific purpose of the
notional scenario. All equations in the model use these two parameters except for the
model of public opinion. The input for this submodel is the number of days into the
conflict; therefore, the time scale is converted to days when used in the equation.
The model conforms to all the model structure tests. Accordingly, the
confidence that the structure can represent the selected elements of fourth generation
operations is strong. The next set of tests suggested by Forrester and Senge focus on the
models behavior and results.
Model Behavior

Once the tests of model structure have been performed, the tests of model
behavior are conducted. These tests focus on the results, responses or behaviors of the
model. The first test is behavior reproduction. The focus of this test is a qualitative
comparison of the model results with historical data. Sterman suggests that when the
model data can be statistically compared to the real system, a test of statistical character
is used (1984, p. 52). The behaviors of the real world data and the simulation results are
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presented for the number of soldiers, casualties, daily attacks and public opinion. The
figures test the behavior reproduction when viewing the historical fit. Additionally, a
paired t-test was performed at monthly increments to validate the statistical character.
The null hypothesis was that there was no difference (δ) between the simulation results
and the real world data, and the alternative hypothesis was that they were different
(H0: δ = 0; Ha: δ ≠ 0).
Figure VII-9 illustrates the results from the model and historical data. Similar
trends and cycles of the historical and model data can be seen in the plot of the data.
Additionally, the paired t-test indicates there was no statistical difference. The paired
t-test statistic equaled t=|0.65|, which was less than the critical value from the
t-distribution, tα=0.05,31=2.36. Consequently, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected; we
cannot assume there is a difference between the real and simulated results.
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Figure VII-9: Simulation Results of Size of Blue Forces
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The size of the Red forces is based on the number of insurgents captured or killed
(Equation VII-4) and the number of new insurgents (Equation VII-1). Figure VII-10
compares the actual number of insurgents from the Iraq Index and the simulation results.
As with the Blue forces, the historical and model data reflect similar trends. The paired
t-test results are t=|1.39| < tα=0.05,45=2.32. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the
average of the differences is zero. As a result it can not be shown that there is a statistical
difference between the model and the true data.
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Figure VII-10: Simulation Results of Size of Red Forces

Next, Figure VII-11 demonstrates the monthly number of Blue Casualties.
Although the real data had a higher variance, the simulation did reflect the trends of the
data. Statistically, t=|-0.142| < tα=0.05,45=2.32, consequently the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected and again, there was no statistical difference suggested. The cumulative impact
was that at the end of December 2006 the model estimates 25,388 Blue Casualties while
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the Iraq Index reports approximately 25,631 US troops wounded or dead (O’Hanlon &
Campbell, 2007, p. 11, 13). This was a difference of less than 300, with a cumulative
error of less than 1%.
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Figure VII-11: Simulation Results of Blue Casualties

Figure VII-12 contrasts the simulation estimates of Red Casualties and the Iraq
Index data at each month. Once again, the paired t-test suggested no statistical difference
(t=|-0.523| < tα=0.05,44=2.32). The cumulative impact was that by the end of November
2006 the model estimated 82,949 Red casualties while the Iraq Index reported
approximately 82,470 insurgents captured or killed (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006, p. 16).
This was a difference of less than 500 insurgents and a cumulative error of less than
0.6%.
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Figure VII-12: Simulation Results of Red Casualties

The simulation results of the number of daily attacks using Table VII-1 was
included previously in Figure VII-7. The paired t-test indicated no statistical difference
between the Iraq Index data and the simulation results (t=|-0.25| < tα=0.05,44=2.32).
The final historical comparison was the Multiple Linear Regression (MLR)
estimate of Public Opinion. The model results are plotted in Figure VII-13. The
historical estimate and model results display no statistical difference based on the paired
t-test, t=|0.50| < tα=0.05,45=2.32. As a result, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of
δ = 0 for any of the major comparisons with historical data and simulation data.
Therefore, it is assumed the model satisfied the behavior reproduction and statistical
character tests for the elements tested.
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Figure VII-13: Simulation Results of Public Support

As the behavior reproduction test focuses on reproducing historical data, behavior
prediction tests focuses on future behavior. System dynamics “models do not strive for
prediction of future values of system variables…However, system dynamic models
should tell certain things about the behavior in the future” (Forrester & Senge, 1980,
p. 219).
Using the data from July 2007, the model behavior was evaluated based on how it
could project the future behavior. The percent of public support for the war in July 2007
was 38.0% (see Chapter 5). The model shows the public support would be 36.6%. The
difference falls with the standard error of the polling data. Additionally, the model
estimates there would be 29,797 Blue casualties. The Iraq Index reported there were
30,612 Blue casualties (O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007, p. 17, 19). As seen in Figure
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VII-11 there were a few months that the Blue forces suffered an intense number of
casualties. The actual number of Blue casualties that occurred in June and July 2007
similarly spiked causing the model to underestimate the actual values. While these
estimates are not exact, the behaviors do match expectations.
The next test is behavior anomaly, which investigates if the model responds to
assumptions and parameters being removed from the system. This test also provides
insight to the assumptions since “one can often defend particular model assumptions by
showing how implausible behavior arises if the assumption is altered” (Forrester &
Senge, 1980, p. 220). Since the model was empirically built, all factors are statistically
significant. If any factor was removed, the model may no longer produce defendable or
understandable results. The demonstration section provides an example of how
parameters of five factors are changed. This analysis provides further justification of the
inclusion of the factors, since each factor screened shows impact on the responses.
The family member test was then considered. This test was focused on whether
the model can be applied to other examples of systems within the same class. This
insures the model has broad applications as opposed to being specifically designed for
only one purpose. Sterman asked, “can an urban model generate the behavior of New
York, Dallas, Carson City, and Calcutta when parameterized for each?” (1984, p. 52).
The basic structure of the Lanchester laws has been applied to a number of battles and
conflicts. Taylor (1983) provided specific applications of the Lanchester Laws. The
submodel of public opinion evolved from data from the wars in Korea, Vietnam,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. Additionally, the submodel of soldier morale was based on
research from World War Two and Peace Corps deployments. Even though the
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framework, in its entirety, has not been applied to a different ‘family member,’ each
individual model has been applied to its setting.
Forrester and Senge also suggest the extreme policy test. They ask “does the
model behave as we might expect for the real system under the same extreme policies
circumstances?” (1980, p. 221-222). All of the equations of the model produce logical
outputs as the parameters are moved to the extremes. The only exceptions may be in the
submodel of public opinion. This model is capable of producing negative public opinion.
Negative public opinion can happen due to two circumstances: when there are too many
Blue casualties; and when the conflict lasted a long time. This does not invalidate the
model. This outcome implies caution should be used when applying the relations
outside the range of the data used to develop them. This model, however, is still able to
produce findings which can be used for comparison of policies or courses of action. In
addition, a nation could possibly turn against a war.
As with the tests of model structure, the model behavior has a test of boundary
adequacy. Again, this test investigates if all the structure is valid at the boundary of the
relations. The rationale for the model structure test on boundary adequacy is still valid
since the parameters within the model are all empirically justified through statistical tests,
all at an α = 0.05 level.
The final behavior validation tests explore the behavior sensitivity of the model to
plausible variations and surprise behaviors. Behavior sensitivity asks, does the model
still pass the previous behavior tests when the parameters are varied? Surprise behaviors
are behaviors which are unexpected but offer insight to how the system operates. By
changing the size of each brigade and battalion in the model, the size of Blue forces can
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be changed. By changing the force size by plus or minus 20% and 10%, Figure VII-14
and Figure VII-15 were created. Figure VII-14 shows the size of Red forces decreasing
as the size of Blue forces increases. As expected, as the Blue Forces are reduced, the size
of Red Forces increased. Similarly, when Blue forces increased the number of Red
forces decreased. As these results are consistent with expectation, the behavior
sensitivity test is considered satisfied.
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Figure VII-14: Behavior of Red Forces as Total Blue Forces Varies

Figure VII-15 shows that by increasing the number of Blue forces, there are
initially more Blue Casualties. While this might be seen as a surprise behavior, more
troops in theater provide more targets. As more troops enter, there are initially more
casualties; however, after 36 months, the number of Blue casualties for the larger force is
less than the other courses of action. This switch in casualty rates does not occur earlier
in the model due to the rapid increase of Red forces at the 13th month. The demonstration
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section of this chapter sets five factors at different settings simultaneously in a full
factorial design of experiments. The response of that analysis additionally justifies the
behavior sensitivity and surprise behavior tests. In conclusion, the model passes both of
these tests.
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Figure VII-15: Behavior of Blue Casualties as Total Blue Forces Varies

The final phase to validate a system dynamics model suggested by Forrester and
Senge is validating the policy implications. The “tests of policy implication differ from
the other tests in their explicit focus on comparing policy changes in a model and in the
corresponding reality” (Forrester & Senge, 1980, p. 224). Since these tests all require the
implementation of the policy evaluated in the system dynamics model and then compared
to the policy implemented in reality, such tests are beyond the scope of this research.
Such an analysis is left for future research.
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Many of the validation tests of model structure and behavior were able to be
applied to the model of elements of fourth generation operations. As the model is applied
in more situations and the results observed, the confidence in the model is expected to
increase. Forrester and Senge suggest all five tests of the model structure, and
specifically three model behavior tests (reproduction, anomaly, and sensitivity), are core
tests. The model presented in this dissertation was able to satisfy all eight of these core
tests.
Demonstrations

This section provides demonstrations of the potential applications of the model of
elements of fourth generation operations. First, five of the factors within the model were
varied to provide a possible decision maker insight into the importance of each factor and
their interactions. These five factors were: (1) size of Blue forces deployed, (2) rate of
new Red Forces, (3) Red fighting effectiveness, (4) percent impact of morale on Blue
fighting effectiveness, and (5) implementation of veteran status. The responses
considered for review were the estimated public support for the war, number of Red
forces and the Blue/Red combat ratio which provides insight where the higher the ratio,
the higher the likelihood of success for Blue forces.
The second demonstration focuses on the functionality of the modeling
framework. The rules of engagement within the model are adjusted based on the public’s
support for the conflict. The interactions within the model and feedback loops are
identified.
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This section is divided into three subsections. The first defines the setting used in
the demonstration. The second subsection is the results of the screening experiment. The
third subsection provides the second demonstration.
Settings of First Demonstration

A five factor full factorial design of experiments was chosen for the first
demonstration. The demonstration is therefore a screening experiment capable of
providing insights about the factors, the related responses and also the factor interactions.
Since this is a deterministic model, only one replication was performed at each setting for
a total of 32 experiments.
The first factor changed the size of Blue deployed battalions and brigades. The
size of each brigade/ battalion was changed by 25%, depending on the high or low
setting. As discussed earlier, this changes the total number of Blue force in theater.
Initially, the unit strength of the battalions/ brigades was 2,600/ 6,300 respectively.
The second factor alters the rate that Red forces increase their recruitment.
Equation VII-1 suggests that after sixteen months, 2,200 new Red forces are added each
month. The factor changes this rate by 10%. Thus, it assumed the rate of new Red forces
may be as low as 1,980 or as high as 2,420. This provided the decision maker insight on
how efforts to stop the recruiting of new Red forces impact the battle. Again, if some
other vetted relationship were available, it could be represented.
The third factor directly adjusted the fighting effectiveness. The Red Coefficient
was set 20% lower at the low setting and 20% higher at the high setting from the base
setting. This replicates actions taken by the Blue forces which directly impact Red’s
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capability to wage war. This may occur by interdicting the Red’s weapons, for example.
This may also happen if Blue reduces their vulnerability to Red’s weapons or tactics by
improving armor or techniques.
The fourth factor adjusted the level of impact of Morale on the Blue Coefficient
(BC). Similar to how Bracken implemented the Bracken Tactical Parameter, the Blue
Coefficient was adjusted where Morale was substituted for Bracken’s Tactical Parameter
(see Equation II-16). The morale impact factor (M) varied from 0 to 1 to adjust the
significance of Morale to the changes of the Blue Coefficient. When M = 0 there was no
impact and the original Blue Coefficient was used. However, when M = 1, twice the
Morale was used as a multiplier of the Blue Coefficient. Since pre-deployment morale
was 0.5, twice the morale was used, so when morale was greater than average, the troops
were more efficient (morale factor greater than one). Similarly, there was a decrease in
capabilities when the morale was less than one. The equation (2Morale*M + 1 – M) BC
was used to account for transient values of M. If some other known or fitted relationship
existed, it could be used in the model. Since this factor was not implemented in the
previous section on verification and validation, the ‘baseline’ case assumes the level to be
at the lower or no impact value.
Based on historical evidence, each time a unit is returned to theater, their overall
morale is decreased by 3% (see Figure VII-5) (Quester et al., 2006, p. 9). This final
factor was adjusted if this impact to overall morale was implemented or not.
Table VII-2 provides a summary of the settings used in the screening experiment.
The levels used in the screening experiment were set at -1 for the low setting and 1 for
the high setting; therefore, normalizing the factors for analysis.
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Table VII-2: Screening Experiment High and Low Factors

Size of Blue Forces (B)
Battalion / Brigade
Rate of Red Increase
(RRI)
Change of Red
Coefficient (C)
Morale
Impact (M)
Veteran
Impact (V)

Setting

Baseline (0)

±25%

2,600/6,300 1,950/4,725 3,250/7,875

Low (-1)

High (1)

±10%

2,200

1,980

2,420

±20%

0.0111

0.00889

0.0133

0 to 1

0

0

1

On/Off

0

0

0.03

Screening Experiment Results

Thirty two experiments were run completing the full factorial design of
experiments for five factors. Three responses were observed: Blue/Red combat ratio,
public support for the war, and the number of Red forces.
Figure VII-16 provides the main effect plots and Figure VII-17 provides the
interaction plots for the Blue/Red combat ratio. The numbers on the x-axis indicate the
settings for the factors indicated in each column for both figures. For the interaction
plots, the numbers on the plots provide the settings for the factor of each row. When the
slope of the line is horizontal, the factor indicated by the row has limited influence on the
results. The influence of the factor identified in the column is observed by the separation
of the two lines. The difference in slope of the two lines within a plot implies an
influence of the interaction of the two factors.
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Figure VII-16: Main Effect Plots for Blue/Red Combat Ratio
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The plot in the first row and third column indicates the Combat Ratio was
approximately ten when the Size of Blue Forces was at the high setting. This plot
additionally indicates the influence from the Red Coefficient was minimal. On the other
hand, the plot in the first row and second column indicates an influence from the change
in Size of Blue Forces, the Rate or Red Increase and their interaction term.
As described by Deitchman, and portrayed in Figure II-11, when the insurgent
forces achieved victory the average combat ratio was four regular soldiers per insurgent
(1962, p. 821). On the other hand, when the regular forces achieved victory the average
combat ratio was approximately ten regular soldiers per insurgent (Deitchman, 1962, p.
821). This analysis suggests that lowering the number of Blue forces in theater by 25%
may lead to defeat no matter the setting or any of the other factors.
Figure VII-16 illustrates that when the Size of Blue Forces was decreased by
25%, the combat ratio was less than four to one. Conversely Figure VII-17 indicates,
increasing the number of Blue forces by 25% and lowering the Red’s recruiting by 10%
lead to a combat ratio greater than ten to one. Only by increasing the number of Blue
forces could the combat ratio be improved to a winning outcome.
The factor with the most influence on the combat ratio was the Size of Blue
Forces. When the Blue forces increased in size there was a positive influence on the
Blue/Red combat ratio. The second most influential factor was the Rate of Red Increase,
indicating as the red recruited more forces there was a negative impact on the combat
ratio. The third most influential factor was the interaction of the Size of Blue Forces and
the Rate of Red Increase. All the other settings and conditions appear indeterminate.
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Table VII-3: Estimated Effect on Red/Blue Combat Ratio

Term

Estimated Effect

Intercept
Size of Blue Forces (B)
Rate of Red Increase (RRI)
Change of Red Coefficient (C)
Morale Impact (M)
Veteran Impact (V)
B * RRI
B*C
RRI*C
B*M
RRI*M
C*M
B*V
RRI*V
C*V
M*V

6.91
7.82
-3.04
-0.136
-0.24
-0.3
-2.12
-0.05
0.03
-0.144
0.096
0.014
-0.22
0.094
-0.0022
-0.3

Keeping a larger number of forces may be the course of action required to win
this notional conflict. To do this, public support must also remain high. Figure VII-18
provides the main effect plots and Figure VII-19 provides the interaction plots for the
public support. Figure VII-19 shows that if there are an increased number of Blue forces
and the Red fighting effectiveness is decreased, then the public support for the war is
approximately 50%. The Red fighting effectiveness can be reduced by technology or
other tools available in fourth generation operations. Technologies may be able to reduce
the weapon effectiveness by increasing armor strength, preventing IEDs, or decreasing
the total number of weapons available to the Red forces. The Red Coefficient may also
be impacted through political, economic or informational methods. For example, the
Blue forces may have a more effective media campaign, creating a less efficient Red
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force. Figure VII-19 also indicates the significance of the interaction of the Morale and
Veteran impact.
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Figure VII-19: Interaction Plots for Public Opinion
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Figure VII-18: Main Effect Plots for Public Opinion

Table VII-4 provides a summary of the influence of the factors on US public
support. As seen in Figure VII-18 the most influential factor on US public support was
the Size of Blue Forces, followed by the Change in Red Coefficient.
Table VII-4: Estimated Effect on Public Support

Term

Estimated Effect

Intercept
Size of Blue Forces (B)
Rate of Red Increase (RRI)
Change of Red Coefficient (C)
Morale Impact (M)
Veteran Impact (V)
B * RRI
B*C
RRI*C
B*M
RRI*M
C*M
B*V
RRI*V
C*V
M*V

38.74
15.58
1.2
-5.88
-0.88
-0.8
1
-0.24
-0.44
0.08
-0.054
-0.068
0.002
-0.056
-0.036
-0.8

It may seem counterintuitive that as Blue forces increase, the public support also
increases. This change occurs in the simple scenario because more Red forces are
captured which directly impacts public opinion. Additionally, with a larger Blue force
there are less Blue casualties and less daily attacks by the Red forces in the notional
scenario.
The size of Red forces in theater directly impacts the Blue/Red combat ratio and
indirectly impacts the public support. Not surprisingly, by reducing the number of Red
forces the ratio favors a victorious Blue force. The results when investigating the factors
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impacting the size of Red force, as seen in Figure VII-20, Figure VII-21 and Table VII-5,
were very similar to the results of the Blue/Red Combat Ratio.
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-1

30000

Blue Forces

-1

-1

-1

1

1

1

1

20000
10000

Red

20000
10000

1

1

1

-1

-1

-1

1
-1

1
-1

1
-1

Morale Impact

Red
Increase

1
-1

Red Coefficent

30000

Red Increase

40000

Red

40000
30000

1
-1

20000

Red
Coefficent

1
-1

10000

Red

40000
1
-1

30000
20000

Blue Forces

Red

40000

1
-1

Morale
Impact

1
-1

10000

1
0

30000
20000

1
0

1
0

Veteran

1
0

1

0

.5

-0.5

-1

1

0

.5

-1

-0.5

1

0

.5

-1

-0.5

1

0

.5

-1

-0.5

10000
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Table VII-5: Estimated Effect on Size of Red Forces

Term

Estimated Effect

Intercept
Size of Blue Forces (B)
Rate of Red Increase (RRI)
Change of Red Coefficient (C)
Morale Impact (M)
Veteran Impact (V)
B * RRI
B*C
RRI*C
B*M
RRI*M
C*M
B*V
RRI*V
C*V
M*V

23723
-16531
8507
331
688
733
-1268
-133
45
-142
50
-3
-28
56
11
733

This screening experiment produced insights indicating the most significant
factors impacting the combat ratio, public support for the war, and number of Red forces
for the notional example. To obtain a historically effective combat ratio, the number of
Blue forces must be increased and the recruiting of Red force must be reduced. To
positively impact public support, enough troops must be employed to gain victories and
the effectiveness of the adversary must be reduced. The public support must remain high
to ensure the troops stay in theater. To reduce the number of adversaries in the theater,
again more troops must be sent and training and recruiting of Red forces must be
reduced. Additionally, this analysis suggests that in the notional scenario, the outcome of
the current course of action is undetermined, while reducing the number of forces may
lead to defeat.
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Second Demonstration

This subsection demonstrates a second application of the model. This example is
notional and is intended to highlight some of the features the framework provides. The
intent of the demonstration is to present the functionality of the modeling framework
illustrated with of elements of fourth generation operations. Specifically, the
demonstration provides insight to how the framework can be applied to model the
transition of rules of engagement (ROE) affected by US public support of the conflict,
demonstrating feedback loops and dynamic rates of flow. Figure VII-22 illustrates the
model of elements of fourth generation operations including public resolve. This model
of public resolve was empirically developed in Chapter 5.

91.47–0.05957 date – 7.322 log10(Bcas)
– 0.0403 DA+0.000841 Rcas

3.2e-07Bcas2 - 0.00465Bcas
+ 0.00394R

Figure VII-22: Model of Elements of 4GO with Public Resolve
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The model represented by Figure VII-22 can change to include the influence that
Public Support has on the ROE. The ROE dictate Blue’s response when attacked. The
response was the fighting behavior of the Blue Forces. As indicated in Equation VII-4,
the attrition of Red forces was represented as a mix of direct and area fire. As public
support for the conflict decreased, the rules of engagement are adjusted to reflect more of
an emphasis on direct fire; therefore, limiting the possibility of collateral damage. For
this demonstration, when public support was greater than 75% Equation VII-4 was used
to represent Blue’s attrition of Red’s Forces. When public support was below 25% the
Blue forces can only employ direct fire attacks (w = 1), thus Equation VII-2 was applied
or the Lanchester Square Laws.
When public support was between 25% and 75%, a linear transition for the Blue
Weiss Parameter and Blue Coefficient was used. This excursion is represented in Figure
VII-23. Since the model is dynamic, the value of the Weiss Parameter may continuously
vary between these extremes to appropriately model the engagements at a campaign
level.
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BCoef = 0.0289 PO + 0.00657
BWeiss = -0.62 PO + 1.155

Figure VII-23: Rules of Engagement Demonstration

The model results without implementing the impacts of public support on the
ROE were used as a baseline case. This was compared to the results with the dynamic
ROE in Figure VII-24.
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Figure VII-24: Number of Red Casualties per Month with Dynamic Rules of Engagement

The dynamic ROE excursion captured or killed more Red forces early in the
conflict when the public support was high. As the conflict continued, the baseline case
demonstrated a higher effectiveness against Red forces, since the Blue forces applied a
direct fire approach requiring more time and accuracy to attack the target.
The impacts of feedback are observed in two areas of this demonstration. The
first feedback loop is from Red Attrition to Public Opinion to Rules of Engagement. This
feedback loop continues to both the Blue Coefficient and Blue Weiss Parameter,
completing at Red Casualties and Red Attrition. This loop is a positive influence where
higher attrition causes, higher public support and thus more Red Casualties.
The second feedback loop was from Red forces to Blue Attrition to Public
Opinion. The loop continues to Rules of Engagement, and the Blue Coefficient and Blue
Weiss Parameter, which impacted the Red Casualties reducing the number of Red forces.
This feedback loop had a negative influence on the US public opinion.
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This demonstration presents an example of how the analytic framework of
elements of fourth generation operations can be applied and altered to provide insights
for a decision maker. The dynamic relationships require additional data and support;
however, this is an initial framework which may be applied to provide additional
information. The modeling framework provides a basis to develop a number of
approaches as relations are developed and verified.
Summary

The objective of this chapter was to present an analytic framework for elements of
fourth generation operations, demonstrating how some elements may be included. The
framework is a strategic level dynamic model of modern conflict. The model is
empirically based on Helmbold’s general form of the Lanchester Laws. The components
of the formulation suggest that the insurgents’ tactics use area fire techniques causing
havoc, while the regular forces may initially respond by area fire but transition to a more
effective direct fire approach.
The framework was introduced and information on the verification and validation
of the framework was presented. The structure and behaviors of the base model passed
several validation tests. The model however, was not tested against policy
implementations since these tests involve “comparing policy changes in a model and in
the corresponding reality” (Forrester & Senge, 1980, p. 224). The policy implementation
test would likely occur during an accreditation process.
Examples of the framework’s utility were provided through two demonstrations.
The first demonstration was a full factorial screening experiment of five factors. Three
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responses were analyzed, providing insight to the notional results of several scenarios.
The number of Blue forces in theater positively impacted both the public support for the
war and the combat ratio. These responses are critical to the success of the conflict.
Each factor included in the analysis was shown to influence the results and were
considered significant. This further provides validation and verification of the model and
its implementation. The second demonstration emphasized the importance of feedback
loops and the framework’s ability to represent softer aspects of combat
The system dynamics framework provides a mechanism to incorporate elements
of fourth generation operations. It can be used either directly or in concert with other
modeling approaches to aid in analyzing courses of action, effects, and plans in
asymmetrical or irregular warfare.
This chapter completed the sixth contribution of the research by constructing an
analytic framework of elements of fourth generation operations which captures the public
resolve and the combatant’s morale.
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VIII. Conclusions

The objective and contribution of this research was to provide an analytic
framework of elements of fourth generation operations, capturing the effects of will of
the combatant and population. This objective required four principle objectives to be
completed, building upon each other to obtain the overarching objective. This format
resulted in six specific contributions to the field of operations research and particularly
combat modeling.
Contributions

The first contribution developed a theory of fourth generation operations based on
the framework of US Joint doctrine. This contribution defined fourth generation
operations as conflict which combines elements of guerrilla tactics, terrorism, traditional
warfare, and the ability to exploit and skip generations of technology to conduct
operations, particularly to target the will and morale of the enemy’s support structure, in
order to achieve political victory. This contribution was accomplished in the third
chapter of the dissertation. This achieved the first half (development) of the first
principle objective which was to develop and model a theory of fourth generation
operations based on the framework of US Joint doctrine.
The second contribution developed the supporting principles of fourth generation
operations. This was also completed in Chapter 3. The principles required to achieve
victory in fourth generation operations are detailed in Table III-1. The significant
segment of the contribution was adding the principle of Population Perception and

224

clarifying the principles of Legitimacy and Perseverance. This contribution also
completed the second objective of the research.
The third contribution of the dissertation was the construction of a theoretical
modeling framework to dynamically portray fatigue within a combat model, which was
accomplished in the fourth chapter. This demonstrated the utility of using a system
dynamics modeling framework to represent the Lanchester Laws as opposed to the
traditional discrete event simulation framework. The framework that was built is a
hybrid of system dynamics since it demonstrated an ability to model discrete events
(addition of reserve forces), while dynamically portraying the impacts of fatigue on the
combatant’s effectiveness.
The fourth contribution was the construction of a theoretical modeling framework
of public resolve. The model was founded on empirical evidence of four key factors.
These key factors were: the number of days into the conflict, the logarithm base ten of the
number of casualties, the number of daily attacks made by the adversary, and the number
of adversary captured or killed. This framework provides a capability to model and
evaluate impacts of conflict on public resolve.
The fifth contribution developed a theoretical modeling framework that
dynamically portrays soldier morale. By using the second order response to an impulse,
the morale of a soldier, or unit, can be estimated in a combat model based on the
expected deployment duration and the number of days deployed. This provides a
capability to model and evaluate impact of soldier morale due to various courses of action
or from other external factors. This contribution allows campaign and strategic level
models to include a morale factor during future analyses.
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The sixth chapter also completes the third objective of this research. This
objective constructed a theoretical modeling framework to dynamically portray public
resolve, will-to-fight, morale and combat spirit within a combat model. The public
resolve portion of the objective was completed in Chapter 5, and the morale and combat
spirit was presented in Chapter 6.
The seventh chapter combines all the contributions to create a complete model of
fourth generation operations. This synergy provides the sixth contribution: construct an
analytic framework of elements of fourth generation operations which captures the will of
the population and combatants. The final contribution provides new measures created to
evaluate the impacts of public resolve and combat spirit. This additionally completes the
final principle objective of the research, which was to provide a capability to model and
evaluate the impacts of public resolve, will-to-fight, morale, and combat spirit of
combatants and population on the outcome of the conflict.
Future Research

This research builds on well established Lanchester laws and theory. The
dynamic framework of these laws presented within this dissertation allows for the impact
of an array of factors and influences. The expansion of these factors and influences can
be both internal and external to the model, allowing the analyst to perform a wide array
of analyses. Examples of how this framework can be expanded include, but are not
limited to: sub-dividing Blue forces, adding stochastic features, and adding other justified
relations. The subdivision of Blue forces to each country of the coalition, and also the
indigenous police and military would provide additional insight to the effectiveness of
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each type of unit. It would also provide observation into how the force structure could be
altered. The model could also expand from a deterministic model to a stochastic model.
This would allow the analyst to use probabilistic models when the data is uncertain.
Finally, as discussed throughout this dissertation, the framework can be easily expanded
to represent other important factors and relations as they become evident.
Further research can model the impact of significant events, such as elections and
troop surges, to the public resolve. These models for public resolve can be used within
current combat models to gauge the public support of various courses of action.
Additionally, the impact of public resolve can be connected to the combat effectiveness
of our troops.
Chapter 5 demonstrated the positive impact that the percent of positive stories had
on the public resolve for a limited data set. Expanding the sample size to include data
from the entire conflict would provide additional information on the public’s response to
positive and negative news reporting. Additionally, the technique used to measure the
number of positive, neutral and negative stories may provide significant results.
Modeling the ‘attrition’ of public morale would also be an interesting excursion.
Similarly, future research may also apply the Lanchester Laws to the soldier’s morale and
combat spirit; therefore, directly attritting the morale of the combatant.
One other area of future research could be to apply the framework of elements of
fourth generation operations to other scenarios and conflicts. Specifically, the Vietnam
War would be an excellent candidate for further investigation to help validate the
modeling framework.
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As data is built-up, the framework should be useful in many areas. The
framework can be used by analysts to provide insights aiding decision making. The
framework can also be used to investigate various scenarios of interest to the decision
maker. Finally, the framework could be used to develop and evaluate a multitude of
courses of action. The proposed fourth generation operations model provides a
foundation to incorporate elements of counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare in an
increasing interconnected world.
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Appendix A: Sources and Data for Public Resolve

Table A-1 presents the public resolve data used in this study. The table indicates
the date the poll was taken, the results of the poll, and the source used to compile the
responses. If the source is indicated as being ABC, CBS, PEW or Gallop Poll, the data
implies the actual question and response was reviewed and placed in the table. The Pulse
of Democracy: The War in Iraq (Gallop, 2006) and American Public Opinion on Iraq:
Five Conclusions (Newport, 2006) are reports developed by the Gallop Association and
include the specific data indicated. The questions did differ slightly between conflicts
and sources; therefore, the original questions asked are presented in Table A-2.

Table A-1: Polling Data of Public Resolve

Don't Know /
Yes, a No, not a
No
Number
Refused To
Source
mistake Mistake opinion
polled
Answer
Iraq
2007 July 20-22
2007 July 18-21
2007 July 6-8
2006 Dec 7-11
2006 Dec 8-10
2006 Dec 6-10
2006 Dec 8-10
2006 Nov 12-13
2006 Nov 9-12
2006 Nov 2-5
2006 Nov 1-4
2006 Oct 27-31
2006 Oct 19-22
2006 Oct 17-22
2006 Oct 20-22
2006 Oct 5-8
2006 Oct 5-8
2006 Oct 6-8

51
63
62
61
55
51
53
56
51
55
53
51
57
47
58
63
55
56

42
36
36
36
39
42
45
40
41
40
44
44
40
43
40
35
40
40

7
1
2
2
6
7
2
4
8
5
2
5
2
10
2
2
5
4
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889
1125
1014
1005
922
1489
505
721
1479
1516
1205
932
1200
1552
1002
1204
983
1007

5
4
1
4
5
6
2
5
6
2
4
5
4
6
2
4
5
2

Don't Know /
Yes, a No, not a
No
Number
Refused To
Source
mistake Mistake opinion
polled
Answer
Iraq (continued)
2006 Sep 21 - Oct 4
2006 Sep 15-19
2006 Sep 15-17
2006 Sep 5-7
2006 Aug 17-21
2006 Aug 11-13
2006 Aug 3-6
2006 Jul 28-30
2006 Jul 21-25
2006 Jul 21-23
2006 Jun 22-25
2006 Jun 23-25
2006 Jun 14-19
2006 Jun 10-11
2006 Jun 9-11
2006 May 16-17
2006 May 11-15
2006 May 4-8
2006 Apr 28-30
2006 Apr 7-16
2006 Apr 6-09
2006 Apr 6-9
2006 Apr 7-9
2006 Mar 9-12
2006 Mar 8-12
2006 Mar 10-12
2006 Mar 2-5
2006 Feb 28-Mar 1
2006 Feb 22-26
2006 Feb 9-12
2005 Feb 4-6
2006 Feb 1-5
2006 Jan 23-26
2006 Jan 20-25
2006 Jan 20-22
2006 Jan 5-8
2006 Jan 5-8
2006 Jan 4-8

47
51
49
56
53
53
59
54
48
56
58
55
44
51
51
53
62
56
51
46
58
53
57
54
49
57
57
55
54
55.02
44.76
44
55
50
50.84
55
49
47

45
44
49
42
43
41
39
45
47
41
40
43
49
44
46
43
37
39
44
47
41
43
42
41
45
42
42
43
41
42.2
54.68
51
44
47
46.23
43
47
45
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8
5

1804
1131
1003
1003
1206
974
1002

2
2
4
6
1
2
5
2
2
1
7
5
2
4
1
5
5
7
1
4
1
5
6
1
1
2
5
2.42
0.44
5
1
3
2.49
2
4
8

0.32
0.13

0.44

1127
1005
1000
1000
1501
659
1002
636
1103
1241
719
1501
1000
899
1004
1136
1405
1001
1000
1020
1018
500
1011
1502
1002
1229
1007
1001
1151
1503

6
5
2
4
5
5
4
2
5
2
4
2
6
5
2
5
4
5
5
6
4
5
2
5
6
2
4
2
5
1
1
6
4
5
1
4
5
6

Don't Know /
Yes, a No, not a
No
Number
Refused To
Source
mistake Mistake opinion
polled
Answer
Iraq (continued)
2006 Jan 6-8
2005 Dec 15-18
2005 Dec 16-18
2005 Dec 7-11
2005 Dec 9-11
2005 Dec 2-6
2005 Nov 11-13
2005 Oct 30 - Nov 02
2005 Oct 30 - Nov 01
2005 Oct 28-30
2005 Oct 21-23
2005 Oct 6-10
2005 Oct 3-5
2005 Sep 16-18
2005 Sep 9-13
2005 Sep 8-11
2005 Sep 8-11
2005 Aug 29-31
2005 Aug 28-30
2005 Aug 25-28
2005 Aug 5-7
2005 Jul 29 - Aug 2
2005 Jul 22-24
2005 Jul 13-17
2005 Jun 23-26
2005 Jun 24-26
2005 Jun 10-15
2005 Jun 8-12
2005 Jun 2-5
2005 May 20-24
2005 Apr 29-May 1
2005 Apr 21-24
2005 Apr 13-16
2005 Mar 18-20
2005 Mar 10-13
2005 Feb 24-28
2005 Feb 25-27
2005 Feb 16-21

50.02
52
52.15
48
48.23
48
54.01
60
50
53.51
49.05
50
55
59.56
50
44
53.16
49
53.14
53
53.94
46
45.96
44
53
53
51
45
58
49
49.27
54
48
46.02
53
50
47.31
47

47.47
46
46.1
47
50.24
48
45.25
39
42
45.24
49.13
44
41
38.59
44
49
45.64
45
46.17
46
44.16
48
52.73
49
46
46
45
47
41
47
47.97
44
47
50.92
45
46
50.93
47
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1.91
1
1.49
5
1.4
4
0.33
1
8
1.18
1.27
6
4
1.8
6
7
0.86
6
0.48
1
1.65
6
1.31
7
1

0.61
0.27
0.14
0.41

0.06
0.55

0.05

0.34
0.21
0.25
0

504
1003
1003
1502
1003
1155
481
1202
936
801
1008
1500
808
812
1167
1523
1005
~1000
1007
1006
485
1222
1006
1502
1004

1
4
8
1
4
2.29
2
5
2.7
2
4
1.26
6

0.46

0.37

0.51

1110
1464
1002
1150
485
1007
441
1001
1111
1008
1502

1
4
1
6
1
5
1
4
5
1
1
6
5
1
5
6
1
5
1
4
1
5
1
6
4
2
5
6
4
5
1
4
5
1
4
5
1
6

Don't Know /
Yes, a No, not a
No
Number
Refused To
Source
mistake Mistake opinion
polled
Answer
Iraq (continued)
2005 Jan 14-18
2005 Jan 12-16
2005 Jan 14-16
2005 Jan 5-9
2005 Jan 7-9
2004 Dec 16-19
2004 Dec 1-16
2004 Nov 18-21
2004 Nov 19-21
2004 Oct 29-31
2004 Oct 28-30
2004 Oct 27-30
2004 Oct 22-24
2004 Oct 15-19
2004 Oct 14-17
2004 Oct 14-16
2004 Oct 9-10
2004 Oct 1-3
2004 Oct 1-3
2004 Sep 23-26
2004 Sep 24-26
2004 Sep 8-13
2004 Sep 6-8
2004 Sep 3-5
2004 Aug 26-29
2004 Aug 23-25
2004 Aug 5-10
2004 Jul 30-Aug 1
2004 Jul 22-25
2004 Jul 19-21
2004 Jul 8-18
2004 Jul 11-15
2004 Jul 8-11
2004 Jun 23-27
2004 Jun 21-23
2004 Jun 17-20
2004 Jun 3-13
2004 Jun 3-6

49
55
51.68
44
50.21
56
44
48
47.36
44.49
44
41
47.15
42
46
46.82
45.83
39
47.49
51
41.86
39
45
37.71
50
48.2
41
47.75
48
49.7
43
51
53.55
46
53.85
52
38
41.36

45
44
47.3
51
47.63
42
49
46
51.23
51.74
52
48
51.16
46
50
51.66
52.87
50
51.22
46
55.31
53
51
57.42
48
49.52
53
50.02
49
46.75
52
45
45.53
48
44.16
47
55
57.53
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6
1
0.78
5
1.54
2
7
6
1.23
2.33
4
11
1.48
12
4
1.28
0.96
11
1.29
3
2.29
8
4
3.87
2
2.11
6
1.66
3
3.3
5
4
0.72
6
1.55
2
7
0.71

0.24
0.61

0.17
1.44

0.21

0.24
0.34
0
0.55

1
0.17
0.57
0.25

0.2
0.44

0.4

1118
1007
1007
1503
1008
1000
885
502
1036
1345
2804
1537
803
1048
1013
547
1233
1017
1204
1006
2494
1202
542
1000
471
1512
1011
1202
1005
2009
955
524
1053
512
1201
1806
496

5
4
1
6
1
4
6
5
1
1
5
6
1
6
5
1
1
6
1
4
1
6
4
1
4
1
6
1
4
1
6
5
1
5
1
4
6
1

Don't Know /
Yes, a No, not a
No
Number
Refused To
Source
mistake Mistake opinion
polled
Answer
Iraq (continued)
2004 May 20-23
2004 May 20-23
2004 May 11
2004 May 3-9
2004 May 7-9
2004 May 5-6
2004 Apr 23-27
2004 Apr 21-25
2004 Apr 15-18
2004 Apr 16-18
2004 Apr 1-4
2004 Mar 30 - Apr 1
2004 Mar 17-21
2004 Mar 10-14
2004 Mar 4-7
2004 Feb 24-29
2004 Feb 24-27
2004 Feb 11-16
2004 Feb 12-15
2004 Feb 10-11
2004 Jan 15-18
2004 Jan 12-15
2004 Jan 6-11
2003 Dec 19 - 2004 Jan 4
2003 Dec 21-22
2003 Dec 18-21
2003 Dec 15-17
2003 Dec 14-15
2003 Dec 14
2003 Nov 12-16
2003 Nov 3-5
2003 Oct 26-29
2003 Oct 20-21
2003 Oct 9-13
2003 Oct 6-8
2003 Oct 03
2003 Sep 10-13
2003 Sep 4-7

50
46
45
42
43.91
47
46
37
47
41.69
35
39
39
37
44
32
39
39
37
50
41
41.94
30
28
34
39
26
31
42
44
39.01
44
42
44
40.61
33
37
42

48
49
49
51
53.83
49
47
54
51
56.92
57
55
55
58
52
60
54
56
58
48
56
55.68
65
62
62
59
67
63
53
52
60.33
54
52
54
58.61
60
61
54
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1
5
6
7
2.25
5
7
9
2
1.23
8
6
6
5
3
8
7
5
5
2
3
1.76
5
10
4
2
7
6
5
4
0.66
2
6
2
0.41
7
2
4

0

0.16

0.63

0

0.37

1005
1113
448
1800
497
802
1042
1000
1201
512
790
1024
1703
~1000
1202
715
~1000
1500
1221
1003
1036
509
1503
1506
799
1001
815
635
506
1023
518
1207
571
1000
522
1104
1004

4
5
5
6
1
4
5
6
4
1
6
5
6
5
4
6
5
6
5
4
4
1
6
6
5
4
6
5
4
4
1
4
5
4
1
6
4
4

Don't Know /
Yes, a No, not a
No
Number
Refused To
Source
mistake Mistake opinion
polled
Answer
Iraq (continued)
2003 Sep 03
2003 Aug 20-24
2003 Jul 14 – Aug 5
2003 Jul 9-10
2003 Jul 7-9
2003 Jun 20 - Jul 2
2003 Jun 18-22
2003 Apr 27-30
2003 Apr 10-16
2003 Apr 8-9
2003 Apr 2-7
2003 Mar 28 - Apr 1
2003 Mar 25-27
2003 Mar 24-25
2003 Mar 23-24
2003 Mar 20-22
Afghanistan
2007 Mar 11
2007 Feb 25
2007 Jan 21
2006 Oct 2
2006 Aug 3
2004 Jul 19-21
2002 Sep 2-4
2002 Jan 25-27
2002 Jan 7-9
2001 Dec 6-9
2001 Nov 26-27
2001 Nov 9-15
2001 Nov 2-4
2001 Nov 8-11
2001 Oct 19-21
2001 Oct 11-14
2001 Oct 7

31
37
30
40
27.13
24
33
27
19
19
20
25
21
23.03
21
22

63
57
63
57
71.59
67
64
70
74
74
72
69
74
75.25
74
71

6
5
7
3
1.28
9
3
4
7
7
8
6
5
1.72
5
7

41
41
52
48
41
25.56
13.13
8.54
6.23
8.89
6.62
10.55
11.1
8.69
9.53
6.73
5.21

53
56
44
50
56
71.77
82.83
89.06
92.52
88.24
91.73
86.35
85.72
88.67
88.4
92.63
90.32

6
3
4
2
3
2.59
3.56
1.82
1.25
2.26

0.08
0.47
0.58
0
0.62

2.23

0.41

0.32

0.32
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0

0

1027
1082
1008

1.65
3.1
3.18
2.07
4.47

1024
2528
1006
508
1201
1024
1003
924
809
912
674
539
492
592
903

1005
1002
1012
498
1003
1025
2418
1012
523
1006
534
670

6
4
6
4
1
6
4
4
6
6
6
6
6
1
6
6
7
4
7
7
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Don't Know /
Yes, a No, not a
No
Number
Refused To
Source
mistake Mistake opinion
polled
Answer
Vietnam War
1973 Jan 12-15
1971 May 14-17
1971 Jan 8-11
1970 May 21-26
1970 Apr 2-7
1970 Jan 15-20
1969 Sep 17-22
1969 Jan 23-28
1968 Sep 26-Oct 1
1968 Aug 7-12
1968 Apr 4-9
1968 Feb 22-27
1968 Feb 1-6
1967 Dec 7-12
1967 Oct 6-11
1967 Jul 13-18
1967 Apr 19-24
1967 Jan 26-31
1966 Nov 10-15
1966 Sep 8-13
1966 May 5-10
1966 Mar 3-8
1965 Aug 27-Sep 1

60
61
60
56
51
57
58
52
54
53
48
49
46
45
47
41
37
32
31
35
36
26
24

29
28
31
36
34
32
32
39
37
35
40
42
42
46
44
48
50
52
52
48
49
59
60

11
11
9
8
15
11
10
9
9
12
12
9
12
9
9
11
13
16
17
17
15
15
16
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3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Don't Know /
Yes, a No, not a
No
Number
Refused To
Source
mistake Mistake opinion
polled
Answer
Korean War
1953 Jan 11-16
36
50
14
1952 Oct 17-22
43
37
19
1952 Oct 9-14
43
37
20
1952 Feb 28-Mar 5
51
35
14
1951 Aug 3-8
42
48
11
1951 Jun 16-21
43
40
17
1951 Apr 16-21
37
45
18
1951 Mar 26-31
45
43
12
1951 Feb 4-9
49
41
9
1951 Jan 1-5
49
38
13
1950 Aug 20-25
20
65
15
1: Data from Gallop Poll of date indicated
2: Data from Gallop's Pulse of Democracy: The War in Iraq (Gallop, 2006)
3: Data from American Public Opinion on Iraq: Five Conclusions (Newport, 2006)
4: Data from ABC of date indicated
5: Data from CBS of date indicated
6: Data from PEW of date indicated
7. Data from CNN of date indicated
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3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Table A-2: Questions Asked During Polling

Timeframe of
Question
Question
Do you approve or disapprove of the current U.S.
2001 - 2002 *
Afghanistan
military action in Afghanistan?
Do you think the United States made a mistake in
2004 *
Afghanistan
sending military forces to Afghanistan, or not?
All in all, considering the costs to the United States
2003-2006 versus the benefits to the United States, do you think
Iraq-ABC
the war with Iraq was worth fighting, or not?
Looking back, do you think the United States did the
2003-2006 right thing in taking military action against Iraq, or
Iraq-CBS
should the U.S. have stayed out?
In view of the developments since we first sent our
2003 troops to Iraq, do you think the United States made a
Iraq-Gallop
2006 * & **
mistake in sending troops to Iraq, or not?
Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the
2003-2006
Iraq-PEW
wrong decision in using military force against Iraq?
Feb. 1951 - Do you think the United States made a mistake in
Korea
Jan. 1953 *** going into the war in Korea, or not?
In view of the developments since we entered the
Aug. 1950 fighting in Korea, do you think the United States
Korea
Jan. 1951 ***
made a mistake in deciding to defend Korea, or not?
In view of the developments since we entered the
1965 - 1973 *** fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a
Vietnam
mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?
* Question from Gallop Poll of dates indicated
** Question from Gallop's Pulse of Democracy: The War in Iraq (Gallop, 2006)
*** Question from American Public Opinion on Iraq: Five Conclusions (Newport, 2006)
Conflict
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Appendix B: Monthly Data for Operations in Iraq

The data in Table B-1 is complied from data within the Iraq Index (O’Hanlon &
Kamp, 2006). The value in the table is the estimated data at the end of the month. Blue
casualties include the cumulative number of wounded and killed. The number of
insurgents, Red forces captured and killed, and daily attacks are the estimates as reported.
Table B-1: Complied Data from Iraq Index (O’Hanlon & Kamp, 2006)

Date
March-03
April-03
May-03
June-03
July-03
August-03
September-03
October-03
November-03
December-03
January-04
February-04
March-04
April-04
May-04
June-04
July-04
August-04
September-04
October-04
November-04
December-04
January-05
February-05
March-05
April-05
May-05

Days into
Conflict

Blue
Casualties

11
41
72
102
133
164
194
225
255
286
317
346
377
407
438
468
499
530
560
591
621
652
683
711
742
772
803

267
681
772
949
1222
1439
1717
2174
2593
2894
3128
3295
3668
5012
5847
6473
7079
8035
8818
9522
11056
11659
12205
12711
13099
13728
14420

Number of Red Captured
Daily Attacks
Insurgents
& Dead
0
2500
5000
5000
5000
5000
5000
5000
5000
5000
4000
4000
4000
5000
15000
15000
20000
20000
20000
20000
20000
21000
18000
18000
16000
16000
16000
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0
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
4750
5500
8500
9500
12000
14000
15750
17750
19750
20970
21970
24470
26970
28970
31970
33970
36470
37470
38470
39470
41470

0
0
0
8
16
18
25
32
32
19
19
21
24
53
53
45
47
77
58
61
77
52
61
54
45
60
70

Date
June-05
July-05
August-05
September-05
October-05
November-05
December-05
January-06
February-06
March-06
April-06
May-06
June-06
July-06
August-06
September-06
October-06
November-06
December-06

Days into
Conflict

Blue
Casualties

833
864
895
925
956
986
1017
1048
1076
1107
1137
1168
1198
1229
1260
1290
1321
1351
1382

14930
15449
16147
16722
17433
17995
18464
18841
19250
19727
20230
20701
21251
21735
22439
23301
24251
24828
25631

Number of Red Captured
Daily Attacks
Insurgents
& Dead
17500
19000
19000
19000
17500
17500
17500
17500
17500
17500
21000
21000
21000
21000
21000
21000
25000
25000
25000
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43470
45470
48470
51470
53470
55470
57470
59470
61470
63470
65470
67470
69970
72470
74970
77470
79970
82470
84970

70
70
70
90
100
90
75
75
75
75
80
100
100
140
160
170
180
175
175

Appendix C: Equations Created in Public Resolve Chapter

The regressions performed in this dissertation are implemented as equations
within the model of elements of fourth generation operations. This appendix provides the
equations developed in the earlier chapters. The name of the equations reflects the name
of the table used when developed previously.
The first line in each equation of the simple and multiple linear regression models
provide the coefficients and the associated R2 of the model. The second line provided the
standard error for each coefficient along with the root mean square error, or standard
error of the model in the last column. The third line shows the t-test statistic for each
coefficient, with the null hypothesis that the coefficient equaled zero (H0: βi = 0;
Ha: βi ≠ 0). The magnitude of the t-test statistic was compared to the appropriate
reference value from the two-sided t-distribution with α = 0.05 (located in the final
column) and the null hypothesis was rejected if the magnitude is greater than the critical
value (indicating strong evidence of a non-zero coefficient), or failed to reject (implying
there is little or no evidence suggesting that the coefficient is not zero). The F-test for the
model is included in the second to last line of each equation. (While redundant for
models with a single independent variable, it is provided for completeness.) The null
hypothesis for the F-test is that all of the coefficients are equal to zero (H0: βi = 0 ∀ i ;
Ha: βi ≠ 0 some at least one i). If the observed F-test statistic is larger than the
appropriate reference value from the F-distribution, then the null hypothesis is rejected
(indicating at least one coefficient is significant). The final line provides the number of
data points available for that conflict. If any coefficient or model was determined to be
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statistically insignificant the equation indicated this in bold markings. As
multicollinearity is present in several of the MLR models, care should be taken in
reviewing the results.
For the logistic regression equations, the summary of the regression coefficients
and standard error is presented in the first two lines for each of the factors. The third line
provides the χ2 term for each coefficient, which is a measure of goodness of fit where the
larger the number implies the better the fit. If any coefficient or model was determined to
be statistically insignificant, the equation indicated this in bold markings.
Equation C-1 represents Table V-1: Public Support for Korea per Time. (Not significant)
Public Support = 48.56 − 0.0109days
R 2 = 0.15
(4.76) (0.0088)
SE = 8.34
(C-1)
10.20
- 1.24
tα =0.05 = 2.23
F = 1.54 < Fα =0.05 = 4.96
N = 11

Equation C-2 represents Table V-2: Public Support for Vietnam (1965-1973) per Time.
Public Support = 60.13 − 0.0126days
R 2 = 0.85
(1.82) (0.0011)
SE = 3.64
(C-2)
33.12 − 11.02
tα =0.05 = 2.07
F = 121.47 > Fα =0.05 = 4.30
N = 23

Equation C-3 represents Table V-3: Public Support for Afghanistan per Time
Public Support = 90.33 − 0.01949days
R 2 = 0.95
(1.25) (0.0011)
SE = 4.02
72.29 − 17.06
tα =0.05 = 2.12
F = 291.09 > Fα =0.05 = 4.49
N = 18
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(C-3)

Equation C-4 represents Table V-4: Public Support for Iraq per Time
Public Support = 64.96 − 0.0204days
R 2 = 0.71
(0.76) (0.0010)
SE = 5.43
85.53 − 21.31
tα =0.05 = 2.26

(C-4)

F = 454.17 > Fα =0.05 = 5.10
N = 191

Equation C-5 represents Table V-5: Public Support for Vietnam (1965-1969) per Time
Public Support = 66.26 − 0.0185days
R 2 = 0.89
(1.99) (0.0017)
SE = 2.70
(C-5)
33.23 − 10.98
tα =0.05 = 2.12
F = 120.46 > Fα =0.05 = 4.49
N = 17

Equation C-6 represents Table V-7: Public Support for Korea per Casualty
Public Support = 114.46 − 14.89 Log10 (Cas )
R 2 = 0.83
(13.82) (2.39)
8.51 − 5.35

SE = 5.21
tα =0.05 = 2.07

(C-6)

F = 28.62 > Fα =0.05 = 4.26
N = 25

Equation C-7 represents Table V-8: Public Support for Vietnam per Casualty
Public Support = 124.98 − 16.51Log10 (Cas)
R 2 = 0.90
(6.04) (1.16)

SE = 3.20

20.69 − 13.66

tα =0.05 = 2.07

(C-7)

F = 186.57 > Fα =0.05 = 4.28
N = 24

Equation C-8 represents Table V-9: Public Support for Iraq per Casualty
Public Support = 108.51 − 15.02 Log10 (Cas )
R 2 = 0.85
(0.45)

SE = 3.84

61.77 − 33.09

tα =0.05 = 2.26

(1.76)

F = 1095.14 > Fα =0.05 = 5.10
N = 191
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(C-8)

Equation C-9 represents Table V-11: Public Support for Iraq (MLR Model)
Public Support
= 91.47 − 0.05957days − 7.322 log10 ( cas ) − 0.04030 Attacks + 0.0008418 Insurgents
(5.24) (0.01935)
17.47
− 3.08

(2.287)
− 3.20

R 2 = 0.87

SE = 3.72
t
= 1.97
α = 0.05
F = 295.69 > Fα =0.05 = 3.89

(0.01506)
− 2.68

(0.000272)
3.09

(C-9)

N = 191

Equation C-10 represents Table V-17: Public Support for Iraq (Two-Factor Analysis
Model using MLR)
Public Support = 51.11 − 4.77time − 7.91casualty
R 2 = 0.85
SE = 3.85
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
(C-10)
tα =0.05 = 2.07
183.64 − 17.26 − 28.69
F = 547.4 > Fα =0.05 = 3.89
N = 191

Equation C-11 represents Table V-19: Public Support for Iraq (Logistic Regression
Model) (Not significant)
Public Support

(

= 1 + e −2.42+ 0.00099 days + 0.552 Log10 ( cas ) + 0.00129 Attacks −1.77 e −05 Insurgents +5.87 e −07 ISF
6.4

−1

(0.00026) (5.30e − 06) (2.26e − 07)

(0.12) (0.0003) (0.048)
461.2

)

134.1

24.2

11.1

(C-11)

6.8

Dev = 809.6 > 219 = χα2 =0.05,186
N = 191

Equation C-12 represents Table V-20: Public Support for Iraq (Logistic Regression
Model Corrected for Overdispersion)
Public Support

(

= 1 + e −2.15+ 0.00204 days + 0.436 Log10 ( cas ) + 0.00162 Attacks −3.030 e −05 Insurgents
(0.22) (0.00077) (0.094)
98.81

6.96

21.55

(0.00056)

(1.08e − 05)

8.41

7.89

)

−1

Dev = 188 ≤ 219 = χα2 =0.05,186
N = 191
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(C-12)

Equation C-13 represents Table V-21: Public Support for Iraq (Factor Analysis Model
using Logistic Regression) (Not significant)
Public Support = (1 + e −0.103+ 0.191time + 0.334 casualty )

−1

(0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0056)
491.3 1831.6

(C-13)

3757.5

Dev = 974.4 > 221 = χα2 =0.05,188
N = 191

Equation C-14 represents Table V-22: Public Support for Iraq based on Percent of
Positive Stories
Public Support
= 43.12 + 30.16 PositiveStories

R 2 = 0.340
SE = 2.44

(0.97) (7.32)
44.25

t

4.12

α = 0.05

= 2.03

(C-14)

F = 16.97 > Fα =0.05 = 3.28
N = 35

Equation C-15 represents Table V-23: Public Support for Iraq based on Percent of
Negative Stories (Not significant)
Public Support
= 49.24 − 4.06 NegativeStories
(2.47) (3.95)
19.96 - 1.03

R 2 = 0.031
SE = 2.95

t

α = 0.05

= 2.03

(C-15)

F = 1.05 ≤ Fα =0.05 = 3.28
N = 35

Equation C-16 represents Table V-24: Public Support for Iraq (MLR with Percent of
Positive Media Reports)
Public Support
= 10.01log10 ( cas ) + 38.70 PositiveStories
(0.24)
41.36

(7.64)
5.06

R 2 = 0.997

SE = 2.60
t
= 2.03
α = 0.05
F = 5636.7 > Fα =0.05 = 3.28
N = 35
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(C-16)

Equation C-17 represents Table VII-1: Model of Daily Attacks
Daily Attacks = 3.20e − 07 BCAS 2 − 0.00465 BCAS + 0.00394 R
(5.6e − 08)

(0.0017)

(0.00071)

(5.71)

(−2.67)

(5.52)

R 2 = 0.96
SE = 16.6
tα =0.05 = 1.71 (C-17)

F = 370.06 > Fα =0.05 = 4.07
N = 44
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